Systemic Conflict, Geopolitics, and Trade-Underlying Factors of Communication Between East and West Germany During Division and the Current Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Seliger, Bernhard J. Ewha Institute of Unification Studies 2012 Journal of peace and unification Vol.2 No.1

As the recent “Arab spring” movement has shown, control of communication is crucial for the survival of nondemocratic regimes. In particular, outside communication that allows citizens to compare alternative political regimes is dangerous. German East-West relations and East-West communication in the time of Cold War from 1945 to 1989 were much thicker than inner-Korean relations at the same time and today. This paper identifies three main driving factors of communication, namely Cold War competition, the existence of West Berlin, and trade relations. Every attempt to improve inter-Korean relations has to start from the fact that the current North Korean regime has no interest in open communication, which erodes the internal controlling power of the state.

Entrepreneurial Activity, Transition and The State­some lessons from Central and Eastren Europe

Seliger, Bernhard 한국외국어대학교 2000 한국외국어대학교 논문집 Vol.32 No.-

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA : PRECONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES

Seliger, Bernhard 연세대학교 동서문제연구원 2002 Global economic review Vol.31 No.4

When in November 2001, the leaders of the Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states met for the "ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) plus three (China, Japan and Korea)," President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea proposed the exploration for an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and thereby opened a new chapter of East Asian integration. The special Northeast Asian perspective on regional co-operation became clear by the simultaneous decision to hold annual meetings of finance and trade ministers of China, Japan and Korea. At the same time, bilateral agreements, like a free trade area between Japan and Singapore, the tentative large free trade area between ASEAN and China and the work-in-progress on a Korean-Japanese Free Trade Area, show the devotion and sometimes even obsession of current policy-making with reaching regional trade agreements. Regional integration, it seems, is finally on the Northeast Asian agenda. In this paper, the preconditions and perspectives of economic integration in Northeast Asia will be explored. Since economic integration is in various ways linked to political factors, the second section discusses the geo-political situation of Northeast Asia today. The third section deals with the economic perspectives of different forms of trade integration, followed by an analysis of various attempts for greater macro-economic and financial co-operation and a short conclusion.

Institutional Competition And External Constraints of Transformation : Institutional Transfer and Institutional Imitation in the former GDR and in Central and Eastern Europe

Seliger, Bernhard SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES SEOUL NAT 2002 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.9 No.1

Twelve years after the change of economic and political systems in Central and Eastern Europe indicators of economic performance and insitutional development still point out that transformation is incomplete. However, the debate of transformation strategies, earlier focusing on 'shock therapy versus gradualism', changed. Recently, transformation theory focuses on factors influencing the success of transformation, including initial conditions, institutional arrangements and policy choices. In this paper, the external restrictions on institutional choice due to national(in the case of Germany) and international economic integration are analyzed. Especially the EU accession can be seen as a form of institutional commitment and restriction of institutional choice. Based on a brief outline of the theory of institutional competition, the strategies of institutional transfer in the former GDR, institutional imitation in countries aiming at EU membership and institutional innovation are discussed. While closing the 'window of opportunity' in transformation institutional transfer or imitation can considerably reduce uncertainties surrounding transformation for business and state.

The Costs of German Unification: A Reconsideration after 20 Years

Bernhard Seliger 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2008 평화학연구 Vol.9 No.4

The year 2007 marked in Germany an important event 17 years after unification. As the German Statistical Office revealed in February 2008, for the first time after unification the German public budgets (i.e. the central, regional and local governments plus social security funds) have been in a structural surplus. Though the deplorable state of East Germany’s economy became visible after the opening of the border, still most politicians and also most economic experts hoped that unification was largely self-financing, by the revenues of privatization. The last communist prime minister of East Germany, Hans Modrow, estimated in early 1990 the East German collective property (volkseigenes Vermoegen) at around 1,6 trill. Ostmark. Even with a realistic exchange rate for the East German mark, this would have been a meant a handy treasure to pay the costs of unification. But the collective property proved to be a phantom. The Treuhand organization, responsible for privatization of East Germany’s companies, alone accumulated debts of 205 bn. Deutschmark, and this does not include any of the infrastructure investment necessary or any of the social transfers necessary to stop mass migration from East to West. In the course of 20 years after unification the East German economy was completely restructured, but at a high price: the costs for unification were and are enormous and still the East-West gap remains considerable, not in consumption, but in production. A transfer economy was established permanently dependent on West German resources. The year 2007 marked in Germany an important event 17 years after unification. As the German Statistical Office revealed in February 2008, for the first time after unification the German public budgets (i.e. the central, regional and local governments plus social security funds) have been in a structural surplus. Though the deplorable state of East Germany’s economy became visible after the opening of the border, still most politicians and also most economic experts hoped that unification was largely self-financing, by the revenues of privatization. The last communist prime minister of East Germany, Hans Modrow, estimated in early 1990 the East German collective property (volkseigenes Vermoegen) at around 1,6 trill. Ostmark. Even with a realistic exchange rate for the East German mark, this would have been a meant a handy treasure to pay the costs of unification. But the collective property proved to be a phantom. The Treuhand organization, responsible for privatization of East Germany’s companies, alone accumulated debts of 205 bn. Deutschmark, and this does not include any of the infrastructure investment necessary or any of the social transfers necessary to stop mass migration from East to West. In the course of 20 years after unification the East German economy was completely restructured, but at a high price: the costs for unification were and are enormous and still the East-West gap remains considerable, not in consumption, but in production. A transfer economy was established permanently dependent on West German resources.

Unified Germany`s Security Policy: Some Lessons for Korea

( Bernhard Seliger ) 한국국방연구원 2003 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.15 No.1

With the economic aspects of German unification still a headache for German politics, and particularly the country`s persistently high unemployment rate, it is somewhat surprising that political unification-including security policy-has proved to be remarkably smooth. Despite the ideological differences between the Bundeswehr (Western German Army) and the "Nationale Volksarmee" (East German Army) the incorporation of parts of the personnel of the NVA into the Bundeswehr and the extension of the Bundeswehr to the new territories posed no major problems. Externally, the new role of Germany in Europe can be described as a normalization of German security policy, previously characterized by a German "Sonderweg" (special way). In this paper, a short review is first given on German security issues before and after unification. Following this, the extension of the Bundeswehr into the new territories of a unified Germany is discussed. And finally, the changing external relations and security policy after German unification are considered. This section focuses on the role of Germany`s firm integration into NATO and the EU as additional factors explaining the smooth transition from a divided Germany to a unified nation, without major external problems as evidenced by the continuing stability of Europe since German unification.

Political Culture and Identity Crisis in Post-Unification Germany

Bernhard Seliger 한국국제정치학회 2007 한국국제정치학회 학술대회 발표논문집 Vol.- No.-

The German Manufacturing Industry Old Achievements , New Challenges

(Bernhard Seliger) 한국경영사학회 2000 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS HISTORY Vol.1 No.1

해외학자 초청 컨퍼런스-Family policy after German unification – a late victory for the East German system?

Bernhard Seliger 한국여성정책연구원(구 한국여성개발원) 2015 한국여성정책연구원 세미나자료 Vol.2015 No.10

Systemic conflict, geo-politics and trade

Bernhard Seliger 한국국제정치학회 2010 한국국제정치학회 학술대회 발표논문집 Vol.2010 No.8

German East-West relations and East-West communication in the time of Cold War from 1945 to 1989 were much denser than inner-Korean relations at the same time. This is even more true when comparing the situation in Germany with that of the two Koreas today. This seemingly surprising fact becomes clear when underlying factors determining communication are studied. This paper identifies three main driving factors of communication between both sides: First, the unresolved Cold War meant that both sides were actively trying to convince the people in the other part of the superiority of their political and economic system. This required a certain degree of openness. In Korea, systemic conflict no longer exists. North Korea is no anti-monde to the South, but a family-owned business trying to survive. Second, the geo-political situation of Germany, in particular the existence of Berlin and the historically dense economic relations between East and West before division made complete isolation difficult. This was much less the case in Korea, a former Japanese colony with a lower degree of internal economic integration and, generally, economic development. Third, trade was a necessity for East Germany to survive, in particular given strong systemic conflict, but is much less of a necessity for North Korea. The underlying reasons for communication also determined communication policy between East and West. Every attempt to improve inter-Korean relations has to start from the fact that the current North Korean regime has no interest in open communication which erodes internal controlling power of the state.