김정일 체제하 북한 군사정책의 변화 가능성

한용섭 한국전략문제연구소 1996 전략연구 Vol.3 No.2

North Korea's military policy does not show any sign of change on the strategic level even after Kim Il-sung's death. The reason why North Korea can not change its military policy is threefold: (1) Under the Kim Jong-il regime, Kim Jong-il can not change overnight policy prioirty the top of which had been laid on military build-up and consequent communization of South Korea through military means for the past five decades: (2) Kim Jong-il is afraid that resource diversion from military sector to economic sector may undermine his power base because the military circles have been playing a key role in upholding the Kim Jong-il regime in the post-Kim Il-sung era, and: (3) Since North Korea has an edge only in military competition with South Korea, Pyongyang intends to maximize the utility of military cards as a means to obtain concessions from U.S. counterparts by setting Seoul hostage to its coercive diplomacy on the other hand. The last point is, in particular, worrisome because North Korea's economy as well as its entire system is experiencing the worst period--either collapse or bare survival. Pyongyang's options become narrow. It may either opt for a military clash with Seoul before its military advantage becomes obsolete ortry to avoid domestic crisis by causing an external crisis as opposed to Seoul. North Korea started to take a dual-track approach to the outside world so as to escape domestic crisis. One is to improve relations with the United States and the other is to antagonize South Korea to the maximun extent Pyongyang decided to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for diplomatic normalization and provision of economic support including less weapon-prone nuclear reactor by the United States. Pyongyang further intends to maximize its success in engaing the United States while trying to isolate South Korea from the scene. To counter North Korea's dual-track approach more effectively, South Korea should design a more comprehensive policy regarding how to build peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by accommodating recent development in U.S.-North Korean relations. On the other hand, Seoul should develop policy options to prevent North Korea's habitual threat of war effectively. This papaer suggests five broad policy options. Two options are summarized here. One policy option will be to increase Seoul's defense budget to redress military imbalance within a shorter time period than originally planned. Another will be to strengthen South Korea-U.S. joint security policy developing mechanism on the basis of more accurate analysis of North Korea's dire situations. In this light, the most recent joint proposal for 4 party talks on peace-building for Korea is perfectly timely. Now, Seoul and Washington should develop conrete measures to induce China and North Korea to the 4 party talks by promoting an active participation in the policy developing process from goverment officials as well as relevant experts.

한반도 위기사태 유형과 효과적 위기관리

한용섭 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.3

Will crisis occur in the Korean Peninsula? This is the most frequently raised question nowadays when North Korea is assessed to be likely to collapse under the worsening economic and systemic situations. If North Korea is likely to create situations which might be developed into a crisis where South Korea and the United States should challenge those North Korean provocations, what shape will the crisis take and how will South Korea resolve it effectively? Regarding the plausible courses of actions to be taken by North Korea in the future, two major scenarios are being drawn up: war scenario and crises shot of war. War scenario is the most frequently envisioned one among all the relevant scenarios regarding North Korea as North Korea is experiencing total system failure nowadays. An all-out war as a result of the North Korean leader's miscalculation is the one that is the most worrisome. It is, of course, controversial whether or not North Korea will actually initiate a war despite its most difficult economic situations. Based on the low possibility of the conventional war, some experts adds that Pyongyang will likely start a war with chemical and biological weapons because chances for North Korea's win in the conventional warfare are so low that Pyongyang has no option but to resort to the unconventional warfare. In addition, various scenarios for crises short of war are predicted. Among them, the most dangerous is Pyongyang's possible provocation in the process of its internal political turmoil. Pyongyang may attempt to turn its internal crisis into an external opportunity where they can run South Korea's life at risk out of desperation. Although it is not likely that Pyongyang will win the war, they may inflict an enormous damage on Seoul as well as on North Korea, in return. Then, the damage will be too great to recover within a foreseeable future even if Korea is unified under South Korea. Pyongyang may try to occupy islands in the western sea near the DMZ while insisting on the return of North Koreans who fled from North Korea for the pursuit of food and freedom. During the military engagement, South Korean armed forces may try to counterattack North Korean armed forces not to allow the North to occupy the islands in the western sea. This is another crisis scenario whose consequences are not so trivial as to overlook. Or the North may attempt to assassinate South Korea's top political figures so as to create a turmoil inside South Korea, while covering up the fact that they have done. Such kind of terrorist act will add to an internal instability inside South Korea, which will in turn, to the North Korean leader, provide an opportunity to the North Korean leader to play South Korea's vulnerability to his favor. Therefore, it is important for the South Korean Government to prepare against those crisis scenarios beforehand. To deter and prevent a North Korean attack, South Korea will need security alliance with the United States. Thus, bilateral alliance between Seoul and Washington is a requirement even in the post-Cold War unless North Korea explicitly abandons a military option. To augment deterrence, South Korea's cooperation with China is significant at the time when North Korea may attempt to use the military option out of desperation. To plan against the possibility of crisis short of a major war, cooperative mechanism among South Korea and countries in the region is required In this regard, four party talks to address the lack of security regime on the Korean Peninsula had been proposed and now, await a full operation with North Korea's full participation. To deal with North Korea's collapse prudently, constructive engagement by South Korea and regional countries is demanded rather than containment. In this process, wise division of labor between South Korea and the United States will bring about a smooth transition of the North as the United States and West Germany had spelled out their sharing of roles and missions to accelerate the German unification cleverly. Indeed, China's cooperation is crucial to holding the transition under a tight control by Seoul and Washington. To tackle non-conventional crisis scenarios properly, the South Korean Government should mend the fences before the advent of the crises. By reviewing the past record of crisis management thoroughly, it should identify trouble spots deep inside the management system. First of all, the Blue House should strengthen the Situation Room so that it can utilize the sophisticated ability of information gathering and analysis of all relevant agencies to the maximum extent. Second, the Blue House should facilitate policy discussion among heads of relevant government agencies at the event of crisis instead of relying on the United States too much. Above all, the South Korean Government should take initiative to turn the crisis into a major issue between the two Koreas instead of absorbing it as an internal problem as to how effectively the South Korean Government will handle the North Korean provocation within the limits of South Korea. The last point will help South Korea to face the crisis more actively to transform the crisis into an opportunity to take advantage of its strength as opposed to the fatal weaknesses of the North. If that is the case, North Korea will abandon military adventures after all.

7075 알미늄합금의 인성에 미치는 가공열처리의 영향

한용섭,천성순 대한금속재료학회(대한금속학회) 1981 대한금속·재료학회지 Vol.19 No.2

A study has been performed on the effect of Thermomechanical Treatment on the toughness of 7075 Aluminum alloy. Three different heat treatments such as Intermediate Thermomechanical Treatment (ITMT), Thermomechanical Treatment (TMT-2) and Conventional Heat Treatment have been applied in this study. The experimental results showed that the ductility and the toughness were increased by ITMT and TMT-2 compared with Conventional Heat Treatment, It was believed that the increase of ductility was due to grain size refinement, and that the toughness increased was due to grain size refinement, retardation of the recrystallization and homogeneous distribution of small Cr-rich particles.

군비통제와 한반도 평화체제 수립: 양자 간 선순환 관계를 위한 제언

한용섭 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2006 한국과 국제정치 Vol.22 No.1

The cold war structure and armistice regime are continuing for more than five decades on the Korean Peninsula. To disconnect the vicious circle between arms race and the cold war structure, the arms control process should begin now. In Europe, the cold war structure and arms race had been as tense as on the Korean Peninsula. However, European countries led by the United States and the former Soviet Union succeeded in the confidence building process through participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe actively, whereas NATO and WTO engaged the mutually balanced force reduction talks to be overtaken by the CFE process later for a bigger success. On the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to establish a trilateral arms control negotiation channel in which South Korea, North Korea, and the United States can discuss military issues on a regular basis. South Korea should organize her arms control agency directly under the President, Arms Control bureau in the Foreign Ministry, and Arms Control Verification Bureau in the Defense Ministry. Through mutual cooperation among three agencies, the South Korean government should design arms control strategy to promote and succeed in the arms control process with North Korea. Since the Korean arms control process entails North Korea and the ROK-US alliance to adapt to new situations, South Korea and the United States need to launch joint study team and devise joint arms control strategy. On negotiating with Pyongyang, Seoul should take a flexible strategy and expand list of arms control measures by offering economic aids to Pyongyang on condition that North Korea relocate its forward deployed military bases to the rear area. South Korea also needs to support the epistemic community of arms control within South Korea as a way to promote peninsula-specific and regional arms control in Northeast Asia

Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia : Findings of the Northeast Asia Policy Forum and Its Future

한용섭,정경영 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 2006 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.11 No.2

The Research lnstitute on National Security Affairs launched the Northeast Asia Security Policy Forum (NEASPF) with its counterpart security and str,ategic thinktanks from neighboring counties,including the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia,in October 2005 at the 50th anniversary of the Korea National Defense Univenity. The NEASPF aims at academically sapporting the building of Northeast Asia Multilateral Security architecture and contributing to achieve peace, stability,security,and prosperity in the region. To create such a regime,key regional actors must develop a joint strategy to emplement the concept. The forum also attempts to relnforce broad and close international academic exchange and cooperative relationships by co-hosting conferences of institutes affiliated with defense universities in the region. The global center of strategic gravity is shiftng tovard Northeast Asia in parallel with the increasing growth of national power among states in Northeast Asia. Given that the regional security environment in the 21st century is facing worrisome uncertaznn due to terrorism,proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),emerging nationalism,and emergence of failing states,it is necessary states in Northeast Asia to undertake practical security cooperation to build a cooperative security order in the region

신년특집 : 안팎의 군사쟁점을 진단 처방한다 ; 전략무기감축과 신 NPT 체제

한용섭 한국군사학회 1996 군사논단 Vol.5 No.1

N/A

[EDITOR’s NOTE] 투자 시장의 히어로?

한용섭 한국경제매거진(주) 2023 Money : How to invest & spend Vol.220 No.-

핵확산과 한반도 군축 ; 한반도 군축에 대한 신사고

한용섭 한국군사학회 1996 군사논단 Vol.8 No.1

N/A

MAP 로 제조한 고온용 동합금 분산강화재의 특성평가

한용섭,한종만,권택규 대한금속재료학회(대한금속학회) 1995 대한금속·재료학회지 Vol.33 No.5

The effects of dispersoid on microstructure and mechanical properties of mechanically alloyed and hot-extruded copper were investigated. Copper powders containing 1∼5% Al₂O₃ and TiB₂ as strengthening dispersoids were mechanically alloyed by milling for maximum 1000 minutes in high energy ball mill. The saturated milling time decreased with increasing dispersoid contents in MA powders. The saturated milling time of MA powders containing Al₂O₃ decreased comparing to that of MA powders containing TiB₂. In this investigation, MA copper with 5%TiB₂ content showed the superior mechanical properties at room temperature and high temperature to any other hot-extruded MA copper consolidates. This better properties of hot-extruded MA copper consolidates containing 5%TiB₂ seemed to be due to the interface precipitation of Fe-rich phase.

한반도 평화체제 구축의 조건

한용섭 동국대학교 북한학연구소 2005 북한학연구 Vol.1 No.1

2006년의 국민적 화두는 한반도 평화체제 구축이 될 것이다. 본고에서는 한반도 평화체제 구축의 조건과 내용, 전력을 모색해 본다. 한반도 평화체제 구축의 조건은 첫째, 당사자 원칙과 국제주의의 조화에서 찾을 수 있다. 남북한과 미국, 중국은 관련 당사자로서 참여해야 한다. 즉 북한은 남한을 당사자로서 인정해야 하고, 남한은 미국과 중국을 관련 당사자로 수용해야 할 것이다. 둘째, 단계적 접근법과 포괄적 원칙을 조화시켜야 한다. 군비통제도 신뢰구축부터 시작해서 제한조치, 군축을 단계적으로 추구할 것이 아니라 포괄적 접근을 먼저 제시하고 타협가능성과 이행가능성이 높은 것부터 합의하여 실천해 가야 할 것이다. 셋째, 합의한 것은 반드시 이행하고 검증해 나가야 한다. 지금까지 거의 모든 남북한 합의와 제네바합의에서 이행하고 검증하는 체제가 마련되지 못했다. 북한 핵문제를 포함하여 검증 가능한 체제를 만드는 것이 중요하다. 넷째, 평화체제는 가등보다는 협력을 지향하는 관계이므로 기존의 합의를 지켜 나가되, 중대한 위반이 없을 경우 과거로 돌아가서는 안 된다는 것이다. 한반도 평화는 정치 군사적 과정이다. 평화협정으로만 달성되지 않는다. 한반도에서 당국사자들간에 신뢰와 평화를 구축해 가는 과정을 만들려면 단계적인 접근법이 필요하다. 현재의 평화무드를 가속시켜 나가면서 평화공존의 토대를 마련하고, 결국은 한반도 평화체제를 환성시키면서 이를 동북아 평화협력체로 연결시키는 작업을 해야 할 것이다. 이를 위해 전략이 필요한데, 무엇보다도 국민적인 합의의 바탕 위에서 북한과 미국을 설득해 나가는 것이 필요하다. 북한과는 대타협이 필요하며, 미국의 적극적인 참여가 필요할 것이다. In recent times, peace building on the Korean Peninsula becomes a salient issue. This paper explores conditions, content, and strategy for the Korean peace regime. The Korean peace regime is based on four conditions: (1) The two Koreas should admit the other's legitimacy in the peace talks and accept the United States and China as legitimate partners in the peace talks; (2) Participants in the peace talks should propose comprehensive negotiating agenda to enhance negotiability and try to strike compromise among the participants. The negotiation agenda had better include confidence building measures, constraint measures, and reduction measures at the same time; (3) Participants should agree to verification measures to confirm the other party's compliance with the agreed upon measures, and; (4) Participants in the peace talks should not go back to the past relationship ridden with conflict and confrontation unless one party violates the agreements to a substantial degree. Peace on the Korean Peninsula takes a long term political and military process, which can not be accomplished merely by the peace treaty at one time. It requires a gradual approach to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. While accelerating the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation process, the two Koreas should institutionalize the peaceful coexistence and complete the peace process in a much broader context of Northeast Asia. To do so, we need a strategy. The strategy entails proactive participation by Washington and Pyongyang in the process. South Korea should take the lead to elicit Pyongyang's cooperation through designing and proposing grand bargain with Pyongyang and also reach national consensus inside South Korea on the modalities and contents of the grand bargain. In this strategic design, the United States should participate from the beginning till the end.