Dynamic Efforts for the Prosperity of the Homeland : 조국의 부강번영을 위한 적극 투쟁: 북한 해외동포정책에 대한 경제적 분석 : A Study of the Economic Dimension to North Korea’s Overseas Compatriots Policy

박정은 서울대학교 국제대학원 2013 국내석사

Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is evidence that, despite everything, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, in fact has been pursuing the “China model” of achieving economic development and opening-up without changing the political system. North Korea’s effort to improve its economy can be studied through a close look at a generally ignored facet of North Korea’s “foreign” relations: Pyongyang’s approach to “overseas compatriots”, in other words the Korean diaspora. The precedent for mobilizing overseas nationals as part of an economic development plan is a key element in the China model itself, considering the important role that overseas Chinese (huaqiao) played in the first stages of “reform and opening-up” as the only “capitalists” Beijing could trust. Similarly, Pyongyang has tried—albeit less successfully—to recruit overseas Koreans to assist in “economic construction.” This thesis examines the hidden economic dimension to North Korea’s overseas compatriots policy in order to show how the DPRK has tried, and failed, to mobilize ethnic Koreans in different parts of the world to help them open-up economically. In order to identify the economic dimension, it is necessary to provide an overview of North Korea’s overall concept of overseas Koreans. Through a close study of the views about and messages to overseas compatriots by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and North Korean state media, this thesis explains the central importance of three ideas that define North Korea’s approach to the disaspora: minjok, democratic minjok right, and gifts. In addition to these core concepts, North Korean materials use illustrative examples of North Korean leaders’ meetings with overseas businessmen to signal their economic approach to the Korean diaspora. Chapters three and four provide an in-depth examination of these concepts and messages. In order to put the general concepts and illustrative examples in context, this thesis next examines key developments over the past few decades in North Korea’s actual approach toward overseas Koreans, with a focus on drawing out the economic dimension to overseas compatriots policies. In this historical sketch of overseas compatriots policy, the focal point of North Korea’s attention can be seen to evolve over time, from an early focus on the large zainichi community in Japan, to an increased interest in the growing Korean-American population in the United States, and, most recently, to an intensifying relationship with chaoxianzu in the bordering provinces of China. The conclusion returns to the questions of how to understand North Korea’s effort to open-up and develop its economy based on its efforts to use overseas compatriots as “safe” capital, why North Korea feels it has to hide such efforts, and why these efforts so far have not been as successful as the DPRK hopes. The conclusion offers some basic recommendations for how North Korea’s efforts to leverage overseas Korean resources in support of “economic construction” could be done more effectively by taking the Chinese experience as a model. Keywords: North Korea and overseas compatriots, North Korean foreign relations, North Korean economic policies, overseas Korean diaspora, Chinese model, “minjok” 지난 20년간 경제위기에 시달리고 있는 북한과 그와 반대로 눈부신 경제성장을 하고 있는 중국을 바라보면서 사람들은 의아해 한다. “왜 북한은 중국모델을 따라가지 않는가”. 그러나 이런 일반적인 생각과 달리 북한은 중국 모델-즉 정치체제를 유지하면서 경제발전을 위한 개방을 꾀하는-을 추구해왔으며 경제상황을 개선하려는 북한의 이러한 노력은 일반적으로 간과되었던 북한의 “국제”관계, 즉 해외동포에 대한 접근법을 살펴보면 알 수 있다. 중국모델에서 “개혁 개방”의 초기 단계에 유일하게 신뢰할 수 있는 “자본가”로서 화교가 얼마나 큰 역할을 담당했는가를 고려했을 때, 경제 발전 계획에 있어서 화교는 매우 중요한 요소였다. 마찬가지로- 중국처럼 성공적이지는 못했으나-, 북한 역시 그들의 “경제 건설”에 해외동포를 끌어들이려 노력했다. 본 논문은 북한이 경제발전과 그를 위한 개방에 도움을 얻고자 세계 곳곳의 해외동포들을 동원하려 어떻게 시도 했으며 실패했는지를 보여주기 위해 북한 해외동포 정책의 숨겨진 경제적 측면을 연구한다. 이를 위해서 북한의 해외동포에 대한 개념을 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 본 논문은 김일성과 김정일 그리고 북한 국영 언론매체가 해외동포를 보는 관점 그리고 그들에게 전하고자하는 메세지를 자세히 살펴본다. 이를 통해 북한의 해외동포에 대한 접근법을 정의할 수 있는 중요 개념으로서 ‘민족’, ‘민족주의 민족권리’, ‘선물’ 이 세가지 단어를 선택하고 이 들의 중요성을 설명한다. 북한은 서적과 언론매체등을 통해서 북한 지도자들과 해외동포 사업가들과의 만남을 자세하게 다루므로써 이를 해외동포들에게 그들의 경제적 관심을 전하는 메세지로 사용한다. 본 논문의 제3장과 4장에서는 이 세가지 개념들과 메세지에 대한 심층 분석을 한다. 제5장에서는 이 개념들에 대한 좀더 자세한 예를 제시하기 위해 북한의 해외동포 정책의 경제적 측면에 초점을 두고 최근 수십년동안 북한이 실제로 어떤 정책을 발전시켜 왔는가를 알아본다. 이러한 정책의 역사를 통해 북한의 해외동포 정책의 포커스가 초기 재일동포에서 재미동포인구의 증가에 대한 관심으로 또 최근 중국 접경지역 조선족들과의 심화되는 관계로 발전되어가는 것을 볼 수 있다. 결론에서는 북한이 해외동포를 “안전한” 자본으로 이용하려는 노력을 통해 그 들의 경제발전과 개방에 대한 노력을 어떻게 이해할 것인가, 왜 북한은 이 의도를 감추려 하는가, 왜 지금까지의 이 노력들이 의도한만큼 성공하지 못했는가하는 질문으로 돌아간다. 또한 중국의 경험을 모델로 북한이 어떻게 하면 해외동포를 “경제건설”을 위한 자원으로써 더 효과적으로 활용할 수 있을지에 대한 제언을 담고 있다.

North Korea between reform and security : the interaction of economic reforms and security environment in China and North Korea

김유리 서울대학교 국제대학원 2014 국내박사

This dissertation is a comparative study of influences from security environment to economic reform decisions in China and North Korea, which resulted in a sharp contrast of economic consequences between the two countries. The puzzle was why North Korea did not, or failed to launch a comprehensive economic reform and opening as China did starting in the late 1970s. Many previous studies on the socialist economic reform, particularly on China, concentrates on the conditions of leadership change or urgent domestic needs to be the major causes of economic reform and opening. But there had been limitations in explanations on the North Korea case which were partly due to the lack of consideration of an additional condition, the influence of external factors. This study argues that the external factors, mainly the security environments, is one of major constraints of reform. Since the basic purpose of a socialist leadership was to keep their political regime safe and stable with economic prosperity, the reform decisions could not be allowed without a guarantee of regime security. In their interactions with the outside world, the security environment should be interpreted as supportive and utilizable for economic development with keeping the political regime safe. If the interpretations turned out as bringing more political threat than economic benefit, they became constraints of reform and opening. Four particular periods were selected for case studies on China and North Korea, two for each country regarding the critical years of reform attempts. The success or failure of each reform attempts found their causes from the interaction between the leadership and security environments. These interactions were reflected in the decisions of economic reform through two routes of influences, the political discourse and the political dynamics. One route is the intentional change of political discourses. When the security environments were interpreted as having improved, the leadership could utilize this as an opportunity to facilitate the pro-reform political discourses in their ideological slogans and propaganda. Another route is the construction of political dynamics. The improvements in security environments helped the top leadership to construct the pro-reform political dynamics among elites, empowering the economic experts to promote pragmatic economic measures. The cases on China dealt with two periods, one around the year 1978 and the other 1992, both critical years of reform and opening. The former was the starting point of reform with the rise of new leadership, and the latter was the second breakthrough which took place despite temporary retreat after the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War. The security environments were interpreted as becoming supportive by the reform leaders, and they managed to change the political discourses toward pragmatism and construct the political dynamics to shift power to the reformers. In North Korea, the two cases dealt with the periods around the year 1984 and 2002, times during which the leadership of Kim Jong Il had pursued certain pro-reform economic measures. There were a series of economic measures, including the Equity Joint Venture Law in 1984 and the announcement of the July 1st Measures in 2002, which however turned out to be limited and temporary in their effects. Security environments were fluctuating and significantly deteriorated right after the initiation of these reform attempts. The political discourses quickly returned to anti-foreign concepts and intensified with the military-oriented slogans due to the international changes interpreted as increasing threats. In political dynamics, the economic experts conducted the pro-reform measures whereas the conservative Party and military leaders maintained their superior political power. Although the economic experts had clear intentions of economic reform, the deterioration of security environments easily shifted the political power to the conservative leaders to put priority on military buildup and ideological mobilizations. The Chinese and North Korean leadership had clearly different interpretations on their security environments, influenced by accumulated historical memories and their interactions with the superpowers, neighboring countries, and another part of divided nation. Security environment of China was selectively utilized as opportunities with continuous improvements to facilitate pro-reform discourses and pro-reform dynamics. This resulted in continuous progress of the reform decisions. In North Korea, however, security environment was interpreted as rapidly deteriorating due the prolonged suspicions on foreign powers and conflicts with South Korea and the United States. This made North Korea intensify the anti-foreign discourses and limit pro-reform political dynamics. After several decades of these repeated interactions between external factors and the leadership, the economic performances turned out quite different in two countries. Now that a third generation leader Kim has emerged, North Korea is again seeking opportunities for economic reform and development while simultaneously seeking to preserve political regime security. This study provides some insights to both North and South Korea in terms of the changes in the security environments and the consequent policy decisions which changed the interaction dynamic between economic reform and regime security.

Analysis of Economic Reform in North Korea: Comparison with Chinese Case

하현지 서울대학교 국제대학원 2016 국내석사

In the 1990s, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the death of Kim Il-sung, North Korean economy entered one of its worst phases. North Korea faced various difficulties resulted from the planned economy. So it has been trying to make its endeavors to escape from economic crisis by reforming its economic system, albeit limitedly, since 2002, including 7.1 economic reform measure, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and Our Style Economic Management Methods. Then, is North Korea really adopting comprehensive economic reform since 7.1 Measures in 2002? If so, how far has the reform progressed? Will these changes in the North Korean economy eventually result in opening up like China did in the late 1970s? This paper aims to answer the questions above. It analyzes and assesses the change of North Korean economic policies and to see how far these economic changes have been progressed since July 1st 2002 by comparing with Chinese reform in the late 1970s. Therefore, it argues that North Korea is not launching a comprehensive economic reform as China did due to the several reasons. The North Korea economic policies are very similar to those of Chinese in the late 1970s. However, no one really knows what impact these policies have made in the North Korean society and it is likely that the result of those economic policies will not result in the same level of economic achievements in China. Compared to the Chinese economic reform in agriculture sector, industrial sector and in special economic zones, the prospects of the North Korean reform do not appear encouraging. The private property ownership is still not allowed, the market is still controlled by the government, it is less likely to attract foreign capital to special economic zones with the international isolation and it is impossible to confirm whether the central-government have decentralized authority. The country’s reforms have been limited both in scope and depth. The North Korea regime prefers political stability that it will not pursue any larger scale reforms because economic reform would likely undermine the stability of the regime. In other words, North Korea’s primary purpose is not economic development or economic recovery, but is a stabilization of the regime. It is true that the number of markets have been increasing, but North Korea still lacks of essential elements to launch a comprehensive economic reform as there are too many obstacles to be solved. Despite the recent economic policies introduced in North Korea over past 10 years, the prospects for the North Korean economy remain clouded due to the internal limits and absence of external cooperation. These obstacles make difficult for North Korea to reach beyond partial measures.

A STUDY ON NORTH KOREA’S NEW MEDIA PROPAGANDA STRATEGY: FOCUSING ON ‘DPRK TODAY’ INSTAGRAM CHANNEL

김정윤 경남대학교 북한대학원대학교 2024 국내석사

본 논문은 2016년부터 김정은 정권 하에 운영되어 왔던 북한 국영 매체인 조선의 오늘 (DPRK Today)의 인스타그램 채널을 중심으로, 북한의 뉴미디어 채널 수용 및 적극적인 활용을 통한 선전선동의 전략적 진화를 탐구한다. 북한은 김정은 시대에 들어 전반적으로 선전선동 시스템을 확대하는 일환으로 인스타그램을 운영해왔다. 대내적으로는 인민들을 사상으로 무장시키고, 대외적으로는 스스로를 고립시켜 은둔해온 북한이 최근 국제적으로 직면하고 있는 엄격한 제재에도 불구하고 이 같이 적극적으로 대외 프로파간다의 영역을 넓혀간 것은 기존의 제한적이던 신문과 방송의 단순 외국어 번역에서 벗어나 북한의 프로파간다를 현대화하고 더욱더 폭넓은 국제 청중을 목표로 함으로써, 북한에 대한 국제 언론의 부정적인 이미지에 맞대응한 것으로 보인다. 이 연구는 인스타그램에 초점을 두고 있으나, 북한의 전통적인 미디어 프로파간다 패러다임이 유튜브, 트위터, 페이스북, 팟캐스트 등을 포함한 현대 디지털 플랫폼으로 확장했다는 점을 중요도 높게 평가했다. 이 전환점은 단순히 기술적인 것이 아니라 글로벌 디지털화와 변화하는 지정학적 환경에 직면한 전략적 재조정을 의미한다. 본 연구의 핵심 목표는 북한의 한 뉴미디어 채널인 '조선의 오늘' 인스타그램을 통해 북한의 디지털 선전 전략의 다각적인 측면을 밝히는 것이다. 북한의 디지털 프로파간다와 기존 언론의 선전 전술, 대상 청중 및 메시지의 차이를 조명하고, 다른 국가주도의 디지털 프로파간다와 비교하여 북한 고유의 디지털 선전 전략을 분석하고자 한다. 이를 위하여 양적 연구인 텍스트 마이닝과 토픽 모델링, 질적 연구인 감정분석, 그리고 전통 미디어 콘텐츠와 비교 분석한 내용을 결합한 방법론적 접근 방식을 통해 이 연구는 북한이 뉴미디어에서 대외적으로 선전하고자 하는 전략적 메시지와 진화양상에 대한 탐구를 제공한다. 이번 연구 결과는 북한의 프로파간다 묘사에서 눈에 띄는 이분법이 있음을 밝혀냈다. 북한의 뉴미디어 프로파간다는 기존의 전통적인 신문, 방송, 통신사에서 보여지는 선전선동과 달리, 수령님 찬양에 대한 내용을 철저히 배제함으로써 독재정권과 관련된 은둔적이고 권위주의적인 내러티브와 극명한 대조를 이루며, 북한 주민들의 번영된 삶과 경제적 발전, 기술 발전 등을 강조함으로써 북한이 지극히 정상국가라는 이미지를 투영하는 것을 주 목적으로 하는 것으로 보인다. 이는 또한, 미국의 제재가 북한에 미치는 영향이 없으며, 서구 및 국제 언론에서 묘사하는 북한에 대한 부정적인 이미지를 정면으로 반박하는 역할을 하는데 일조하고자 했다. 이러한 뉴미디어에서의 활동은 북한의 글로벌 이미지를 재구성하기 위한 계산된 전략을 강조할뿐만 아니라, 현대 지정학적 영역에서 디지털 미디어의 힘에 대한 이해를 반영한다. 인스타그램에서의 짧은 포스팅 주기 및 상호작용 허용, 해시태그와 같은 기능을 통해 북한은 지난 8년간 현대화된 북한의 이미지를 투영하고, 북한을 자발적으로 접하지 않을 수 있는 세대의 국제 청중에게까지 적극적으로 북한의 내러티브를 선전할 수 있는 기회를 적극적으로 활용했다. 이와 같은 연구와 연구결과를 통해 본 논문은 디지털 시대에 북한의 복잡한 선전 활동을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 이 작업이 북한의 디지털 선전에 대한 학문적 담론에 기여할뿐만 아니라, 국제사회가 북한의 대외 커뮤니케이션 및 프로파간다 전략 진화 역학을 이해하고 대응하는 데 있어 실용적인 통찰력을 제공할 수 있기를 바란다. This thesis delves into the strategic evolution of North Korean propaganda, examining its embrace and adept use of social media channels, with a focus on the DPRK Today Instagram page - a key facet of North Korea's media landscape under Kim Jong-un's regime since 2016. The study is particularly salient, given the deteriorating state of North Korea's external propaganda amidst a backdrop of stringent international sanctions it faces recently. Historically, the regime has fortified its internal narrative with ideologically charged propaganda, while maintaining a relative seclusion from global media discourse or external propaganda. However, recent years have shown North Korea's active foray into digital media scene open to international audience. This turning point is not simply technological; it represents a profound strategic realignment in the face of global digitisation and a changing geopolitical environment. The main objective of this research is to uncover the multifaceted aspects of North Korea's digital propaganda strategy through the prism of 'DPRK Today' Instagram page. The study elucidates clear distinctions between North Korea's traditional and digital (or social media) propaganda efforts in their thematic contents, targeted audiences, strategies, goals and effectiveness. Employing a blend of quantitative and qualitative analysis such as text mining, topic modelling, sentiment analysis, and comparative studies, this research scrutinises the strategic narratives North Korea projects internationally on the social media channel. The findings reveal a striking dichotomy in the portrayal of North Korean propaganda. The regime's digital propaganda efforts are meticulously crafted to depict North Korea as a "normal state" with North Korean people enjoying burgeoning economy and advanced technologies despite a series of U.S. sanctions that are widely expected to have had a negative impact on North Korea. Also, the core contents omitting praising the leader, in stark contrast with the traditional media attempts to erase the reclusive, authoritarian image historically attributed to it. This juxtaposition underscores North Korea's strategic intent to remodel its international persona, reflecting a keen awareness of digital media's influence in modern geopolitical discourse. By thoroughly examining its recurring themes, keywords, alt texts of photos, captions and hashtags, as well as observing its evolution of strategies such as messaging, frequency of posting, engaging with the audience and how it differs from other state-run Instagram propaganda pages, the study transcends academic exploration, offering an intricate portrayal of North Korea's sophisticated propaganda mechanisms in the digital era. It sheds light on the politicisation of new media and unveils North Korea's employment of digital platforms as instruments of contemporary narrative shaping and diplomatic engagement. This research enriches academic dialogues on North Korea's digital propaganda tactics and furnishes actionable insights for policymakers, media analysts, and global community to navigate and counteract the emerging trends of digital communication strategies employed by states like North Korea.

(A) Study of alternative approaches toward the denuclearization of North Korea

김태호 경희대학교 평화복지대학원 2016 국내석사

The unstable international situation by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development has been started long time ago. Although a lot of efforts had been done by the international community to resolve the issue so far, rather, the issue got more troublesome and became an insoluble problem since the North’s nuclear technology and strategy had been developed and changed significantly. Even though negotiation and sanction had been made in earnest in order to solve the issue after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, in conclusion, all the methods had been failed in breaking the North’s will of nuclear possession. As a matter of fact, after the end of Six Party Talks, the issue has been stuck literally and seems to be an impossibly difficult problem. In this situation, this study tries to come up with a new alternative in approaching the North’s nuclear issue more realistically. It tries to focus on the current Kim Jong-Un regime’s nuclear strategy, in addition, also tries to focus on the change of the North Korean society to draw possible approach in affecting the North’s nuclear policy. It also addresses other countries’ nuclear renunciation cases which had been done after the end of the Cold War era to draw major motives of denuclearization. Thus, this study tries to present a new alternative approach toward the denuclearization of North Korea by the analysis of the current North Korea and nuclear renunciation case studies. This new approach can be more realistic method in resolving the issue, which already has been a chronic problem for a long time, by focusing the North’s recent strategy and society.

Revolution in North Korea? : cross comparison with the Romanian revolution

Park, Rosa Graduate School of International Studies, Korea Un 2014 국내석사

Thus far, North Korea has not reached the tipping point towards revolution. With a notoriously problematic regime under Kim Jong-un, North Korea should be a top priority for the international community. Crimes against humanity detailed by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) point to the necessity for change in North Korea. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-un has not hinted at any willingness to abide by international norms and standards. This paper will question why revolution has not yet occurred in North Korea and what the international community can do to pressure North Korea to instigate change. The situation in North Korea will be compared with the Romanian Revolution of 1989. There are substantial similarities between Kim Jong-un‟s North Korea and Nicolae Ceauşescu‟s Romania. However, there are also apparent differences that reveal a component of why there is not yet revolution in North Korea. The Romanian example points to the importance of revolutionary challengers, a permissive international environment, and state breakdown in the downfall of a brutal dictatorship. As North Korea follows the trajectory of Romania, a formula for the prospect of revolution can be assessed: increased reliance on China as well as other trading partners, reliance on quasi-state supported markets, continuous defection, international pressure in the form of strategic sanctions, and the status quo of political and social repression. It is the responsibility of the international community to implement policies, which pressure the Kim regime to structurally change to improve the quality of life for North Koreans. Otherwise, grievances will accumulate to critical mass and result in revolution.

North Korea as a revisionist state : leaders' political psychology of nuclear provocations

조평세 Graduate School, Korea University 2018 국내박사

김정은의 북한은 강도높은 핵/미사일 도발로 또다시 전 세계의 헤드라인을 장식하는데 성공했다. 2012년 김정은의 정권 세습 이후 6년동안 북한은, 김정일 시기 2회 핵실험의 두 배인 4회를 감행했고, 미사일 도발은 김일성과 김정일 통치시대 전체의 도발보다 세 배 가까이 증폭했다. 그리고2018년 1월부터 김정은의 북한은 국가 핵무력 완성을 이제 성취했음을 공표하며 미국과 대한민국에 대한 전면적인 평화공세를 전개하고 있다. 문제는 이러한 대량살상무기 개발을 통해 김정은 정권은 미국의 선제공격 위협과 국제사회에서의 고립을 초래하는 등, 그 체제를 안전하게 하기보다 더 불안하게 만드는데도 불구하고 왜 지속적으로 핵무기를 개발하고 도발을 증가하는가이다. 본 논문은 이 의문을 풀기 위해 신고전적 현실주의(neoclassical realist) 접근을 채택하여 북한을 현상타파국가(revisionist state)로 이해한다. 북한의 지정학적 환경과 동북아시아에서의 힘의 분배가 핵개발 등 북한의 외교정책 행위를 설명하는데 결정적인 중요성을 가지고 있음을 인정함과 동시에, 본 논문은 북한 지도자의 심리와 국가정체성 인식 등을 매개설명변수로 설정하여 그들이 외부환경을 어떻게 인식하고 해석하여 핵 도발로 연결시키는지 더 깊이 탐구한다. 지금까지 북한에 대한 연구는 대부분 체제적(systemic) 접근방식, 혹은 국제적 분석수준(international level of analysis)에 치중되어 왔다. 이 때문에 북한의 외교정책행위를 분석하는데 있어 “현상유지 편견”(status-quo bias)에서 자유롭지 못했다. 이는 북한이 모든 여타 합리적 국가 행위자(rational state actor)와 같이 지정학적 위치와 상대적 힘의 분배에 단순히 반응하여 현상을 유지하려고만 한다는 제한된 진단과 이에 따른 불완전한 처방을 내리게 했다. 하지만 최근 발달된 지도자의 발언 컨텐츠를 분석하는 다양한 방법론과 도구들을 통해 북한의 외교정책결정과정에 대해 보다 깊고 새로운 연구들을 할 수 있는 가능성이 열렸다. 특히 지도자의 공개연설 등에서 “운영코드”(Operational Code)를 추출하는 verbs-in-context-systems (VICS) 방법을 통해 국가지도자의 외교정책결정의 성향적(dispositional) 변수들을 분석할 수 있게 되었다. 또한 쟈크 하이만스 (Jacques Hymans)의 “외부행위자 계수법”(external-actor counting method)은 국가지도자의 “국가정체성인식”(National Identity Conception, NIC)을 파악하여 핵무기 개발 경향의 정도를 분석하기도 한다. 현재까지 이런 유용한 연설 컨텐츠 분석도구들은 매우 소수의 논문에서만 북한 행태연구에 적용되었고, 특히 이 도구들을 이용한 북한의 3대 세습 지도자 김정은의 공개연설 분석과 핵 도발 증가 설명변수 분석은 아직까지 전무하다. 본 연구에서는 이 인지심리학적 컨텐츠 분석 방법들을 활용하여 북한의 김정은 시기 핵 도발 증가를 설명하고자 한다. 먼저 북한 핵개발의 지정학적 그리고 역사적 맥락을 검토하여 북한의 현상타파적 국가정체성을 파악하고 북한 대내외정책의 지도 이념이라고 할 수 있는 주체사상의 발전과정을 설명한다. 또한 이 주체사상이 어떻게 수령 개인숭배와 결합되어 더 공고화되었는지 그 배경을 설명한다. 이를 통해 북한의 핵무력 추구가 그 현상타파적 국가정체성과 통일혁명전략의 당연하고 타협 불가능한 결과일 뿐임을 설명한다. 그 다음, 이 설명을 뒷받침하기 위해 정치/인지심리학적 분석도구들을 이용하여 북한지도자의 “국가정체성인식”과 “운영코드”를 도출한다. 그 결과 본 연구는 김정은의 “적대적 민족주의”(oppositional nationalism)와 “현상타파적”(revisionist) 성향이 지난 두 지도자들보다 현저히 더 강해진 것을 밝히고 그의 집권 이후 핵 도발 증가를 설명한다. 이 연구결과의 정책적 함의는 다양하다. 먼저 기존 학계의 북한 핵개발 원인에 대한 이해, 즉 북한의 핵개발은 단순히 체제의 생존을 위한 것이라는 것과 북한의 지도자는 단순히 “합리적 행위자” 라는 보편적 견해에 이의를 제기한다. 이는 미국과 대한민국의 대북전략에 상당한 변화를 주문한다. 또한 학술적으로는 기존 국제정치 학계에서 만연한 “현상유지 편견”을 탈피하여 신고전현실주의 모델을 바탕으로 한 “행위자 특정”(actor-specific) 중심 외교정책연구의 가능성에 따른 추가 연구과제들을 제시한다. Kim Jong-un’s North Korea has successfully gotten the world on its nerves once again with its brazen nuclear provocations. Nuclear explosive tests since Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power in 2012 doubled that of his father Kim Jong-il, and his missile tests in his first six years have almost tripled that of the entire period of reign under his father and grandfather combined. Since January 2018, Kim Jong-un’s North Korea is embarking on a full-scale peace offensive toward the US and South Korea, proclaiming to have finally achieved the completion of its nuclear weaponization. The puzzle is why the North Korean leader would accelerate his development of the weapons of mass destruction when doing so would make his regime less secure, rather than more secure, by inviting a preemptive military attack and further sanctions and isolation from the international community. This research assumes a neo-classical realist approach to tackle this puzzle and in turn observe North Korea as a revisionist state. While acknowledging the determining importance of North Korea’s geopolitical environment and relative power distribution in Northeast Asia in explaining and predicting its foreign policy behavior, this research further explores the intervening variables of leader psychology and national identity perceptions to see how the external operating environment has been perceived and translated into nuclear provocations. Researches on the regime’s foreign policy making have suffered heavy tendencies to adopt a systematic approach, or an international level of analysis, that generate a “status-quo bias” when trying to understand and predict its behavior. In other words, taking for granted that North Korea behaves like all rational state actors do simply in response to geostrategic international position to preserve the status-quo, studies on its foreign policy behaviors have offered limited diagnoses and prescriptions. Despite the common obstacles of the lack of data in North Korea studies, however, recent advancements in analytical methodologies on state leader’s public speeches have opened fresh research possibilities on the inner workings of North Korea’s foreign policymaking. Most notably, verbs-in-context-systems (VICS) method to extrapolate the leaders’ “operational code” has been widely utilized to analyze state leaders’ dispositional factors in foreign policymaking. Also, Jacques Hymans’ method of “external-actor counting” has offered helpful quantitative content analyses of state leaders’ public statements to measure “national identity conceptions” that explain their proclivity to develop nuclear weapons. These analytical tools have been applied in only a handful of researches on North Korea, and there are none that analyzes the speeches of Kim Jong-un using these methodologies to explain the recent rise in nuclear provocations since his assumption of power. In this research, these cognitive-psychological methods of content analysis are utilized to explain North Korea’s nuclear provocations. Before employing these tools however, the research thoroughly examines the geopolitical and historical context of North Korea’s revisionist national identity to determine the operational environment where the regime is positioned and from which its juche nationalist outlook is developed and further reinforced by its suryong cult. From this, it is demonstrated that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-armed statehood is only a natural and non-negotiable manifestation of its national identity and revolutionary reunification strategy. To support this argument further, the cognitive-psychological methodologies are used to determine North Korean leaders’ “national identity conceptions” and “operational codes”. The analysis finds that North Korean leaders’ “oppositional nationalism” and “revisionism” have increased along the two successions of power, and that the current leader Kim Jong-un displays the highest revisionist orientations and proclivities to develop nuclear weapons for his juche unification revolution. The policy implications from this research are manifold. Conventional understanding on the North Korean regime that its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are for mere security and survival, and that its leader is merely a unitary rational actor, is challenged. In turn, several aspects of strategy and policy of the US and the Republic of Korea are called for change. This research also calls for a break from the “status-quo bias” in IR scholarship to suggest further research in “actor-specific” foreign policy analysis under the neoclassical realist framework.

노무현정부와 이명박정부의 대북정책 비교

강선태 건국대학교 행정대학원 2009 국내석사

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the policies toward North Korea of Rho Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung-Bak governments and to find out the difference and the identicalness on the policy of the two regimes based on this analysis and grope the appropriate and consistent direction of North Korea Policy by overcoming the difference. The followings are the results of the comparison on the North Korea Policy of Rho Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung-Bak governments. 1. The North Korea Policy approaching methods of the two regimes are totally different. Rho Moo-Hyun government approached the relationship toward North Korea with the viewpoint of nationalism while Lee Myung-Bak government is approaching it as international relationship. So, in case of the North Korea Nuclear, Rho Moo-Hyun government dealt with it separately according to the principle of separation of politics and economics. Rather, his regime had a tendency to indentify the North Korea Nuclear as a separate issue between the North Korea and the U.S. As a result, the solution for the North Korea Nuclear appeared differently. Rho Moo-Hyun government intervened actively with the viewpoint of nationalism, but at the same time they would sometimes kept the passive attitude. On the contrary, Lee Myung-Bak government proclaimed the principle of denuclearization and opening 3,000 from the beginning, and clearly announced that they would support the North Korea based on the progress of the nuclear issue, and they are applying practicalism and mutualism as methods. Current relationship between the two Koreas is completely blocked and its future is opaque since Lee Myung-Bak regime. 2. There are many factors for backgrounds which form the North Korea Policy, but it appears to be greatly affected by ruler's value, belief, philosophy, and experiences in life. If it is the formula for the North Korea Policy to be determined by the mutual consent of the nation rather than by the particular political party or a ruler, it is my judgment that being changed of the North Korea Policy according to the change of the regime is not appropriate. 3. I observed the North Korea Policy with the viewpoint of integration theory, but I think the relationship between the two Koreas has a limitation. The North Korea approaching method with the viewpoint of functionalism is clearly expected to be effective, but it is difficult to judge the policy effect because continuous interchanges and cooperation is a challenge. 4. As Lee Myung-Bak government began, there were three causes for blockage of the South Korea-North Korea Relations. All three factors were related to the North Korea Policy, and one of them is judged to be North Korea's complaint because Lee's regime is pressuring North Korea with the policy of denuclearization and opening 3,000 whose conditions are not acceptable to them. The second cause is the insertion of the unique socialism emotion that they feel the joint declaration and mutual agreement set by Kim Jeong-Il of North Korea and the former presidents Kim Dae-Joong and Rho Moo-Hyun are selectively accepted by the President of South Korea. And the third factor is that the terms and policies on North Korea Policy are hard to be accepted by North Korea. As an example, the term Denuclearization and Opening 3,000 seems to be no problem as a North Korea Policy term for South Korean government, but it is a policy and term that is hard to be accepted by the North Korea side, namely, the North Korea Nuclear is not only a threat as a nuclear weapon, but also it is being used as a mean to maintain its system in North Korea. That is because the U.S is the only answer for the security of North Korea's system if they choose to follow the principle of denuclearization in the Korean peninsular and to be guaranteed of its system. 5. Henceforth, the appropriate directions for North Korea Policy are as followings. First, we will have to carefully review the strategy of the U.S for the northeast Asia and manage the neighboring countries and North Korea in order to accomplish the unification by establishing the North Korea Policy that will be favorable to our side in terms of North Korea Relations. Second, while maintaining the principle, the policies toward North Korea of the governments of Rho Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung-Bak should be mixed and implemented, and it should be directed toward the strengthening of practicalism and mutualism. In other words, it is my thought that it will be wise to choose a comprise which corrects the bad habits of North Korea step by step as we drive the North Korea Policy toward practicalism and mutualism while supporting North Korea.

North Korea’s trade with China : aggregate and firm-level analysis

정승호 서울대학교 대학원 2014 국내박사

This dissertation uses firm-level as well as aggregate data to investigate the economic relationships between North Korea and China. More specifically, it analyzes the effects of North Korea-China trade on the economic growth of North Korea. It further discusses the impacts of sanctions by South Korea and Japan on North Korea-China trade. Finally it estimates the determinants of the performance of firms that are trading with North Korea in China Chapter 2 uses cointegration tests and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to examine causality between Sino-North Korean trade and economic growth of North Korea from 1970 to 2012. To carry out empirical analysis, VECM is constructed, which is comprised of four variables, GDP, exports, imports, and investment. Investment is used as the key explanatory variable of economic growth, and imported capital as a proxy of investment. The cointegration equation suggests that the mechanism of North Korea’s economic growth is basically similar with that of low income, market-oriented countries, in the sense that trade and foreign capital inflows do matter for its growth. The estimation of the VECM shows that, in the long-run, exports, imports, and investments Granger-cause income through error correction mechanism, but not vice versa. With respect to short-term causality, however, the variables have little causal relations with each other except for causality flows from imports to exports. This shows that traditional barter-type settlement is still prevalent in Sino-North Korean trade. Chapter 3 addresses the question whether North Korea–China trade dilutes the effects of the unilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea and Japan, and if so, to what extent and in what way. It finds structural adjustment of North Korea’s export pattern in size and trade type for the purpose of diluting the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions, imposed by South Korea in particular. It also finds that South Korea’s economic sanctions significantly boost North Korea’s exports to China, and the export increase has been large enough to cover the loss from South Korea’s sanctions. In particular, North Korea has increased both exports to the Chinese domestic market (through general trade) and exports transferred in China (through bonded trade). These findings show that North Korea has mitigated the economic damage of sanctions by employing a broad range of techniques for trade diversion. The changes would take place because incentives of both North Korean regime and foreign firms meet well particularly after South Korean sanctions. Finally, Chapter 4 identifies the determinants of Chinese firms’ performance by using the survey data of the firms that trade with North Korea in Dandong, China. The survey was conducted in 2012 and 2013 to assess the impact of the sanctions imposed by South Korea in 2010. 138 firms engaged in trade with North Korea are used in the analysis out of 174 sample firms. With special attention paid to the firms’ relationships with their North Korean partners, it finds that the business ties with army-affiliated North Korean counterparts have a stronger positive effect on the performance of Chinese firms than the ties with other counterparts. In particular, the business ties between the Han zu companies and the army-affiliated North Korean partners are found to be the most influential. This empirical finding suggests that North Korea’s “military first” polices de facto regulates resource allocation mechanisms in North Korea’s export sectors, after the imposition of South Korean sanctions. It also finds that Chinese firms that have more partners and formal dispute resolution channels tend to achieve more favorable outcomes in cross-border exchanges with North Korea, because these features function as hedge against the risk from North Korea’s unstable ‘Wa-Ku’ system. The following chapters are all self-contained and can be read independently.

North Korean Official Text Analysis

김재호 서울대학교 대학원 2022 국내석사

This thesis quantifies the sentiment innated in articles that KCNA published towards South Korea and the United States from 2014 to 2020 with text analysis method as well as finds the factors that affect sentiments. Analyzing English translated articles and official statements that KCNA contains help to understand precise perception that North Korea possesses towards South Korea and the United States by minimizing the nuance difference between North and South Korean language. Moreover, it is possible to find the factors that affects to perception changes through main keywords that appear in a certain period. In addition, this thesis shows its significance in providing numerical value in perception change and enabling more precise comparison, while previous studies are limited to categorize the perception change into deterioration, amelioration, and stalemate. This thesis used ‘TF-IDF,’ a method that calculates the importance of a text in a set of documents, and the ‘SentiWords’ database that quantifies the sentiment of English words between -1 to 1 to calculate a perception beneath each article and listed frequently used keywords in a certain period. Those values are verified by comparison with the results previous research presents. As a result, it is concluded that North Korea’s perceptions toward South Korea and the U.S. are based on its ambivalent perceptions that South Korea is both an enemy and a partner to reunify while the U.S. is an enemy, threats to its survival and a partner to cooperate. Upon these basic perceptions, temporary factors shift the overall perception. Additionally, it is observed that North Korea maintains its favorable stance on having conversation with South Korea and the United States. The trendline of North Korea’s perception towards South Korea and the U.S. shows similarity with previous research that used quantitative methods. This study focused on the quantification of North Korea’s perception that has not been spotlighted in North Korea studies. It is expected that the research is able to assist objectivity in North Korea studies since major methodologies on North Korea studies are criticized due to reflection of scholar’s perspectives and provide a positive outlook on denuclearization and the U.S.-North Korea summits 이 논문은 조선중앙통신이 2014년부터 2020년까지 한국과 미국을 향해 실은 기사들을 텍스트 분석을 통해 그 속의 감정을 계량하고 그 감정에 영향을 미치는 요인들이 무엇인지 확인하는 연구이다. 본문에 대한 텍스트 분석과 단순 기사만이 아닌 조선중앙통신이 실은 정부 부처 혹은 주요 인물의 성명서 또한 분석함으로써 북한이 각 국가에 가지고 있는 인식을 조금 더 정확히 반영할 수 있으며, 시기별 주요 키워드를 통해 북한이 각 국가에 가지고 있는 인식에 영향을 미치는 요인이 무엇인지 또한 파악할 수 있다. 그뿐만 아니라 이전의 연구들이 국가 간 관계가 좋고 나쁨의 카테고리 속에서 분류하고 있던 것과 달리 본 연구에서는 감정의 계량화를 통해 시기별 감정을 더욱 세분화하여 비교할 수 있게 되었다는 점에 의의가 있다. 각 기사의 감정을 계량하기 위해 문서 내의 각 단어의 중요도를 계산해주는 TF-IDF 방법과 각 단어의 감정을 -1에서 1의 범위 안에서 수치화한 ‘Sentiwords’ 데이터베이스를 통해 각기 문서들의 감정을 계산하였으며, 각 문서 속에서 많이 나타난 단어들과 해당 시기의 남북, 북미 관계의 정성적 분석을 통해 밝혀낸 북한의 인식에 영향을 미친 요인과의 비교를 통해 기사 내 주요 어휘와 인식변화에의 영향과의 상관관계를 검증하였다. 그 결과 북한은 한국을 ‘적’과 ‘통일의 대상’이라는 시선으로, 미국을 ‘협력의 대상’이자 자신을 ‘위협하는 존재’라는 이중적인 시선으로 바라보고 있음과 동시에, 이러한 복합적인 시선을 토대로 일시적인 요인들에 의해 감정이 변화하고 있음을 확인하였으며 북한이 한국, 미국과의 대화에 긍정적인 시각을 견지하고 있음을 확인하였다. 문서의 감정 수치화를 통해 본 북한의 대미, 대남 인식 추이가 기존의 정성적 분석을 통한 연구들과 유사하게 진행되고 있음을 확인하였다. 본 연구는 지금까지 북한 연구에서 시도되지 않았던 ‘감정의 수치화’에 주목하였다. 이를 통해 지금까지 북한 연구에서 비판받아 온 ‘연구자의 시각 반영’이라는 부분에서의 객관성을 보조하는 역할을 할 수 있을 것이라 기대된다. 더불어 추후의 비핵화를 및 북미 협상에 긍정적인 전망을 가져다줄 수 있다고 기대된다.