한국전쟁기 대한조선공사(大韓造船公社)의 국가 경영과 한계

배석만 ( Bae Suk-man ) 부산광역시 시사편찬위원회 2018 항도부산 Vol.35 No.-

이 글은 ‘국영’이라는 형태로 본격적인 경영정상화와, 나아가 성장·발전을 시도하는 대한조선공사의 한국전쟁 기간 동안의 경영 과정과 그 한계를 살펴본 것이다. 1950년 1월 대한조선공사는 ‘반관반민의 국책회사’로 출범하였다. 그러나 국영기업의 단점을 보완하기 위한 민간기업의 경영 요소를 도입하는 시도는 형식적인 것이었다. 대한조선공사는 시작부터 전형적인 국영기업이었고, 이로 인해 곧바로 경영에 있어서 관료주의의 경직성이 나타났다. 한국전쟁은 대한조선공사 출범 반년 만에 일어난 돌발변수였다. 이 돌발변수는 대한조선공사 경영에 긍정적인 요소이자 부정적인 요소였다. 긍정적인 요소는 전쟁특수가 대표적이다. 부산항으로 밀려드는 선박의 수리 및 정비 수요의 급증은 경영 개선에 도움을 주었다. 반면 戰時 인플레이션은 가장 큰 부정적인 요소였다. 인플레이션은 수많은 기자재가 필요한 조선산업의 특성상 단기간에 경영을 어렵게 만들었다. 또 정부 재정을 초긴축 기조로 전환하게 함으로써, 정부의 대한 조선공사에 대한 금융 지원을 인색하게 만들었다. 전쟁특수보다 인플레이션이 오래 지속되었음으로 한국전쟁은 대한조선공사에게 부정적 요인으로 작용한 측면이 크다. 한편 정부의 일관성 없는 정책은 혼란을 가중시켰다. 국내 선박 시장에서 외국중고선과 경쟁이 어려운 상황이었음으로 조선산업과 관련한 정부의 보호 정책은 일관되고 확고해야 했지만 그렇지 못했다. 대한조선공사와 대한해운공사의 갈등과 대립은 상징적인 사례였다. 정부 정책이 일관성을 보이지 못한 이유는 선박 확보 및 수리의 ‘시급성’때문이었다. 사실을 추적해 들어가면 ‘명분’에 불과하기도 했던 ‘시급성’은 전쟁이 가져다 준 것이었음으로, 이 또한 한국전쟁에서 기인한 것이었다고 할 수 있다. This paper examines the management process and its limitations of the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation, which attempted to normalize its management and seek growth and develop as ‘state-operated’ company during the Korean War. In January of 1950, the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation was launched as a ‘semi-governmental corporation’. However, attempts to introduce management elements of private corporations to complement the disadvantages of a governmental corporation were simply formalities. The Korea Shipbuilding Corporation was a typical government-run enterprise from the outset. Accordingly, it immediately showed bureaucratic rigidity in management. The Korean War was an unexpected variable that occurred half a year after the establishment of the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation. This unexpected factor became a positive and negative factor in the management of the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation. Special procurement demands of war was the representative positive factor. The surging demand for repair and maintenance of ships crowding into the Busan port helped improve its management. On the other hand, wartime inflation was the biggest negative factor. Inflation made management difficult in a short period of time due to the nature of the shipbuilding industry, which requires a lot of equipment and materials. In addition, since the government went into retrenchment, its financial support for the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation was decreased. Since inflation lasted longer than the special procurement demands of war, the Korean war worked more as a negative factor for the Korean Shipbuilding Corporation. Meanwhile, inconsistent government policy added to the confusion of management. Given that the domestic shipbuilding market was in a disadvantageous position in competing with foreign second-hand ships, the government’s protection policy regarding the shipbuilding industry should have been consistent and firm. However, this was not the case. Conflicts and confrontations between the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation and the Korean Shipping Corporation are symbolic examples showing the government’s inconsistent policy, which has been attributed to the ‘urgency’ for procuring and repairing ships. Nonetheless, since closer examination reveals that such ‘urgency,’ which was no more than a ‘justification,’ was the effects of the war, it can be argued that the ‘urgency’ likewise resulted from the Korean war.

1970년대 대한조선공사의 옥포조선소 건설과정 : 중화학공업화 정책 하의 국가와 기업

배석만(Bae-Suk Man) 한국경영사학회 2021 經營史學 Vol.99 No.-

본 연구는 박정희정권의 중화학공업화 선언을 계기로 시작된 대한조선공사의 옥포조선소 건설과정을 구체적으로 분석하였다. 이를 통해 몇 가지 새로운 사실을 밝혔다. 첫째, 수출용 대형유조선을 건조하는 전문조선소로 출발한 옥포조선소는 불황으로 다목적 조선소로 건설 방향을 바꾸었다. 이 과정은 대형유조선 전문 조선소 유지하려는 기업과 정부부담을 줄이려는 타협의 산물이었다. 둘째, 공사 중지를 포함한 전면적 구조조정 문제는1978년 대우조선으로 사업주체가 교체되는 시기가 아니라 1977년 본격적으로 검토되었다. 태스크 포스 회의가 열리고, 관련 실무 작업반까지 조직한 전면적인 재검토 작업이이루어졌다. 셋째, 구조조정 검토의 결론은 대한조선공사가 건설공사를 계속하는 것이었는데, 사실 잘못된 판단에 근거한 것이었다. 세계 조선시장이 1980년 이후 회복될 것이며, 그 근거로 중소형 선박 시장의 확대, 이중벽 유조선 수요를 들었으나, 주지하듯이1980년대에도 세계 조선산업은 불황이 지속되었다. 이중벽 유조선 수요도 1990년대에들어서 점차 확대되었다. 재무부와 한국산업은행이 정확히 예측하여 공사 중지에 무게를실었으나 관철되지 못했다. 넷째, 1978년 사업 주체 교체는 정부 의도 보다는 대한조선공사의 공사 포기에 따른 어쩔 수 없는 조치였다. 정부는 재벌그룹 현대, 대우와 교섭했으나, 현대에게는 사실상 거절당했고 대우에게는 대가로 특혜를 줄 수밖에 없었다. 다섯째, 옥포조선소 건설 사례로 볼 때, 1970년대 박정희정권의 중화학공업화정책 추진과정은 국가의 ‘계획의 합리성’만으로 설명할 수 없다. 정부는 내부적으로 통일되지 않았으며, 일관성이 없기도 하였고, 잘못된 판단에 의거하여 정책이 추진되기도 하였다. 당연한 얘기일 수도 있으나 기업 역시 일방적으로 정책에 끌려갔던 것이 아니었다. 오히려 정부 정책을 조정․조율하는 중요한 한 축을 담당하였고, 생각보다 큰 영향을 미쳤다. This study analyzed in detail the construction process of the Okpo Shipyard of Korea Shipbuilding Corporation, which began with the declaration of heavy and chemical industrialization under the Park Chung-hee regime. This revealed some new facts. First, Okpo Shipyard, which started as a shipyard specializing in building large oil tankers for export, changed its construction direction to a multi-purpose shipyard due to the recession. This process was the product of a compromise to reduce the burden on the government and companies that wanted to maintain a shipyard specializing in large tankers. Second, the issue of total restructuring, including the suspension of construction, was seriously considered in 1977, not when the business entity was replaced by Daewoo Shipbuilding in 1978. A task force meeting was held, and a full-scale review work was carried out, including the relevant working group. Third, the conclusion of the restructuring review was that Korea Shipbuilding Corporation would continue the construction work, but in fact, it was based on an erroneous judgment. The global shipbuilding market will recover after 1980, and the expansion of the small and medium-sized ship market and the demand for double-wall tankers were cited as the grounds. The demand for double-wall tankers also gradually expanded in the 1990s. The Ministry of Finance and the Korea Development Bank accurately predicted and put weight on the suspension of the construction, but it was not implemented. Fourth, the change of project subject in 1978 was an unavoidable measure following the abandonment of construction by Korea Shipbuilding Corporation rather than the government’s intention. The government negotiated with the chaebol groups Hyundai and Daewoo, but was virtually rejected by Hyundai and had no choice but to give Daewoo preferential treatment in return. Fifth, in the case of the construction of the Okpo Shipyard, the process of promoting the heavy and chemical industrialization policy of the Park Chung-hee administration in the 1970s cannot be explained only by the national ‘rationality of the plan’. The government was not unified internally, was inconsistent, and policies were promoted based on wrong judgments. It may be obvious, but companies were not unilaterally drawn to policies. Rather, it played an important role in coordinating and coordinating government policies, and had a greater impact than expected.

1970년대 초 조선산업의 수출전문산업 전환기 국가와 기업 ― 대한조선공사 옥포(玉浦)조선소 건설계획 추진과정 분석

배석만 ( Bae Suk Man ) 서울대학교 인문학연구원 2021 人文論叢 Vol.78 No.3

이 글은 대한조선공사 옥포조선소의 건설이 시작되는 과정을 구체적으로 분석하였다. 옥포조선소 건설은 1970년대 초반 한국 조선 산업이 수출전문산업으로 전환하는 계기로써 현대건설 울산조선소의 건설과 함께 중요한 의미를 가진다. 대한조선공사가 세계 최대 규모인 100만 톤급 옥포조선소 건설계획을 공식화하고 계획 승인과 관련 지원을 요청했던 1972년 8월 시점의 정부 태도는 부정적인 것이었다. 정부가 태도를 바꾸어 계획 승인과 적극적 지원을 결정한 것은 1973년 1월 중화학공업화 선언 이후부터였다. 정부는 1억 달러에 이르는 옥포조선소 건설 차관의 제공자가 확정되지 않으면 승인과 지원을 할 수 없다는 입장이었다. 그러나 중화학공업화로의 정책전환 이후 갑자기 승인이 이루어졌다. 이 시점에도 여전히 차관 제공자가 확정되지 않은 동일한 상황이었다. 옥포조선소 건설계획의 추진 과정은 한국 조선산업의 수출전문산업화 전환이 정부의 정책적 육성에 의한 것이었다기보다는 기업의 생존과 성장 전략에 따른 결과물이었음을 보여준다. 대한조선공사를 자극한 것은 정부 정책이 아니라 현대 울산조선소 건설이었다. 1970년대 초반 수출전문산업으로 전환하는 시점의 조선산업에서 정부 정책의 역할은 그 전환을 ‘선도’했다기보다는 민간 기업의 전략 추진을 ‘조절’하고 ‘보조’하며 따라가는 것이었다. This article specifically analyzed the process of starting the construction of the Okpo Shipyard of Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation. The construction of the Okpo Shipyard in the early 1970s was an opportunity for the Korean shipbuilding industry to transform into an export- specialized industry, and it has an important meaning along with the construction of Hyundai E&C Ulsan Shipyard. The attitude of the government at the time of August 1972, when Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation formalized the world's largest 1 million-ton Okpo Shipyard construction plan and requested the approval of the plan and related support, was negative. It was after the declaration of heavy and chemical industrialization in January 1973 that the government changed its attitude and decided to approve the plan and actively support it. The government took the position that it could not approve and provide support until the provider of the $100 million Okpo Shipyard Construction Loan was confirmed. However, approval was suddenly granted after the policy shift to heavy and chemical industrialization. At this point, it was still the same situation where the loan provider had not been confirmed. The progress of the Okpo Shipyard construction plan shows that the transformation of the Korean shipbuilding industry into export-specialized industrialization was a result of the survival and growth strategy of the company rather than the government's policy fostering. It was not the government policy that stimulated Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation, but the construction of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard. The role of government policy in the shipbuilding industry at the time of transition to an export-specialized industry in the early 1970s was not to “lead” the transition, but to “regulate” and “assist” and follow the strategic promotion of private companies.

박정희정권기 조선공업 육성정책과 일본

배석만(Suk-Man Bae) 한국경영사학회 2010 經營史學 Vol.55 No.-

본 연구는 박정희정권이 대한조선공사 -이하 ‘조공’으로 줄임-를 다시 공기업화 하고 ‘일본 요소’와의 결합을 통해 조선공업(造船工業)의 육성을 추진했던 1960년대 정책 전개과정을, 222만불의 일본 상업차관 도입 사례를 통해 구체적으로 검토하는 것을 목적으로한다. 이를 통해 박정희정권의 국가주도 산업정책에 대한 평가 및 그 과정에서 일본이라는 요소의 역할을 살펴보았다. 1960년대 박정희정권의 조선공업 육성정책은, ‘국가의 강력하고도 효율적 개입’의 사례로 개발국가론자들이 흔히 거론하는 현대그룹 울산조선소를 중심으로 한 1970년대 조선공업 육성정책보다, 국가의 개입정도가 훨씬 더 강력하고 전면적인 것이었다. 그러나 222만불에 달하는 조선 기자재를 상업차관으로 도입하려는 정책의 전개과정을 구체적으로 파악 해 봤을 때 박정희정권의 조선공업 육성을 위한 산업정책은 효율적이지 않았다. 오히려 일관성 없고 내부 모순적이기까지 한 정책추진과정은 조공 부흥에 걸림돌이 되었다. 한편 조선 최강국이자 인접한 거리에 있던 일본은, 1960년대 조선공업 육성을 위한 자본 및 기술 공급처로 박정희정권이 주목한 나라였다. 그러나 일본은 박정희정권이 기대한 만큼 협조적이지 않았다. 일본정부는 일본 민간해운업계의 한일항로 진출을 위한해운협정 개정을 위해 222만불 조선 기자재의 수출승인을 보류하여 조공의 조선계획에결정적 차질을 초래했다. 이런 모습은 제국주의적 경제 진출의 일면으로 평가한다면 지나친 것 인지 모르겠지만, 최소한 이웃 나라와의 공존공영과 호혜의 원칙에 입각해서선의의 원조를 제공한다는 일본 정부의 공식적 입장과는 거리가 있었다. 일본정부는 경 제협력의 구체적인 과정에서 철저하고 신중하게 국익을 따지고 민간 경제계의 요구를 대변하는 자세를 고수했다. 결과적으로 1960년대 국가의 강력한 개입을 통한 ‘조공’ 부흥과 일본 의존으로 요약되는 조선공업 육성정책은 비효율적이었으며 실패한 것이었다. 이것은 박정희정권기 공업화에서 국가 개입의 효율성과 일본 요소를 강조하던 연구들의 주장이 극히 제한적으로 적용되어야 함을 의미한다. 물론 이러한 정책 실패가 아무런 의의가 없는 것은 아니었다. 1960년대 시행착오의 정책 경험은 1970년대 조선공업 육성정책에 주요한 영향을 미쳤기 때문이다. This study was designed to review development process of policies in 1960’s what were established to promote shipbuilding industry by nationalizing ‘Korea Shipbuilding& Engineering Corporation’ (referred to as ‘KSEC’ below) again in the Park Chung Hee Regime Period and combining it with ‘Japanese components’ through introduction cases of 2,22 million commercial loan from Japan. Furthermore, it aims to assess industrial policies led by the Park Chung Hee Regime and examine Japan’s roles in the process. As cases of a ‘powerful and efficient intervention of nation’, the policies to promote shipbuilding industry in the Park Chung-Hee Regime of 1960 s were much more powerful and general than those established in 1970’s focusing on Ul-san Shipyard of Hyundai Group what developmental state theorists frequently used to mention. However, industrial policies for promoting shipbuilding industry in the Park s Regime were not that efficient, considering the developmental process of policies to introduce shipbuilding materials accounting for 2,22 million dollar as commercial loan. It was rather a big obstacle to revive KSEC, since the process to push ahead with the policies were extremely inconsistent and internally contradictory. On the other hand, the most powerful country in shipbuilding industry, Japan, located close to Korea was that the Park’s government paid attention to as a supplier of capital and technology. But Japan was not as cooperative as they expected. Japanese government caused serious failure in KSEC s shipbuilding plans by holding off exporting 2,22 million shipbuilding materials to revise the shipping agreement for Japanese private shipping companies to break into and advance to Korean and Japanese sea routes. It was definitely different from the official situation of Japanese government to provide well-meant aid based on the principle of live-and-let-live and reciprocity, although, this situation can be explained as part of an imperialistic economic buildup. Japanese government hanged on to their position to give priority to national interests thoroughly and carefully and speak for requests of private economic world during the concrete process of economic cooperation. Eventually, promotion policies in 1960’s what was to revive KSEC through powerful intervention of nation and highly depended on Japan, were inefficient and failed. This implies, researches which have stressed the efficiency of the national intervention and Japanese components during the industrialization led by the Park s Regime need to be applied very restrictively. Of course, it doesn’t mean that there was no significance in failure of these policies, because such political trials and errors had considerable effects on another promotion policies of shipbuilding industry in 1970.

1950년대 이승만정권의 대한조선공사 경영정상화 추진 과정과 귀결

배석만 동아대학교 석당학술원 2023 石堂論叢 Vol.- No.85

This article analyzes the process of the Rhee Syngman regime's promotion of normalization of management of the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation in the 1950s and confirms the results. To mention the results first, there were policy efforts such as expanding facilities and seeking privatization, but the results were insignificant. Attempts to build large ships through facility expansion, which began with the government-led planned shipbuilding, and attempts to privatize them for management efficiency were not properly made. The reason why Korea Shipbuilding Corporation's management normalization efforts failed to produce results can be pointed out from various angles such as policy, management, and market. However, the fundamental reason was that 10 years, including three years of war, were not enough to fill the insufficient capital and technology of the large shipyard, which had virtually only facilities left after liberation, with only policy efforts. As a result, private entrepreneurs with capital and management capabilities that can generate profits and grow by efficiently operating heavy industry factories that require huge amounts of funds have not grown. Although huge funds were invested through finance and aid, accumulation of technology enough to compete with foreign used ships in the domestic market still needed time. As the failure to normalize management led to worsening management, the only way left for the government, which excluded the dismantling of the shipyard from the solution option, was “a return to the inevitable state-run system.” The Rhee Syngman regime stopped its privatization drive and reviewed the return to the state-run, but it collapsed in a situation where it could not reach a conclusion. Following the Chang Myone regime that ended in the search for a solution, the Park Chung-hee regime re-established the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation Act as a special law in 1962, returning the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation to the state-run system. Looking at the management system alone, the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation went back to the 1950s. 이 글은 1950년대 이승만정권의 대한조선공사 경영정상화 추진 과정을 분석하고 그 귀결을 확인한 것이다. 결과를 먼저 언급하면, 시설 확충과 민영화 모색 등 정책적 노력은 있었으나 성과는 미미했다. 정부 주도 계획조선을 계기로 시작된 시설 확충을 통한 대형 선박 건조 시도도, 경영의 효율성을 위한 민영화 시도도 제대로 이루어지지 않았다. 대한조선공사의 경영정상화 노력이 이렇게 성과를 내지 못했던 이유는 정책, 경영, 시장 등 다양한 각도에서 지적할 수 있다. 그러나 근본적인 원인은 해방 후 사실상 시설만 남은 거대 조선소의 부족한 자본, 기술 등의 요소들을 정책적 노력만으로 채우기에 전쟁 3년을 포함한 10년의 기간이 충분하지 않았다는 것이다. 막대한 자금이 필요한 중공업 공장을 효율적으로 가동하여 이윤을 창출하고 성장시킬 수 있는 자본과 경영 능력을 가진 민간기업가는 결과적으로 성장하지 못했다. 재정, 원조를 통해 막대한 자금을 투입했으나, 외국 중고선과 국내 시장에서 경쟁할 수 있을 정도의 기술력 축적 역시 아직 시간이 필요한 상황이었다. 경영정상화 실패가 경영 악화로 이어지면서, 조선소 해체를 해결 선택지에서 배제한 정부에게 남은 길은 ‘어쩔 수 없는 국영체제로의 회귀’였다. 이승만정권은 민영화 추진을 중단하고 국영 회귀를 검토하였으나, 결론을 내지 못한 상황에서 붕괴되었다. 해결의 모색 단계에서 끝난 장면정권에 이어, 박정희정권은 1962년 ‘대한조선공사법’을 다시 특별법으로 제정하여 대한조선공사를 국영체제로 회귀시켰다. 경영체제만으로 본다면 대한조선공사는 다시 1950년 시점으로 돌아간 것이었다.

사내직업훈련제도의 전개 : 대한조선공사 사례를 중심으로

신원철(Won-Chul Shin) 한국사회사학회 2010 사회와 역사 Vol.0 No.85

한국의 국가는 직업훈련제도를 형성하고 운영하는 데 주도적인 역할을 해온 반면에, 경영자는 사내훈련에 소극적이며, 노동조합은 별다른 역할을 하지 못했다. 이러한 한국의 직업훈련제도의 특성과 당사자들의 행위 유형이 어떻게 형성되었는가를 대한조선공사 사례를 통해서 살펴보았다. 식민지 시기에 전시하 숙련노동력 부족에 대처하기 위하여 조선총독부 주도로 사내직업훈련이 실시되었다. 대한조선공사의 사내훈련 기관은 1939년에 기술원양성소에서 출발하여 1950년대의 조선고등기술학교, 1960년대의 기술원양성소, 1970년대의 사내직업훈련소로 발전해왔다. 그런데 이러한 사내훈련은 저숙련균형의 함정에서 벗어날 수 없었다. 경영자는 양성공의 숙련향상에 많은 투자를 하지 않았고, 이들을 주로 저임금 노동력으로 활용하려 하였다. 이에 따라 노동조합운동이 고양되는 시점에서는 훈련소 출신 노동자들의 처우개선 요구가 표출되었고, 이들의 요구를 대변할 기구가 없는 상황에서는 이들은 이직을 선택하였다. 결국, 한국 조선산업의 직업훈련제도는 통용가능한 숙련이 존재하는 상황에서 저숙련균형에서 벗어날 수 있는 독일과 같은 집단주의적 해결책이나 일본과 같은 개별 기업수준의 해결책을 모두 실현하지 못하고 있는 것으로 보인다. The Korean Government has played a leading role in creating and administrating the plant-based job training institutions, while the Korean managers have been so passive in skill formation institutions. And the Korean trade union movements have exerted no influence on those institutions. This paper deals with the evolution of the plant-based job training system focusing on the KSEC, with a view to find out the way in which the contemporary Korean job training institutions have been established. The colonial Japanese government had instituted the plant-based training system to cope with the skill shortages during the Pacific War. The first plant-based job training center of the KSEC was opened in 1939. Thereafter were there various institutions such as the shipbuilding technical high school in 1950s and the training center for skilled workers in 1960s and the plant-based job training center in 1970s. Despite a number of in-plant training facilities, a type of low skill equilibrium was reproduced continuously as the skills of the shipbuilding workers were transferable. Managers of the KSEC did not invest so much on the trainees and saw them only as sources of cheap labor. Thus workers, employed after completing the plant-based job training program, made demands for improvement of their labor conditions whenever the labor movement was strengthened as in the late 1960s and as in 1987. And they moved on to other shipyards when it was not possible for them to express their demands through organizations. It seems that Korean shipbuilding firms have not succeeded in establishing either the collectivist solution of the German skill formation system or the segmentalist one of the Japanese system to provide for transferable skills enough.

워싱턴 D.C 소재 '대됴션쥬미국공사관(美國華盛頓朝鮮公使館)'의 역사적 의미 해석을 통한 복원 및 활용 방안 연구

김종헌,Kim, Jong-Hun 한국건축역사학회 2014 건축역사연구 Vol.23 No.4

The Korean Legation in Washington, D.C., is a proof that Emperor Kojong of Chosun Dynasty tried to establish relationship with the U.S. in 1891, that was before the declaration to establish Korean Empire. In that sense, the building is a historic place. The legation building is a symbolic place attesting to the turbulent history at the time of 1890 to 1910, when Korea had to suffer the forced treaty with Japan in 1905 and the annexation into Japan, and then to the 20th century up to the present time, 2014. The legation building can be turned into a space to host well-planned exhibits to show Korea's history and culture to local residents, foreign visitors to Washington, D.C., and overseas Koreans. The followings are the basic principles for the future use of the legation in line with the basic direction. The building's use should not be limited to museum, but should be flexible to accommodate various different practical usage. It is necessary to make the Korean Legation building that can incorporate the characters and the history through modern interpretation of the historicity of the place, the Korean culture, and historical events. The future usage of the Korean Legation building should enhance the value as a cultural heritage by linking the interpretation of the historical events and real life shown through exhibits, performance and people.

朝鮮重工業株式會社의 戰時經營과 해방 후 재편과정

배석만(Bae Suk-Man) 부산경남사학회 2006 역사와 경계 Vol.60 No.-

The purpose of this paper is to examine the management of Chosun Heavy Industry Company during the Pacific War, which was the only shipyard built a steel vessel in Chosun under the rule of Japanese imperialism, and its reorganization after the liberation of Korea. First, the existing scholars concluded that it was established in order to foster war industry but it didn't develope with a confusion of war. But, as a result of my study on the management of the company during the Pactific War, it expanded its business and gave satisfactory results owing to the promotion of building of ships for military use. Second, the company was reorganized by the policy on a disposal of Japanese property which U.S.A. set. The policy was obscure because Korean property should belong to Korea and Japanese should belong to Japan. The company became Korea Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation(大韓造船公社), state enterprise, after the establishment of Syngman Rhee's regime by this policy. However, a part of the company's property which belonged to Japan belonged to Japanese government. A managemental situation of the company was worse in the process for a reorganization of heavy industry. The major cause was the absence of human and material resources of Japan after the liberation of Korea. Though heavy industry in Chosun developed under the rule of Japanese imperialism, it grew only by a intentional fostering of Japanese imperialism and was subordinated to Japanese economy. In result, a break with Japanese economy made a mirage of the growth of Chosun Heavy Industry Company.

일본의 침략과 대한제국의 경운궁

이민원(Minwon Lee) 독립기념관 한국독립운동연구소 2004 한국독립운동사연구 Vol.0 No.22

기업별 노동조합과 고용 관계 -1960년대 대한조선공사의 사례

신원철 ( Won Chul Shin ) 한국사회사학회 2001 사회와 역사 Vol.60 No.-

This study investigates the formation of enterprise-level union system and the internalization of labor market on 1960s, focusing on Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation (KSEC, Taehan choson kongsa). Contrary to the history of trade union movements in Western societies, there is no meaningful tradition of craft union in Korea. Enterprise-level union in KSEC was established in 1953 when a labor law was established and trade unions were legalized by the government. According to the established law, collective bargaining was allowed only at enterprise-level. Moreover working conditions of shipbuilding workers employed by KSEC were better than other workers who were employed irregularly and moved around among small and medium size shipbuilding yards. The 1960s saw the growth of the shipbuilding industry, and especially of KSEC. The labor market conditions of 1960s made it possible for KSEC Union to regulate employment relations effectively. In the 1960s competition from outside workers was restricted and competition between inside workers was minimized by KSEC Union. Promotion of ``hobong`` was determined following a seniority rule, and an equal rise in wage rate was made for all members of the trade union. KDEC Union has always supported the practices of FOLM. Workers` desire for secure employment and decent earnings could be expressed only through an enterprise-level union. Workers did not have any other choice. Whether their desire could be realized or not was determined by power relations between labor and management. While the power relations were influenced by many factors, such as government labor policy and external labor market situations, workers` choice for FILM was inevitable.