1900~1940년 왕립아시아학회 한국지부와 서양인들의 한국 연구

이영미 ( Lee Yeong-mi ) 인하대학교 한국학연구소 2021 한국학연구 Vol.- No.62

On June 16th, 1900, seventeen Western people gathered at the reading room, Seoul Union, and founded the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (Korea Branch). It was established as a branch of the British academic association which received its charter in 1824, but its founding fathers were residents in Korea, rather than those in London. They held regular meetings for research presentation and published Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (Transactions). They barely received intervention of the headquarters. It settled in the early 1910s after some difficulty, and had been the center of Korean studies for about thirty years until the Japanese forced American missionaries to leave Korea. It was reestablished by a few American and British people on December 18th, 1947. Last year saw its 120th year. This article reviews the early history of the Korea Branch between 1900 and 1940, and divides it into three stages (1900-1916, 1917-1928 and 1929- 1940). First, George H. Jones (1867-1919), Homer B. Hulbert (1863-1949) and James S. Gale (1863-1937) had a major role in its foundation. Especially, Gale contributed to its settlement after Jones and Hulbert left Korea. Secondly, some Anglican missionaries had a real enthusiasm for Korean studies. Under the influence Eli B. Landis (1865-1898), missionary and scholar like Jones, Hulbert and Gale, Mark N. Trollope (1862-1930) published his research to Transactions in the initial period. He had been elected as president almost every year since 1917, and helped his colleagues study Korea. Finally, in the end of 1920s, second generation of American missionaries in Korea started leading the Korea Branch. Among them, Harold J. Noble (1903-1953) and George M. McCune (1908-1948) got a doctor’s degree in Korean studies and entered the world of academia in the United States. Around the same time, Andreas Eckardt (1883-1974), Catholic missionary, got a doctor’s degree as well and became a pioneer in Korean studies in Germany.

한국SGI 성장의 차원에서 본 부산의 포교와 발전-SGI 전개와 문화회관의 형성을 중심으로-

김현석 한국신종교학회 2022 신종교연구 Vol.47 No.-

Korea SGI stands for Korea Soka Gakkai International, a new religion that started its activities when the Japanese Soka Gakkai (創価学会) was introduced into Korea. The Soka Gakkai is one of the representative religious groups of new religions of Japanese origin, enjoying a fairly stable religious influence compared to other new religions. Established modeling the organizational structure of the Soka Gakkai, Korea SGI operates with its own sub-organizations and has ‘Districts’ [方面] centered around a large city as well as ‘Zones’ [圈] in the sub-administrative regions of the city. As of August 2022, Korean SGI is known to have 46 Districts and 146 Zones across the country. The fact that a city has well-established Districts and Zones means that the city has a large number of members and well-established Culture Centers for them. Culture Centers are religious facilities of SGI Korea, where its members can engage in basic religious activities, thus serving as the most active hubs for the believers. Currently, the Districts, Zones, and Culture Centers are most well established in the cities of Busan and Daegu, as well as in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do. All these regions have in common that the members of the Soka Gakkai formed small organizations from the time the Soka Gakkai was introduced into Korea, and that makes them considerably significant in the propagation history of Korea SGI in Korea. This is why this study examines the introduction and development of Korea SGI in Busan as well as the current state of its propagation there. In the past, Busan served as the Busan-Gyeongsang General Headquarters of Korea SGI, which was later divided into three General Headquarters, and then started to expand its influence while carrying out its regional activities. These three General Headquarters later developed into ‘Zones,’ which underwent the process of being divided into smaller ‘Zones’ several times over time and played a key role in shaping the’Districts’ and ‘Zones’ in present-day Busan. Of course, Busan witnessed the development of Culture Centers along the way, establishing 13 Culture Centers. However, the believers in the Yeongdo Zone could not keep their own Culture Center recently and are renting out the Culture Center instead, which means that Busan currently operates and manages 12 Culture Centers. Nevertheless, Busan still boasts of the second most Districts, Zones, and Culture Centers after Seoul and Gyeonggi-do, and this proves that there are many active believers in Busan with a stable religious influence. With this in mind, this study attempts to examine the organizational system of Korea SGI, the development and current status of its Culture Centers, and the spread of SGI Korea in Busan from the time the Soka Gakkai was introduced to the present day. It is hopefully expected that an understanding of what the process of the propagation and development of Korea SGI looked like in Busan, which played a major role in stabilizing Korea SGI today, will be of great help to understanding the development process and the current status of its propagation in Korea. 한국SGI는 한국 창가학회(Korea Soka Gakkai International)라는 의미로 일본의 창가학회(創価学会)가 국내로 유입되면서 활동을 시작한 종교이다. 오늘날 일본계 신종교를 대표하는 종교 단체 중 하나로 다른 신종교와 비교해도 상당히 안정적인 교세를 보인다. 일본 창가학회의 조직구조를 참고하여 확립한 한국SGI는 큰 도시를 중심으로 방면(方面)을 구성하고, 그 도시의 하위 행정 지역을 권(圈)으로 구축하여 다시 한국SGI 나름의 아래 조직을 두고 활동을 하고 있다. 2022년 8월 기준 한국SGI는 46개의 방면, 146개의 권으로 이루어져 있다. 이 방면과 권이 고루 확립된 도시가 그만큼 신자들도 많고, 신자들이 이용하는 문화회관도 잘 구축되어 있다는 것을 의미한다. 여기서 문화회관은 한국SGI의 종교시설로 신자들의 기초적인 종교 활동을 할 수 있는 곳이므로 접근이 가장 활발한 장소이기도 하다. 현재 방면과 권, 그리고 문화회관은 서울과 경기도를 비롯한 부산과 대구가 가장 많이 형성되어 있다. 이들 지역은 창가학회가 유입될 시기부터 작은 조직을 형성하여 활동한 도시라는 공통점이 있다. 그래서 한국SGI에서도 상당히 의미가 있고, 중요한 도시임에는 틀림이 없다. 그런 의미에서 이번 연구에서는 먼저 부산에 집중하여 부산의 한국SGI 유입과 전개 과정 그리고 오늘날의 포교 현황을 살펴보고자 한다. 부산은 과거 경상남도와 함께 부산에 거점을 두고 부(산)경(남)총합본부로 활동을 하였다. 이후 3개의 총합본부로 나뉘면서 본격적으로 지역적 활동을 개시해나가며, 부산의 교세를 넓혀나갔다. 이 3개의 총합본부는 훗날 권으로 발전하여 몇 번의 분권을 거치면서 오늘날 부산의 방면과 권을 형성하는 데 중요한 역할을 한다. 물론 이 과정에서 문화회관도 함께 발전하여 13개의 문화회관을 구축하기도 한다. 하지만, 최근 영도권 신자들의 회관이 없어지면서 임차회관을 이용하고 있다. 고로 현재 부산은 12개의 문화회관을 운영ㆍ관리하고 있다고 할 수 있다. 여전히 방면과 권, 문화회관의 현황은 서울과 경기도에 이어 3번째로 많은 도시이다. 그만큼 활동하는 신자가 있고, 교세 또한 안정되어 있다는 방증이다. 따라서, 본 논문은 한국SGI의 조직체계와 문화회관의 전개와 현황을 부산이라는 도시에 적용하여 창가학회로 유입될 당시부터 오늘날까지의 부산은 어떠한 전개 과정을 거치면서 한국SGI가 포교가 되었는지 검토하고자 한다. 오늘날 한국SGI의 교세의 안정화에 큰 역할을 한 부산의 포교와 발전 과정을 파악한다면 필시 한국SGI의 국내 전개 과정과 포교 현황을 이해하는 데 큰 도움이 될 것이다.

한국전쟁 시기 북한의 대(對)중국 번역 기획 - 북한의 대외 홍보 기관지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』 연구

등천 한국문학연구학회 2023 현대문학의 연구 Vol.- No.79

The purpose of this study is to comprehensively investigate the activities for the translation of New Korea, a Chinese monthly journal published in North Korea in the 1950s, and to examine the translation of North Korean literature during the Korea War. New Korea (Saejoseon), which is North Korea’s public relations organization, was founded in January 1950 as a Russian version by Saejoseon Prehistory, and the Chinese version was published from January 1951. From January 1951 to December1953, New Korea contained a total of 50 novels and poems based on the Korean War, establishing a unique genealogy of translation of war literature. Due to the urgent situation of war and the strict limitation of the literary column, the translators of New Korea were able to move on to rewriting the original work through intentional mistranslation and significant corrections. This ‘rewrite’ is also another proof of the association of national ideology. The literary works translated through New Korea consist of three types: the narratives of war heroes, the narratives of suffering and resistance, and the narratives of friendship among North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The three narrative types show similarities to North Korean literature translated and introduced by contemporary China, but reveal subtle differences in the proportion of each type, text selection, and specific translation methods. This difference is most clearly embodied in the narratives of friendship between North Korea and China. By using New Korea as a case to study North Korea’s translation activities, this study attempts to offer a fresh perspective for scholars both in China and South Korea. It examines the complex relationship between war and literature, as well as that between ideology and translation activities. It reevaluates the communication between China and North Korea concerning translation in the 1950s, when Cold War discourses were formed, including their collaborations and disagreements. 이 연구는 북한에서 발행한 대(對)중국 홍보 기관지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』을 학계 최초로 검토하고, 한국전쟁 기간 북한 번역주체가 기획한 자국문학의 중국어 번역 작업을 고찰하는 것을 목표로 삼는다. 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 북한 번역자가 중국어로 번역하고 중국 독자들이 수용하는 독특한 성격을 지닌 대외 홍보 미디어다. 1951년 1월 창간호부터 1953년 12월까지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 6·25전쟁을 소재로 삼은 소설과 시가를 총 50여 편 수록함으로써 전쟁문학 번역의 독특한 계보를 구축했다. 이 작품들은 인민군의 전투 과정에 집중한 영웅서사, 북한 인민을 형상화한 수난·저항서사, 조소·조중의 친선 관계를 다룬 우호서사의 세 가지 유형으로 구성된다. 『새조선(新朝鮮)』 번역주체는 3대 서사를 체계적으로 번역함으로써 ‘조국해방전쟁’의 정당성을 재삼 역설하고 북한·소련·중국의 동맹관계를 공고히 하여 전쟁의 승리를 확보하는 데 선전지로서의 역할을 충실히 수행했다. 전쟁이라는 급박한 상황과 문예란의 엄격한 지면 제한으로 『새조선(新朝鮮)』의 번역주체는 ‘의도적 오역’과 대폭적인 첨삭을 통해 원작에 대한 ‘다시 쓰기’로 나아갈 수 있었다. 이런 ‘다시 쓰기’는 ‘조국해방전쟁’ 문학이 가진 ‘내부적 결속력’을 중국 독자의 공감을 일으킬 수 있는 ‘외부적 연대력(連帶力)’으로 전환시키는 중요한 수단이다. 한국전쟁 기간 동안 북한 작가들의 다양한 문학적 시도와 이로 인한 북한 문학장의 역동성을 중국 독자에게 전달했다는 점에서 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 중요한 문학사적인 의미를 지니고 있다. 이에 대한 연구를 통해 전쟁과 문학, 이데올로기와 번역 실천이 맺고 있는 복합적인 층위를 체계적으로 규명할 수 있다.

독도문제와 한ㆍ미ㆍ일 공조체제의 미래

이성우 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2010 국제지역연구 Vol.13 No.4

This paper discusses the tri-lateral relationship among South Korea, the United States, and Japan which is remarked as the most critical part of international dynamics in East Asia. Concerning historical and territorial issues, South Korea and Japan have maintained a relationship of traditional rivalry and the U. S. has been recognized as a major power in the area. This paper tests the positive state hypothesis and the responsive state hypothesis about Japanese foreign policy behavior under the given circumstances. While the responsive state hypothesis argues that Japan has minimized its response to conflicts with neighbor countries, the positive state hypothesis explains that Japan have taken an aggressive stance to its neighbor countries concerning territorial and historical issues like the Dok-Do issue. This paper argues Japan has adopted a dual-stances. With passive foreign policy, Japan has tried to achieve support from the United State. At the same time, Japan employed an aggressive and positive stance to achieve its policy goal regarding the territorial issue. The time series analysis informs that the U. S. has been cooperative to South Korea when Japan takes conflictual stance to South Korea. When South Korean leads the cooperative relationship with Japan, the U. S. decreases the cooperation with South Korea. On the other hand, when Japan leads the cooperative relationship to South Korea, the U. S. increases the cooperation with South Korea. These results can be interpreted that the U. S. has competed with Japan concerning bilateral relationship with South Korea. This paper argues Japan has adopted a dual-stances. With passive foreign policy, Japan has tried to achieve support from the United State. At the same time, Japan employed an aggressive and positive stance to achieve its policy goal regarding the territorial issue. The time series analysis informs that the U. S. has been cooperative to South Korea when Japan takes conflictual stance to South Korea. When South Korean leads the cooperative relationship with Japan, the U. S. decreases the cooperation with South Korea. On the other hand, when Japan leads the cooperative relationship to South Korea, the U. S. increases the cooperation with South Korea. These results can be interpreted that the U. S. has competed with Japan concerning bilateral relationship with South Korea. 본 연구는 동아시아의 국제정치 역학관계에서 중요한 의미를 차지하는 한국, 미국, 일본의 3 자관계를 다루고 있다. 전통적인 라이벌 구도를 유지해온 한국과 일본의 첨예한 대립이 일어나는 상황과 관련하여 미국과 관련하여 일본의 행태에 대한 적극국가 가설과 반응국가 가설의 이론을 경험적 분석을 통해 검증하였다. 일본은 전통적으로 주변국가와의 갈등이나 비판에 최소한의 적응만 수행하는 반응국가의 행태를 보여 왔지만 독도 문제와 같은 민감한 영토문제와 관련하여 보면 적극적이며 공세적인 입장을 취한다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 일본은 강대국인 미국에 대해서는 반응적 행동을 취하면서 후원과 지지를 획득하는 동시에 주변국과의 영토와 역사문제에 있어서는 공세적인 적극적 행동을 취했다고 주장한다. 본 연구는 시계열 분석을 통해 미국은 일본의 공세적인 대외정책에 대해서 한국에 대해 갈등을 줄였다는 점에서 한국과의 관계에 호의를 보이고 일본에 대하여 지지하지 않음을 의미하는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 한국이 일본과 협력을 주도하는 경우 미국은 한국에 대하여 협력을 감소시켰지만 일본이 한국과 협력을 주도하는 경우 미국은 한국에 대해 협력을 강화시켰다. 이 결과는 미국은 한국과의 관계에서 일본과 경쟁을 했음을 의미하는 것을 해석할 수 있다.

China's Nonferrous Metals Industry and Implications for Korea-China FTA Negotiations

고정오,조정란 인하대학교 정석물류통상연구원 2013 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS AND TRADE Vol.11 No.3

Korea and China have promoted a bilateral FTA since 2005 to upgrade their economic relationships. If the Korea-China FTA is concluded, then trade between the two countries is likely to involve substantial changes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Offer lists submitted by Korea include steel, petrochemicals and machinery and those by China include some agricultural and marine products as well as nonferrous metals. Korea's interest in the Korea-China FTA has focused mainly on damage to the agricultural sector and there have been a lot of studies on the effects of the FTA on Korean agricultural sector. However, little is known about why China includes the nonferrous metals industry for early voluntary liberalization and its implications for the domestic economy. Nonferrous metals industry is one of China’s national strategic sectors and has a large supply excess in the country. This study targets the survey of Chinese nonferrous metals industry and trade structure and considers the problem of nonferrous metals in the context of negotiations for the Korea-China FTA and its implications for a higher-quality Korea-China FTA. Korea and China have promoted a bilateral FTA since 2005 to upgrade theireconomic relationships. If the Korea-China FTA is concluded, then trade between the two countries is likely to involve substantial changes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Offer lists submitted by Korea include steel, petrochemicals and machinery and those by China include some agricultural and marine products as well as nonferrous metals. Korea's interest in the Korea-China FTA has focused mainly on damage to the agricultural sector and there have been a lot of studies on the effects of the FTA on Korean agricultural sector. However, little is known about why China includes the nonferrous metals industry for early voluntary liberalization and its implications for the domestic economy. Nonferrous metals industry is one of China’s national strategic sectors and has a large supply excess in the country. This study targets the survey of Chinese nonferrous metals industry and trade structure and considers the problem of nonferrous metals in the context of negotiations for the Korea-China FTA and its implications for a higher-quality Korea-China FTA.

The Policies of South KOREA’s Counter Intelligence Agency on North Korea’s ESPIONAGE Activities in South Korea

Jo Sung gu J-INSTITUTE 2018 Protection Convergence Vol.3 No.2

At the present, South Korea ’s security is as urgent as North Korea’s denuclearization because North Korea’s espionage is very active. The core to espionage in Korea is that, since the Korean War following the invasion of North Korea, most terrorist activities and espionage activities have been executed by North Korea, anti communist investigation has targeted the North Korean regime. However, while South Korea underwent a democratic regime transfer, some regimes have been friendly to North Korea according, and counter intelligence agency dealing with intelligence on North Korea caused rapid changes to power transfer, reduction of organization, and personnel, so it is not possible to pursue the policy of counter intelligence activities coherently. Therefore, in this study, I have examined the security strategy of the Korean counter intelligence agency against North Korean espionage activities for college students majoring in security at Korean universities at the present time starting with the incident of a North Korean female spy, who was disguised as an employee for a cafe located in Gyeongsan-shi, Gyeongbuk and who was arrested after handing over the intelligence gathered on North Korean defectors to North Korea in 2014. First, South Korea’s counter intelligence manpower should be increased. Second, the legal grounds for South Korea’s counter intelligence activities should be further expanded. Third, it is necessary to develop various techniques of counter intelligence activities in South Korea. Fourth, the scope of counter intelligence activities should be expanded in Korea. Fifth, South Korea’s counter intelligence education should be expanded. Sixth, South Korea’s counter intelligence agencies should expand investigative cooperation. As a result of the study, I was able to derive such results and have presented directions for North Korea’s espionage activities based on the political environment in Korea.

Korea-Japan Relations during the Second Republic of Korea: A Counterfactual Analysis of the Aborted Korea-Japan Normalization

윤태룡 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2009 평화학연구 Vol.10 No.2

This paper purports to provide a counterfactual analysis of a non-event during the Second Republic of Korea, that is, the aborted Korea-Japan Normalization. The author argues that without General Park Chung Hee’s military coup on May 16, 1961, the rapprochement between the two former enemies would have been possible during the Second Republic of Korea. The ongoing process of negotiations for diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan would have been accelerated and have reached the ultimate goal but for the military’s unconstitutional toppling down of the first democratic regime in South Korea. Many experts argue that President Park’s strong leadership or the U.S. pressure is the main reason for the achievement of Korea-Japan Normalization. However, based on counterfactual analysis, this paper concludes that Korea-Japan Normalization would have been achieved much earlier than the year of 1965 when the two states actually reached an agreement only after spending four years of tough bargaining after the coup in South Korea. This paper purports to provide a counterfactual analysis of a non-event during the Second Republic of Korea, that is, the aborted Korea-Japan Normalization. The author argues that without General Park Chung Hee’s military coup on May 16, 1961, the rapprochement between the two former enemies would have been possible during the Second Republic of Korea. The ongoing process of negotiations for diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan would have been accelerated and have reached the ultimate goal but for the military’s unconstitutional toppling down of the first democratic regime in South Korea. Many experts argue that President Park’s strong leadership or the U.S. pressure is the main reason for the achievement of Korea-Japan Normalization. However, based on counterfactual analysis, this paper concludes that Korea-Japan Normalization would have been achieved much earlier than the year of 1965 when the two states actually reached an agreement only after spending four years of tough bargaining after the coup in South Korea.

미 오바마 시대의 한·미 경제통상과 FTA

최원목 법무부 2009 통상법률 Vol.- No.85

오바마 시대의 미국은 새로운 무역장벽을 설치하는 식의 보호무역주의를 채택하지는 않을 것이나, 경제위기 극복의 필요성과 공정무역 패러다임에 입각하여 전세계 통상관계를 재조명할 것이다. 한․미 통상관계도 예외일 수 없으며, 교역불균형과 과도한 정부규제에 대한 미국의 압력이 증가하여 양국간의 마찰과 갈등이 심화될 것이다. 한-미 FTA 비준 문제와 관련, 정권교체기와 경제위기에 직면한 미국은 이 문제에 대한 본격적 검토를 미루고 있어, 앞으로 FTA 재협상을 요구할지 여부는 미지수이다. 다만, 실물경제 위기가 심화되고, 자동차 산업의 파산에 대한 적절한 국내대책이 마련되지 못하면, 최소한 한정된 의제의 FTA 부분 재협상이나 추가협상을 요구할 가능성이 크다. 이러한 시기에 한미 FTA를 발효시켜야 하는 것은 양국이 해결해야할 역사적 사명이다. FTA 재협상과 같은 난제를 푸는 길은 우리측이 미리 FTA를 일방적으로 비준하여, '재협상 절대 불가'의 배수진을 치는 것이 아니라, '재협상 불가'는 일관되게 외치되 비준시기를 조절하여, 향후 있을지 모르는 추가협상 국면에 차분히 대비하는 것이다. 오바마 행정부와 의회가 준비도 되기 전인 지금 우리 쪽에서 밀어붙인다면 오히려 이슈는 더욱 국내정치화 되어, 미국 정부로서도 비준안을 의회에 상정하기가 더 어려워진다. 그러므로 앞으로 꾸준히 미국 정부와 의회의 동향을 주시하여, 미측이 비준문제에 관한 본격적인 검토를 마치고 재협상 문제가 일단락되어 하원에 비준안을 상정할 것이 뚜렷해지는 시기에 맞추어, 우리측이 먼저 비준안을 통과시켜야 한다. 만일 재협상 국면이 도래하여, 우리가 타협하는 것이 파국을 막을 수 있는 유일한 길인 상황이 벌어지면, 우리측도 면밀히 준비한 협상카드를 공세적으로 제시하여 새로운 이익의 균형을 추구해야 한다. 이런 의미에서, 자동차 부문에서 협정문의 본질을 해하지 않는 범위에서 추가적인 합의를 도출하고, 개성공단 문제에 관한 진전을 양측이 교환하는 것은 FTA 상호 비준이라는 난제를 푸는 하나의 방안이다. 앞으로 오바마 시대에 대비하기 위한 우리 통상정책의 방향은 미 의회를 자극하거나 양국간의 갈등요인을 방치하는 것이 아니라, 국내의 식품검사․유통제도를 과학화·선진화하고 각 분야의 과도한 규제를 완화하는 것이어야 한다. 이러한 '예방 통상외교'를 대미통상정책의 기조로 함으로써, 불필요한 통상마찰의 가능성을 줄여나가는 것은 불확실성이 증폭되는 시기에 강대국을 상대하는 우리의 운명적 전략이며 지혜이다. 아울러 우리도 경제위기가 가속화되고 있는 만큼, 대내적 비효율성을 줄이는 방향으로 경제 구조조정을 하면서, 정부정책의 대국민 신뢰성을 회복하는 것이 시급한 과제이다. It is a general view that the United States under Barack Obama's leadership will not take strong protectionist approaches in dealing with foreign trade, but it is likely that the United States would reassess and restructure its trade relationship with the world. Given the economic crisis that the U.S. economy is undergoing, and its concerns about unbalanced automobile trade with Korea, such issues as trade imbalance and excessive regulations in Korea-U.S. bilateral trade could be major trade agenda between the two countries. With respect to the ratification issue of the Korea-U.S. FTA, President Obama and U.S. Congress have yet to complete their evaluation on whether to proceed with ratification or to demand renegotiation. As economic crisis progresses and if no substantial rescue plan for U.S. automobile industry is agreed between the administration and congress in the United States, it is likely that the Obama Administration will make official renegotiation requests of Korea-U.S. FTA with a limited scope of agenda focusing on automobile trade. In order to prepare for this possible scenario, Korea should not unilaterally ratify the FTA at this moment, but rather it must set its ratification schedule after Washington's move becomes predictable. In the meantime, Seoul needs to put on the scales what to give and what to take in the possible renegotiation process so as to explore new balance of interests between the two economies. If the renegotiation actually becomes unavoidable, Korea must use its prepared cards aggressively. As a quid pro quo in return for its concessions in the automobile sector, Korea may demand from the U.S side certain concessions regarding the issue of rules of origin of products produced in the Kaesung Industrial Complex in North Korea. After all, a basic direction of Korean trade policy in this changed environment should be the "Preventive Trade Diplomacy" by which possible disputes with trade partners can be effectively prevented. Food safety and agricultural inspection systems in Korea need to be upgraded and be thoroughly based on scientific evidence. By doing this, possibilities of unnecessary trade frictions and disputes between Korea and the United States, two long-time allies in Asia, could be substantially reduced in an era of uncertainty. As Korea is also going through serious economic downturn, internal economic restructuring works need to take place so as to reduce internal inefficiencies.

한미FTA 재협상 가능성과 비준 전망

최병일 법무부 2009 통상법률 Vol.- No.87

Korea and the United States have yet to ratify the Korea-US FTA('KORUS FTA'). Considering that the ruling party has majority seats at the National Assembly, ratification in Korea is not much contested. Rather than a matter of 'whether,' it is a matter of 'when.' In this regard, there has been a heated debate: some claimed the wisdom of ratifying ahead of the U.S., while others have argued for a 'wait and see' approach due to the uncertainty of the U.S. ratification of the KORUS FTA. Whereas the new Obama administration places high value on the KORUS FTA in terms of enormous economic opportunities, strengthening of the Korea-US alliance, and improving the leverage of the U.S. in the North East Asia, it is unlikely to move forward without addressing its concern on automobile. The Korean government made it clear that it would not renegotiate the auto provision of the KORUS FTA. It does not want to reopen the KORUS FTA, because it believes the current agreement reflects a well balanced interest between the two countries. On the other hand, the U.S. is still delaying the ratification of the KORUS FTA in search for a solution to deal with its concern on automobile. In this context, the moves of the two countries regarding the ratification of the KORUS FTA are strategically linked. If Korea fails to ratify ahead of the U.S. while it has a chance to do so, it will commit a major strategic blunder. Washington will consider it as a willingness of Korea to accommodate the U.S. request for renegotiation. Renegotiating the automobile provision is a flawed idea, in terms of economics, international code of conduct, and consequences to future negotiating leverage of Korea. Should the U.S. come to ask for a renegotiation in the automobile sector, Korea would be brought to demand concessions in other sectors, in order to maintain an equitable balance. In the course of this process, it is very likely that the debate will spill beyond the strict boundaries of technicality of trade negotiations, and fuel broader conflicts in the Korean society. The political instability in Korea may do harm to the Korea-U.S. alliance. Korea and the U.S. should refrain from renegotiations. Instead, they should look for a mutually acceptable course of action, because saving the KORUS FTA is in the interests of Korea and the U.S. The benefits Korea could get from an early ratification are three-fold: first, Korea will send a strong message to the world community by translating into action a perception shared by world leaders that the return to protectionism is a foil to be avoided at all costs in the search of a way to overcome the current global economic crisis, second, Korea could put an end to the domestic debates nurtured by partisan groups that seek to take undue political advantage by caviling at the KORUS FTA, third, it could put a substantial strain on a potential U.S. demand for renegotiations in the automobile sector. Washington will be less inclined to demand for renegotiations, more inclined to look for other options. The strategic approach to a way forward for the KORUS FTA has three main components: first, Seoul should seize the momentum and ratify the agreement ahead of Washington, second, Seoul needs to rally the supporters of the KORUS FTA in the U.S. so that they convey the unequivocal message to Washington that renegotiations on auto is a recipe for disaster, third, Seoul should clinch the Korea-EU FTA at the earliest possible time so that Washington comes to recognize the ever-increasing cost of delaying the ratification of the KORUS FTA. These strategic moves will substantially diminish the likelihood of the U.S. request for renegotiation and pave the way for a more amicable solution. While the complaints of the Congress and auto industry push the U.S. government to take a more aggressive stance, Washington will also have to make a room to maneuver for Seoul. The outcome of international negotiations between sovereign nations reflects the balance between the interests of domestic stakeholder and foreign counterpart. One needs to be reminded that the additional negotiations of the NAFTA eventually failed to materialize the extreme demand of the U.S. labor and environment group. The strategic moves mentioned above will remove a major roadblock for the ratification of the KORUS FTA. As a result, the enforcement of the KORUS FTA may be in sight. 한미FTA가 발효되기 위한 한국과 미국에서의 비준이 아직 이루어지지 않고 있다. 비준동의안은 현재 한국에서는 외교통상통일위원회를 통과하고 국회 본회의에서의 표결을 남겨두고 있다. 한미FTA를 지지하는 여당이 다수당인 상황에서 비준동의안 통과보다는 그 시기가 문제이다. 한국 정치권은 한미FTA의 비준시기에 대해 격론을 벌여왔다. 한국이 먼저 비준하여야 한다는 '선비준론'과 비준을 미루고 미국의 움직임을 주시하자는 '관망론'이 대립되어 왔다. 미국은 한미FTA의 경제적 기회, 한미동맹강화, 동북아시아에서의 미국의 입지강화에 긍정적인 영향을 인식하면서도 자동차분야의 불만 때문에 현재 체결된 한미FTA를 그대로 수용하는 것에는 부정적이다. 한국정부의 공식적인 입장은 "자동차분야 재협상은 없다"는 것이다. 한국정부는 현재 체결된 한미FTA를 그대로 발효시키길 희망한다. 미국은 아직까지는 어떠한 방식으로 그들의 불만을 해소할 수 있을지에 해법을 찾아내지 못했다. 이런 상황에서 한국과 미국의 비준은 전략적으로 연계되어 있다. 한국이 먼저 비준할 수 있는 기회가 왔을 때 이를 전략적으로 활용하지 않는다면, 미국은 자동차 문제 해법의 하나로 기존 협정문을 수정하는 재협상도 적극적으로 고려할 것이다. 자동차 분야 재협상은 논리적으로나, 국제협상의 관례로 보나, 향후 국제협상에서의 한국의 입지를 고려해 볼 때, 심각한 문제점들을 내포하고 있다. 한국과 미국은 재협상을 차단하면서 한미FTA를 살릴 수 있는 길을 모색해야 한다. 한국이 먼저 비준함으로써 얻게 되는 효과는 세 가지이다. 첫째, 21세기 최초의 글로벌 경제위기를 극복하기 위해서는 보호주의로 회귀해서는 안 된다는 세계지도자들의 공통된 인식을 한국이 행동으로 보여준다. 둘째, 한미FTA를 흠집 내서 정치적인 반사이익을 챙기려는 집단에게 국내적으로 한미FTA논쟁은 종결되었음을 선언하고 정부는 다른 중요한 국정과제에 집중할 수 있게 된다. 셋째, 한미FTA의 자동차 분야를 변경하자는 미국의 재협상 요구를 상당히 부담스럽게 만들 수 있다. 한국이 먼저 비준하게되면 한국은 명분싸움에서 미국을 압도하게 된다. 미국이 자동차 분야의 불만을 터트리는 와중에 한국이 FTA를 비준하지 않고 있다면, 미국은 한국정부가 재협상할 생각과 의지가 있다고 판단하게 될 것이다. 재협상을 원하지 않는 한국이 미국에게 나서서 재협상을 요구해달라고 초청하는 형국을 자초하는 셈이다. 미국이 자동차 분야 재협상을 요구하게 되면 협상의 균형을 맞추기 위해 한국은 다른 분야도 협상테이블 위에 올려놓고자 할 것이고 재협상 의제에 대한 논란이 다시 한국정국을 가열시키고, 정쟁의 수단으로 전락할 가능성이 크다. 비준을 미루는 경우, 한국이 챙길 경제적인 실리도 없다. 미국이 재협상을 고집하는 경우 그 파장이 어떨지 미국도 내다 볼 수 있다. 한국과 미국 모두 한미FTA를 성공적으로 비준하기 위한 전략적 접근법의 기본방향은 세 가지이다. 첫째, 한국은 미국 보다 먼저 비준할 수 있는 기회가 앞에 있을 때 적극 활용해야 한다. 둘째, 미국 내 한미FTA 지지세력을 적극 활용하여 자동차 재협상은 한미FTA를 파괴할 수 있음을 인식시킨다. 셋째, 한-EU FTA를 조속히 타결시켜 미국으로 하여금 한미FTA 비준을 계속 지연하는 경우 그들이 입게 될 손실을 확실하게 인지시킨다. 이러한 접근법은 한국이 원하지 않는 미국의 재협상요구 가능성을 약화시킬 수 있으며 미국으로 하여금 재협상이 아닌 보다 창조적인 해법을 모색하게 만들 것이다. 현재 미국 행정부는 한미FTA 협정문을 검토하면서 자동차분야 불만해소방안을 다각도로 고심 중이다. 미국 의회와 업계의 불만이 그들을 공격적으로 만들지만, 한국정부의 반응을 신중하게 고려하지 않을 수 없다. 국내 이해집단의 요구와 협상상대국의 요구 사이에서 국제협상의 결과는 결정되어 지기 때문이다. NAFTA의 경우에도 미국 내 노동, 환경단체들의 강경한 입장은 멕시코와의 추가협상에서 반영되지 못했음을 상기할 필요가 있다. 이런 전략적인 접근법이 실천에 옮겨진다면 한미FTA 비준의 큰 걸림돌이 제거되고 협정발효로 가는 청신호가 켜질 것으로 기대된다.

산업패널을 이용한 한국의 대중국 수출결정요인 분석

양평섭 한국동북아경제학회 2007 동북아경제연구 Vol.19 No.1

Since the normalization of the relationship in 1992, trade between Korea and China has increased rapidly, an annual average growth rate standing at 27.4%. As a result, China is now Korea’s largest trade partner. As of 2005, the total trade volume between the two stood $100.6 billion, substantiating a magnificent growth from $3.4 billion in 1991. China’s portion of Korea’s total exports has also naturally risen from 3.6% in 1992 to 21.8% in 2005. Growth in trade volume also generated some significant changes in the trade structure. In 2005, for instance, 53% of the total trade volume and 55.8% of Korea’s export to China are generated by processing trade. Consequently, intermediate goods now makes up 82.0% of Korea’s export to China. And 70% of the total trade volume between the two countries and 76.4% of Korea’s exports to China are generated by foreign firms investing in China. Highlighting the complementary nature of the trade structure of the two countries, this paper attempts to analyze how China’s export, China’s industrial production, and Korea’s investment in China have determined the structure of Korea’s exports to China. With the respect to the question of how Korea’s export pattern differed by manufacturing industries, it also varied by China’s export volume, size of China’s domestic market, and Korean investment in China, all contribute to an increase in China’s import from Korea. This study shows that there is a positive correlation between Korea’s investment in China and Korea’s export to China and also that Korea’s export induction effect as a result of Korean investment in China is far greater than export substitution effect. The results put together demonstrate that Korea and China have maintained a complementary division of labor and that Korean investment in China is an important factor behind the rise in Korea’s exports to China. However, as China’s industrial and trade structure becomes more sophisticated, Korea faces fierce competition from China in the final goods market, and China’s import substitution rate is becoming faster with the improvement of China’s product competitiveness. Korean enterprises in China will also increase their usage of intermediate goods and materials purchased within the Chinese market. In the mid and long-term perspectives, given the overall changes, a negative impact may well be delivered to Korea’s intermediate goods-driven export to China.