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게슈탈트 놀이프로그램이 학령후기 아동의 자기수용에 미치는 효과
김채현,김숙희 한국아동심리재활학회 2020 놀이치료연구 Vol.24 No.1
본 연구는 게슈탈트 놀이 프로그램이 학령후기 아동의 자기수용에 미치는 효과를 알아보기 위해 실시되었다. 연구 대상은 초등학교 5, 6학년 아동 12명이다. 실험집단 6명, 통제집단 6명으로 각각 무선 배치하였다. 변화를 알아보기 위해, 자기보고식 자기수용검사를 실시하였고 프로그램 평가지를 분석하였으며, 자기수용 관련 행동을 관찰하였다. 본 연구 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 실험집단 아동의 자기수용 척도 점수가 사전에 비해 사후에 향상되었다. 둘째, 실험집단의 자기수용이 낮은 행동은 감소하고 자기수용이 높은 행동이 증가하는 양상을 보였다. 본 연구는 학령후기 아동의 자기수용을 증진시키는 데에 게슈탈트 놀이 프로그램이 유용할 수 있음을 시사한다. This study referred to the effects of Gestalt play program on the self-acceptance in late-school children. The subjects of this study were 5th and 6th grade in the elementary school children, Each of 6 persons was randomly assigned to the experimental and control group. To identify the change, the children's self-report peer self-acceptance tests were conducted, program evaluation were analyzed, expressions related to self-acceptance were observed. The results were as follows. First, the self-acceptance scale score of children in the experimental group was improved. Second, expressions with low self-acceptance decreased. And expressions with high self-acceptance were increased. This study suggested that The Gestalt play program could be useful for promoting the self-acceptance of late school children.
Effect of Co-Opted Board on Audit Fees
김채현,이은서,이준엽 한국국제회계학회 2020 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.89
In this study, we examine the effect of co-opted board on audit fees (as a proxy for audit quality), wherein the board comprises directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office. We use two measures developed by Coles et al.(2014) to calculate the co-opted board. First, we use CO-OPTION, which is the proportion of the board size comprising the co-opted board. Second, we use TW CO-OPTION, which is the sum of co-opted directors’ tenure divided by the sum of all directors’ tenure. Using a sample of 9,592 firm-year observations in the United States for the period 2000 to 2013, we find that having a high proportion of co-opted board members leads to a decrease in audit quality. This is reflected in the negative relationship between co-opted board and audit fees. This evidence is consistent with the notion that board composition and the effectiveness of board monitoring play significant roles in determining audit fees. Overall, our results are consistent with those of prior studies that co-opted board imposes weak monitoring. In addition, our study contributes to the auditing literature by showing how board composition and monitoring effectiveness influence audit fees.