Economic sanctions and effectiveness analysis on Russia : Focusing on Western sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions

Kim Byoung Hoon 韓國外國語大學校 國際地域大學院 2023 국내석사

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a second attack on Ukraine, further straining the global economy, which has been plagued by COVID-19. The West has imposed strong and diverse economic sanctions on Russia, and Russia's response to these sanctions has had a major impact on Russia's external economic environment and economy as a whole. The U.S. and the West have imposed tougher additional financial sanctions, including a ban on transactions with major Russian banks, a freeze on foreign exchange reserves, and blocking major banks' SWIFT networks. In the case of natural gas import restrictions, unlike the United States, no relevant provisions were introduced in the EU's economic sanctions package against Russia. However, since the REPowerEU plan introduced by the EU includes breaking away from dependence on Russian natural gas, it can be evaluated as actually taking on energy sanctions against Russia. Concerned that Western financial sanctions would reduce the value of the ruble and freeze gas bills, Russia demanded that Europe and other unfavorable countries pay for natural gas only in ruble, not in euro or dollar. It also sells natural gas, oil, and coal, which have not been exported to European countries, to China, India, and Turkiye. Russia is increasing its sales of Siberian natural gas, which opened in 2019, through its pipeline to China, and in particular through the Siberian Power Gas Pipeline, which runs through the Russian-Chinese border city of Blagovenesc. In this study, we examined Western sanctions against Russia and Russia's response, and attempted an empirical analysis on the effectiveness of sanctions through vector autoregressive analysis. The results of the empirical analysis showed that both natural gas price changes and exchange rate changes had a significant short-term effect on GDP changes, and that the effects of financial sanctions were offset in the short term as energy price changes had a greater impact on the Russian economy.

IS DPRK BACK IN RUSSIA’S MIND? : RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARD DPRK IN CONTEXT OF NEW EAST POLICY

엘리자 베타 북한대학원대학교 2023 국내석사

러시아와 북한은 대부분의 국제문제에서 상당한 의견일치를 보이고 있다. 양국의 친선은 갑작스러운 현상은 아니며, 북한과 긴밀한 관계를 유지 및 심화하기 위한 러시아의 지속적인 대외정책에 따른 결과다. 이러한 러시아의 대북정책은 2012년 신동방정책이 등장한 이후 변경된 것이다. 본 연구는 1991년 러시아연방 출범 이후부터 현재까지 러시아의 대북정책 변화에 집중한다. 1990년 대 러시아 외교정책은 위협요소를 판단하고 해결하는 것이 핵심이었다. 당시러시아는 경제 회복이 필요했고, 관련 강대국과 협력을 강화하는데 몰두할 수 밖에 없었다. 따라서 북한은 러시아 외교에서 주요 관심대상이 아니었다. 2000년대 초반 러시아는 양면외교를 실시했고, 그 결과 서방세계와 협력 유지와 더불어 아시아 국가와도 친선관계를 맺기 시작했다. 해당 기간은 국제적으로 다극체제를 형성해야 한다는 러시아의 대전략이 자리 잡은 시기이기도 했다. 그러나 러시아는 동아시아에 대한 일관된 전략을 수립하지는 못했고, 대북정책 역시도 가시적인 성과가 부족했다. 2014년 크림 위기 이후 러시아와 서방세계 사이 관계가 급격히 악화되면서 러시아의 대외정책도 바뀌었다. 러시아는 새로운 경제 파트너와 정치적 지지세력을 찾아야 했고, 아시아 국가와의 협력을 포괄적으로 발전시킬 것을 모색하기 시작했다. 그 결과 경제적, 정치적, 안보적 도전을 극복하는 것을 목표로 한 신동방정책이 추진되었다. 러시아는 신동방정책을 선포한 뒤 북한 정부와 경제적, 정치적으로 양국 관계를 발전시키고자 했다. 양국은 금융, 인프라, 무역 등을 경제적 구상을 실현하기 위해 노력했지만, 북한의 핵문제는 이것의 큰 장애가 되었다. 또한 북핵에 대한 러시아의 입장과 외교정책적인 교리로 인해 양국간 군사동맹이 형성된 것 역시 아니었다. 하지만 러시아는 동아시아에서 유일한 외교적 동맹국으로서 북한을 우선시하고 있으며, 북한 역시도 국제무대에서 러시아를 지지하고 있다. Russia and the DPRK show substantial solidarity on most international issues. Such fraternity between the two countries is not an accident, but a deliberate result of Russia’s policy of deepening ties with the DPRK government. In this regard, this study examines Russia’s policy toward the DPRK following the emergence of the New East Policy in 2012, placing it in the context of evolving Russian foreign policy since the foundation of the new Russian government in 1991 until the present day. Following the formation of the new government, Russia had to formulate a new foreign policy and identify the threats that it faced. In the 1990s, the Russian government pursued economic growth, and thus the main purpose of its foreign policy was aimed at improving ties with the economic powers. Therefore, the DPRK fell outside of Russia’s foreign policy focus. In the early 2000s, Russian foreign policy was ambivalent toward both developing ties with Asian countries and maintaining cooperation with the Western world. During this period, a vision of building a multipolar world took root in Russia’s grand strategy. However, the government did not set a coherent strategy toward East Asia, and its policy toward the DPRK failed to produce tangible results. After Russia’s relations with the West began to deteriorate rapidly after the 2014 Crimean crisis, its foreign policy behavior began to change as well. The Russian government needed to find new economic partners and political supporters, thus it sought to promote its New East Policy, which aimed at overcoming several economic, political, and security challenges by developing cooperation with Asian countries. After announcing the New East Policy, the Russian authorities focused on improving ties with the DPRK government to develop economic and political bilateral relations. Russia and DPRK attempted to realize various financial, infrastructure, and trade initiatives, but the nuclear issue hindered the countries from becoming reliable economic partners. They also could not be military allies as they were during the Cold War due to the doctrinal principles of Russia’s foreign policy and its position on the nuclear issue. However, Russia gives priority to the DPRK as it is its only diplomatic ally in East Asia and always stands with Russia on the global stage.

South Korea and Russia Trade Cooperation through The Northern Sea Route : focusing on LNG

다리아, 카메도바 부산대학교 대학원 2023 국내석사

South Korea and Russia have served as mutually important trade partners, and in the future, there is a need to promote and improve trade between the two countries. Nowadays, great attention has been paid to using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for shipment, which is often mentioned together with an export of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). Therefore, LNG can be expected to become the main trade commodity between the two countries for the vitalization of trade cooperation. By conducting a theoretical analysis of Russian and international literature, this thesis’s main aims state as follows: first, to try to solve problems in bilateral trade and provide implications for trade vitalization between Russia and South Korea. Second, to analyze the basic contents of the two countries' energy strategies and whether there is a need for energy cooperation between Russia and Korea, focusing on LNG. Third, to examine the relevance and eligibility of the Northern Sea Route for LNG shipping between the two countries. The research results are summarized as follows. It was confirmed that there is a potential for trade vitalization between the two countries through LNG trade via the Northern Sea Route. First, from the Korean perspective, there is a possibility to import LNG at a competitive price, reducing time and cost shipping via the NSR. Moreover, there is a potential for export increase by providing icebreakers and LNG tankers to Russia. Second, from the Russian perspective, there is a possibility of obtaining one more exporter of LNG in large quantities. Also, Russia can get a strong partner in the development of the Arctic region and the Northern Sea Route.

Formation of a Coherent Concept of Russia's National Interest in the Caspian Sea : A Constructivist Explanation

이유신 The Johns Hopkins University 2004 해외박사

This dissertation examines the Caspian legal dispute in the mid-1990s from the Russian perspective. In particular, it attempts to answer the question of why Russia moved toward cooperation in order to create a new international regime of the Caspian Sea. To do this, I rely on constructivism which emphasizes the role of both structures and agents in explaining foreign policy outcomes. First, I define the term "structure" in constructivism. Structure includes social practices which are the source of constraints/enablements on actors' behaviors. This definition significantly broadens Kenneth Waltz's definition of structure especially in the sense that the former includes ideational structure constituted by "the subjective and intersubjective meanings held by actors." Second, I operationalize one crucial doctrine of constructivism, structuration theory, by borrowing insights from theories such as neorealist theory, bureaucratic politics, coalition politics, and cognitive psychology. Relying on this analytical framework, I first explore how two main competing agencies - the Foreign Ministry and the oil industry faction - under varying domestic political and institutional settings interpreted external structures differently. I then investigate how these two agencies acted and interacted with other agencies. Finally, I examine how the structural consequences of these actions and interactions were perceived by the two competing agencies and constrained them over time. What matters here is process: the agencies' interpretations of structures led to policies that create social reality; this reality will be perceived by the agencies and then constrain/enable them all over again. By tracing this process, the analytical framework attempts to identify a causal mechanism of how Russia's Caspian policy moved toward cooperation, to be more exact, how the position of the oil industry faction won over that of the Foreign Ministry in late 1997. This examination demonstrates that the Foreign Ministry shifted its position because the reality created either intentionally or unintentionally through the interaction of the Foreign Ministry's opponents became increasingly distant from the ministry’s ideas between late 1993 and late 1997.

Correlation analysis between growth of Shanghai cooperation organization(SCO) and trade of Russia using gravity model

KIM SANG GYEONG 한국외국어대학교 국제지역대학원 2024 국내석사

The economic growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) has attracted the attention of the international community. The SCO has established its status as a giant multilateral cooperation organization by revitalizing economic cooperation among its members and diversifying its fields of cooperation into economic, financial, trade, and digital. It also accounts for 25% of the world's GDP and shows promise as a huge market. Along with the growth of the SCO, the trade volume between Russia and SCO member countries reached a record high of $263 billion in 2022. The share of SCO member states in Russia's total trade continues to grow. As Russia seeks to increase its trade with the Eurasian region, it is seeking to reorganize its SCO members into major trading partners. This is also a move to prepare for external factors such as sanctions against Russia and the financial crisis. The SCO is the most important economic cooperation organization and a way out for Russia, as Russia has tried to recover its economy based on the SCO whenever its economy was hit by shocks. Therefore, this study focuses on this phenomenon and analyzes the correlation between the growth of the SCO and Russia's trade. We conclude that the growth of the SCO is the growth of the economic size of the SCO, and that the expansion of its membership is the main factor in the growth of the SCO. In addition, we derived the factors of SCO growth and set up a research model based on the theoretical and empirical validity of the gravity model. We add dummy variables that are predicted to have an impact on Russian trade to enhance the robustness of the model. The empirical results show that the increase in the economic size of SCO member states has a positive effect on Russia's trade volume. HDI and trade openness, which are considered growth factors in the SCO, also have a positive effect, but FDI has a negative effect. Consistent with the original prediction of the gravity model, the distance variable had a negative effect. Given the geography of Russia and the presence of SCO member states bordering the country, we expected a positive effect of border contact, but the analysis showed a negative effect. Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which is based on a customs agreement, was also found to have a positive effect on Russian trade volume. It can be interpreted that FDI contributes positively to the economic growth of SCO member states, but it has a negative impact on Russian trade volume, as it provides opportunities for trade and cooperation not only with Russia but also with other countries. In addition, the negative effect of the common border can be explained by the fact that if the centers of logistics and national centers are far from the border, the effect of the common border cannot be significant.

Russia's gas pipeline politics towards East Asia : a comparative study of EU-Russia gas relationship

이경석 Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei U 2015 국내석사

On May 21, 2014 the Russo-Sino gas pipeline deal fired a flare that Russia shifts its eye on the East Asian gas market. Conventionally, Russia has highly concentrated on the European gas market and has taken fruitful political and economic interests. However, in 2014 after the aggressive political drive of Russia towards Ukraine, a harsh level of sanctions from the European Union and the United States has played a decisive role to alter the big picture of Russian gas policy. Combined with this external driving force, declining political control from the Kremlin to the Russia Far East also propels Russia to seriously consider the East Asian gas market. The East Asian gas market is one of the attractive targets of Russia because the traditional energy-poor East Asian countries; ROK, Japan and China have severely thirsted for a stable energy supply. In this respect, the altered Russian stance towards East Asia is expected to modify the sweeping energy dynamic in East Asia: The full-fledged energy supply and demand structure is now set up. However, what is Russia’s concrete gas pipeline blue print towards East Asia? And how can East Asian countries make more equitable gas cooperation with Russia? Yet, due to the lack of precedents in terms of gas ties between Russia and East Asian countries, this paper analyzes the Russia-EU gas pipeline cases to find the answer. In Europe numerous interstate gas pipelines are already constructed, with more pipelines under construction or being planned. Through scrutinizing the individual Russia-EU gas pipelines, this paper deduces three definite aims of Russian gas pipeline politics in Europe. Russian gas pipeline politics has been implemented to (1) minimize the role of the transit country; (2) directly target the high gas demand countries’ gas market; (3) wield political leverage towards CIS member states. Based upon the assumption of the inertia of Russian gas policy, Russia is expected to utilize the same gas pipeline politics towards East Asia. This paper sets forth three implications regarding Russia-East Asian gas pipeline politics: (1) East Asian should struggle to bolster multilateral cooperation; (2) East Asian countries must be on alert for increasing Russian political leverage; (3) ROK and Japan must diversify their gas pipeline routes to China.

An Analysis of the Korean Government Policy toward Russia : from High Politics to Low Politics : 역대 한국정부의 대러시아 정책 분석: 하이폴리틱스에서 로우폴리틱스로

양정윤 서울대학교 대학원 2015 국내석사

This paper aims to investigate Korean government policy toward Russia after establishing diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia in 1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea and Russia established diplomatic ties in 1990. For the last some 25 years, Korea has been implementing expansive diplomatic policy toward Russia. In 1994, under the former president Kim Young-sam administration, Korea-Russia relations were enhanced into ‘Constructive Mutually Complementary Partnership.’ In 2004, at the summit meeting held in Moscow, Korea-Russia relations were developed to ‘Mutually Trustful and Comprehensive Partnership’ and in 2008 the relations were once again upgraded as ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership.’ Korea and Russia shared similar view and interests on many issues, such as peace in the Korean peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue, economic interests, South Korea-North Korea-Russia Trilateral Cooperation including the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) extension, and so forth. However, neither Korea nor Russia could be completely assured of the stability of projects mentioned above due to the North Korea factor. For instance, constructing a Korea-Russia pipeline via North Korea is a lucrative project for both sides, but it causes complex security and military implications. Nevertheless, of special interest is that South Korea maintains its active foreign policy toward Russia for last 25 years. It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate transition of Korean government policy toward Russia for past years in the Korea-Russia relation. At first, it will provide an overview of Korean government policy toward Russia after the normalization of Korea-Russia relations in 1990, and then it will analyze changing focus of Korean government major policies toward Russia from high politics to low politics. Considering the transition of Korean government policy to Russia and its policy issues, it is estimated that Korea-Russia diplomatic relations has been moved from high politics area to low politics area. Within the subfield of international relations, the concept high politics covers all matters that are vital to the very survival of the state, namely national and international security concerns. In opposition, low politics is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state as the economics and social affairs. The hypothesis of this study is that the Korean government policy toward Russia started from high political area and gradually changed to low political area. Finally, this paper aims to evaluate Korean government policy toward Russia and implications from policy implementation.

(A) study on Russia's public diplomacy goals and strategies : focusing on the comparison between the Baltic States (B3) and the Visegrad Group countries (V4)

김애리 韓國外國語大學校 國際地域大學院 2019 국내석사

본 연구는 구소련 국가인 발트3국(이하 B3로 칭함)과 구소련의 위성국가였던 비세그라드 그룹 4국(이하 V4로 칭함)에서 오늘날 러시아의 공공외교정책이 어떤 유사점과 차이점이 있는지, 그리고 어떤 요인이 차이를 유발하는지 분석하고자 한다. 러시아의 공공외교는 특히 B3와 V4를 비롯한 탈 소비에트 국가들에서 중요한 외교정책 실행 수단이 되었다. B3와 V4국가들은 소련 해체 이후 EU와 NATO에 가입하며 서구세계로 통합되었음에도, 러시아는 여전히 이들 국가에 영향력을 행사하며 서구 세계와 러시아 사이에서 완충지대의 역할을 하기를 원한다. 그러나 이러한 목표 달성을 위해 군사력, 경제력과 같은 하드파워를 행사할 경우 해당 국가들의 대 러시아 인식 악화 뿐만 아니라 국제사회의 비난과 제재를 피할 수 없다는 것을 러시아도 잘 알고 있다. 따라서 러시아는 이 국가들이 러시아의 이익과 전략적 목표에 부합하게 행동하도록 만들기 위한 측면에서 소프트파워의 중요성을 인식하고 있으며, B3와 V4 지역에서 러시아의 소프트파워 강화를 위한 수단으로 공공외교정책을 활용하고 있다. 러시아의 공공외교에 관한 선행연구들은 러시아가 서구 국가들과 탈 소비에트 국가들에 각기 다른 공공외교 전략을 수립하고 실행하고 있다는 점은 밝히고 있다. 그러나 탈 소비에트 국가들 내에서도 러시아의 공공외교 전략이 어떤 차이를 보이는지를 분석한 연구는 없다는 점에서 본 연구는 의의를 가진다. 본 연구는 이 두 지역에 대한 러시아의 공공외교정책 수립과 실행이 어떤 유사점과 차이점을 보이는지 분석함으로써 러시아의 공공외교 전략을 보다 깊이 이해하고, 한국에 주는 함의를 도출할 수 있다.

ANOMIE, INSTITUTIONS, AND CRIME : THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTUIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND CRIME IN RUSSIA

김상원 University of Oklahoma 2003 해외박사

This dissertation examines social change, social institutions, and crime in Post-Soviet Russia. Russia has experienced rapid social and economic change following the collapse of the Soviet Union, creating anomic conditions and social disorganization. Further, as the country moves toward capitalism, it is likely that Russians are beginning to adopt a capitalist ideology and an emphasis on individual economic success that may go unchecked in the accompanying anomic environment. However, while anomie and the ineffective social control may increase crime rates, the strength of non-economic social institutions such as family, education, and polity may condition the impact of social change on crime and violence. In order to test these hypotheses generated by Durkheim and by Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory, I employ cross-sectional data from Russia’s 89 regions in 2000 and OLS regression techniques to examine (1) how the varying pace of negative social change in the country has influenced crime and violence, (2) if social institutions influence the cross-sectional variation of crime rates in Russia, and (3) the conditioning role in this relationship played by the strength of social institutions. The findings show that socioeconomic change is consistently positively and significantly related to the variation of regional homicide rates, but not robbery and burglary rates, in Russia. Social institutions play a mixed role in homicide and property crime rates in Russia. The strength of polity is negatively and significantly related to both homicide and property crime rates, while education is negatively related to homicide and has no association with property crime. Finally, of the three institutional measures, only education appears to condition the effects of socioeconomic change on homicide, while none of the non-economic institutions appear to condition the effects of socioeconomic change on property crime. In sum, the findings suggest that negative socioeconomic change in transitional Russia is important in explaining the variation of violence in Russia and that social institutions do not appear to condition the effects of negative socioeconomic change on crime and violence in the country.

The Agriculture Sector in Russia after WTO: Influence on CIS countries and Developing countries

Stanislav, Kan 고려대학교 국제대학원 2013 국내석사

On the 16th of December, 2011 Russia joined WTO. It led to the most controversial question which is under consideration nowadays. It is the problem of Russia WTO Accession’s consequences in terms of the agricultural sector and its influence on CIS and developing countries. Agriculture is one of the most important industries in the world, and the condition of it is different in each country, WTO may cause serious problems in Russia’s trade relationship with CIS countries and developing countries. In this paper, its purpose is to find out how Russia’s Accession to WTO can influence on CIS and developing countries in terms of agricultural trade. The paper aims to identify Russia’s commitments in the agriculture sector after WTO. Based on the theoretical part, the paper will explain WTO Accession’s consequences in Russia’s agriculture sector and its influence on CIS countries and developing countries. The paper consists of theoretical parts from the long process of Russia WTO Accession to its major characteristics of the agriculture sector. Then, there will be identification of Russia’s commitments in the agriculture sector after WTO. And based on the theoretical parts the paper will explain the influence of Russia’s Accession to WTO on CIS and developing countries. i