中國女性의 政治. 社會參與 硏究

趙壽星 韓國外國語大學校 外國學綜合硏究센터 中國硏究所 1993 中國硏究 Vol.14 No.-

사회과학 : 중국의 사회계급구조 변화에 관한 연구 -마오저뚱과 덩샤오핑의 이론과 실천을 중심으로-

조수성 한국외국어대학교 외국학종합연구센타 중국연구소 2003 中國硏究 Vol.31 No.-

중국 도시지역 "서취(社區)" 건설에 관한 연구

조수성 대한정치학회 2012 大韓政治學會報 Vol.19 No.3

중국이 사회주의 시장경제체제를 전면 도입하면서 계획경제하의 단위제가 해체되고 아울러 도농이원구조의 호구제가 이완되면서 도시주민에 대한 관리시스템을 재정비할 필요성은 급속히 증대되었다. 이러한 중국 경제발전의 시대적 요구에 따라 진행된 것 이 ‘서취’건설인 것이다. 민정부는 1999년 서취건설 지침을 마련하였으며, 각 도시는 지역실정에 맞추어 서취를 새로이 구성하였다. 따라서 성공사례로 선정된 모델들은 각 기 명칭이 다르고 내용도 차이가 난다. 상하이는 ‘서취지에따오’모델, 선양은 ‘서취위 원회’모델, 쟝한은 ‘서취관리위원회’모델이라 한다. 중국정부는 서취건설을 통해 주민자치를 확대하고 민주화를 추진한다는 목표를 세웠다. 이는 기존의 주민위원회가 자치조직 역할보다는 지에따오빤스추가 하달한 행정 업무를 수행하는 정부 말단조직에 불과한 상황을 개선하겠다는 것이었다. 그러나 모델 로 선정된 3개 지역의 서취조차도, 정도의 차이는 있으나, 모두 이러한 목표를 달성하 지는 못하였다. 그 이유는 두 가지로 설명할 수 있다. 하나는 서취건설이 아래로부터 의 개혁이 아니라 위로부터의 정책주도형 개혁이며, 다른 하나는 도시 기층 자치조 직인 서취주민위원회 레벨에 중국공산당위원회 지부를 신설하여 당의 영향력을 증대 시켰기 때문이다. 결과적으로, 중국공산당의 주민에 대한 통제가 오히려 더욱 강화되 어 ‘당-국가-사회(party-state-society) 일체화체제’가 구축됨으로써 ‘서취민주(shequ- democracy)’를 논하기는 아직 시기상조라고 판단된다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 서취건설의 모델들이 사회공공서비스 제고를 위한 각종 정책들을 추진하는 과정에서 사회가 국가로부터 공공영역을 확대하기 위한 시도들이 이루어지고 있는 점은 긍정적으로 평가할 만하다. 간단히 말해, 중국 도시지역 서취건설은 경제발전이 정치민주화를 가져온다는 근대 화이론가들이 주장보다는 오히려 경제발전이 권위주의체제를 강화시킨다는 주장이 더 설득력이 있다.

중국정치문화에 대한 역사적 고찰

조수성 영남정치학회 1998 영남 정치학회보 Vol.8 No.-

중국 선거제도 개혁 사례에 대한 신제도주의적 분석

조수성 계명대학교 국제학연구소 2003 국제학논총 Vol.8 No.-

Since 1980s China launched political system reform, she put its focus on the enlargement of basic label democracy, especially emphasized the election-system reform. Then, several kinds of new in the villagers committee direct election model appeared in rural villages. Until the end of 1990s, this tides and accomplishments on election system spreaded up to the township label. The remarkable cases were the ′direct election system′ of Buyun and ′two ballots system′ of Dafeng. Beyond expectation, in the next term election in Buyun, the magistrate was elected by the direct system, but in Dafeng the next magistrate was appointed by the CCP Committee of the District as of before, was not elected by the inhabitant′s vote. This paper, using the new institutionalism approaches, tried to analyze how and why these two new systems can be designed and formed, and why one system can keep going and the other one changed so rapidly. Consequently, 1 can summarize some findings as below. 1. The ′direct election system′ of Buyun and ′two ballots system′ of Dafeng could have been designed by the CCP cadres those who wanted to be a forerunner. Under the reform-oriented political circumstances, the core members of the CCP Committee of Shenzhen City and the CCP Committee of Shizhong District consciously designed a new election institution by the rational choice. 2. The main reason why Buyun′s new system was soft-landing and Dafeng′s was hard-landing can explain in the point of path dependency. Because the villagers of Buyun and the leaders in making new institution got lots of benefits after the new electoral institu-tion settled down, so they did willing to cooperate to overcome upper pressure sensibly. On the contrary, ′two ballots system′ of Dafeng didn't offer not so much benefits either to the residents or to the prime movers, therefore, the cadres didn't want to take risks unnecessarily and the voters also retreated from the direction from Central Committee of CCP. In sum, the forming and the changing of a new institution mainly depends on the rational choice of the behaviors.

中国基层各种选举的现状及其未来走向

조수성 한중사회과학학회 2010 한중사회과학연구 Vol.8 No.1

중국의 선거제도 개혁은 村(한국의 里에 해당)단위에서부터 시작되었다. 1988년 <촌민위원회조직법 시행안>이 마련된 후, 농촌 일부지역에서 시범적으로 촌민자치 조직인 촌민위원회의 주임을 뽑는 주민직접선거가 진행되었다. 1990년대 중국 농촌에는 각종 독창적인 선거 모델들이 등장하였고 10여 년간의 경험은, 물론 서구민주주의국가의 선거와는일정 거리가 있지만, 중국 선거민주화 수준을 상당히 제고시켰으며, 여타 기층조직도 직접선거제도를 도입하도록 영향을 미쳤다. 2004년부터 2008년까지 4년간 중국 기층레벨의 각종기관들에 대한 선거가 집중적으로 진행되었다. 촌민위원회선거, 공산당 촌지부선거, 도시사구 주민위원회선거, 縣ㆍ鄕인민대표선거등이 줄줄이 치루어졌다. 이러한 기층레벨 선거들의 현황을 분석해 본 결과, 각 선거 간에는 상당한 상관관계가 있으며, 20년간의 발전에도 불구하고 아직도 여러 면에서 한계성이 있음이 밝혀졌다. 관련성측면을 살펴보면, 그동안 산발적으로 진행하던 선거를 농촌지역의 촌민위원회선거와 도시지역의 주민위원회선거를 연동적으로 조정하여 같은 기간에 실시하는 추세에 있으며, 각종 선거시행세칙을 상호보완하고 선거절차의 우수사례를 상호 참고하여 규범화하고 있다. 각종 기층선거의 한계성은 두 가지 측면 즉선거의 우수사례 면과 선거의 지역별 격차 면에서 찾아볼 수 있다. 1990년대 농민들은 ‘해선’, ‘양표제’등 여러 민주적 선거방식을 독창적으로 고안해냈었는데, 2000년대에는 독창적인 우수모델의 출현이 현저히 감소하고 있으며, 중국 각 지역 간에는 투표율, 선거인명부 등록률,경선참여율, 당선인들의 자질, 선거발전 등 면에서 격심한 편차가 나타나고 있다. 이러한 현황파악에 기초하여, 중국 기층레벨의 각종 선거가 나아갈방향을 짚어보았다. 인민대표선거는 농촌지역과 도시지역 인구대비 선출인원의 불평등 규정을 개선하여 공평성을 제고시켜야 하며, 촌민위원회선거는 안정화를 계속 유지하며 당지부선거나 鄕鎭長선거 등을 동시에 진행하여 선거에 소모되는 시간과 비용을 절감해야한다. 또한 도시지역 주민위원회선거는 아직 미성숙단계이기 때문에 각 지역의 실정에따라 직접선거를 전면적으로 도입해야 할지 등 선거방식에 대해 신중히 검토하여야 한다. 결론적으로, 중국 기층레벨의 각종 선거는, 정부의 정치동원수단이자정치민주화를 추진하고 있다는 대외 홍보용인 부분도 있지만, 그 형식과 내용면에서 중국 정치발전을 도모하고 있는 것은 사실이다. 즉 선거를 통하여 기층조직에 합법성을 제공하고 있으며, 공민들의 정치참여주요채널이 되고 있으며, 공민들의 정치권리 행사의 주요 형식이 되고있으며, 공민들의 이익표출의 주요 메커니즘이 되고 있는 것이다.

90年代 中國女性의 地位變化에 관한 硏究

趙壽星 韓國外國語大學校 外國學綜合硏究센터 中國硏究所 1997 中國硏究 Vol.20 No.-

중국 선젼(심천)市 룽깡(龍岡)區 따펑(大鵬)鎭 '3회 2표 鎭長선거제'에 대한 분석

조수성 계명대학교 국제학연구소 2002 국제학논총 Vol.7 No.-

In autumn 1998, the Shenzhen City Party Committee made a plan to practice direct election for magistrate. But, this plan was not accepted by the upper organs, because it would violate Article 102 of the Constitution and the Organic Law for Local People’s Congresses. Therefore, the Shenzhen Committee changed the plan from direct election to ´three polls, two ballots´ system. In Dafeng township, the system was carried out to choose the candidate of magistrate in January 1999. All registered voters were allowed to participate in an open primary to nominate candidate, referred to as a ´sea election(haixuan)´(the first poll of first ballot). Those receiving more than 100 votes who met eligibility requirements gave campaign speeches at an open forum, and then underwent an indirect election or ´public opinion poll(minyi ceping)´ by some 1068 electors.(the second poll of first ballot) The winning candidate’s name was then submitted to the Township People’s Congress for a confirming vote, as the sole candidate of magistrate as permitted by law(second ballot). Finally, the incumbent had won and would remain at his post for another term. In 2002 election, the system was not operated, instead the magistrate of Dafeng was appointed by district party committee as of before. Why the ´three polls, two ballots´ system was reversed in spite of the democratic spirit of it? 1. the institutional inertia : These vote methods kept control in the hand of the district party committee, rather than practiced by law. 2. the restriction of candidate qualifications : Voters could each nominate one individual. These individuals had to meet specified age, education and other qualifications, and had to be communist party members. 3. the problem in composition of electoral college : All district party members, all township and village cadres, all villager small groups’ heads, representatives of enterprise and unions naturally should be the member, only some villager representatives would be allowed to participate in the primary election. 4. the limitation of ´sea election´ in itself : 5. the limitation of subject in democratic trial : This election reform was not from the below, was from the above. Therefore the cadres steped back to immediately as receiving the challenge from the top. By these problems and limitations, the ´three polls, two ballots´ system was not in practice any more.

中共의 政治社會化에서 메스콤의 役割 : 政權初期부터 文化大革命까지

趙壽星 韓國外國語大學校 外國學綜合硏究센터 中國硏究所 1984 中國硏究 Vol.8 No.-

中國村民委員會選擧 一모델 調査分析 : '三上三下三公布' 모델 "Three Ups, Three Downs, and Three Announcements" Model

조수성 계명대학교 국제학연구소 1998 국제학논총 Vol.3 No.-

Since the "Organic Law for Villagers Committee of the Peoples Republic of China (Draft)" was put into practice in June 1988, hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants have been participating in direct elections for their villagers committee members. In Mao's China, direct elections at the village level were limited to team leaders and villager's representatives, and most elections were indirect or even some positions were filled by appointment from higher up along the party line as in the case of village cadres who were appointed by CCP village party leaders or higher level authorities. Thus the insistence upon direct election for the villages committee members constitutes a significant innovation. While the villagers committee system was not yet instituted in the early 1980s, some localities had already elected villagers committee cadres. After 1988, however, all villages were electing their committee members, and some completed three or four elections cycles so far. But due to the vagueness of the Organic Law's instructions for carrying out elections and the absence of supporting regulations or legislation, the election experiment has varied greatly not only from province to province but also among counties and townships within the same province. Thus after more than ten years of implementation, many kinds of election types appeared in China. Out of these types only three models were recommended to the Ministry of Civil Affairs throughout the country by the The Chinese Political Science Association. Out of these three models, the one originating from Runan County will be analyzed in this paper. Summarizing the practices of various localities, the election procedure can be divided into the following stages: establishment of the body administering of the election, the mobilization of election and voter registration, determination of election methods, nomination of candidates, and balloting. Among these stages, the candidate nomination is the most problematic aspect of the whole process. Until 1980s, candidates were generally nominated by the communist party village branch or the township government or by the officials responsible for administering the election. But the Chinese peasants gradually became aware that the extant process of candidate nomination was not a desirable one, and they tried to figure out a more democratic nomination method for themselves. Villagers who have had more election experiences wanted to have a stronger voice in the process of candidate selection. As a result, some localities came up with election forms peculiar to their local conditions. One of these is the "three ups, three downs, and three announcements" model adopted by Runan County, Henan Province. The actual implementation of this model involved the following steps. First, villagers in various groups discuss and appraise each possible candidate to prepare an initial list of candidates and submits or "ups" it to the village election committee. At this stage, each group produces its own slate according to their preferences based on their majority opinion. Second, after reviewing the lists of candidates produced by various village groups or by the villager's representative conferences, the committee returns or "downs" an amended list back to the villagers for approval. Once the list has been reviewed and amended three times back and forth or "up and down", and also announced to the villagers in each stage, the administrator releases the final list of candidates and announces it three days before the election day. Since the candidates on the initial list are directly and freely put together by village voters, the initial lists have a wide representation and reflect the free will of the voters. Naturally there can be too many nominees on the initial lists-more than ten nominees are not uncommon-for a single position of village chairmanship, and the list has to be narrowed down to a manageable size of a handful of candidates. This selection of only a few final candidates materializes through the process of three "ups" and "downs". The focus of this model is to select candidates by means of negotiation and consultation between the voters and the village election committee. This model has some important positive implications. First, Chinese peasants can participate in the democratic process by voicing their opinions in the nomination of candidates before actual balloting. Second, through internal and advance compromises, this model can resolve conflicts, minimize overheating competition, and encourage social stability. Third, CCP village cadres can exercise their political power during the candidate adjustment period to keep up and strengthen their leadership on the villagers committee and villagers. This model also has some drawbacks. The main problem results from the fact that the consultation process is too vague and the restrictions are not clear enough. In particular, many local party branch secretaries and township cadres usually involved in the process may try to influence the election outcome. Consequently the peasant voters, not yet politically sophisticated, may not be able to free themselves from the conciliation or inducement of these dominant figures in the election process. Second, the present cadres can relatively easily be reelected by exercising their influence over election. This is because the leading figures responsible for administering the election process are the current villagers committee cadres. Under these circumstances, there can quite possibly be long-term career cadres. Third, this model is hardly practical in localities where deep-rooted factional or clan conflicts are predominant. This model, however, is relatively useful in stable villages. In order to minimize the influence peddling by the cadres and the process be kept transparent. I propose that in the first and second "up" processes the villagers take pre-election instead of consultations. Although this model of election has some problems to be resolved yet, the vast majority of localities in Henan Province conduct their elections according to this model and it is almost certain that this model will quickly spread to many other villages, because peasants generally consider they are exercising their political rights by voicing their opinions in the candidate selection processes.