Nuclear decisions : why states acquire or forgo nuclear weapons

이호정 Graduate School, Korea University 2010 국내석사

It seems that grave security threats lead states to consider going nuclear. However, even in the situation that the adversaries possess nuclear weapons, some states choose not to acquire the nuclear arsenal. This runs counter to the estimation of worrisome nuclear cascade. Then in the same serious threats, the enemies’ nuclear armament, why do some states forgo nuclear acquisition while others pursue nuclear weapons development? First, the alliance restraint can affect a nuclear bidder’s decision. A powerful ally can assure the state facing danger by providing extended nuclear deterrence. The protection by an ally can significantly decrease the need of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the ally can make the nuclear seeker to give up the nuclear weapons program by posing threats of abandonment. If the security assurance is reliable and the threats are credible, the nuclear seeking state is likely to forebear nuclear acquisition. Second, military pressures by states which have interest in stopping the nuclear bidder can be the supplementary factor affecting nuclear decisions. If the pressures are credible enough, the nuclear seeking country would hesitate to pursue the nuclear weapons program. Through two case studies, this research shows how the two factors affect state decisions on nuclear weapons acquisition. With restraints by the United States and latent threats posed by neighboring countries, South Korea is not trying to develop nuclear weapons despite nuclear threats from the North. On the other hand, failure of alliance restraint by Washington and weak military threats from India led to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development.

북한의 핵보유국화와 미·중 패권경쟁 : 3차 북핵위기와 북·미·중 전략적 삼각관계

이우탁 동국대학교 일반대학원 2023 국내박사

As the US-China competition intensified, the North Korean nuclear issue went through fundamental transformation. Changes in North Korea-U.S.-China’s strategic triangle relationship—formed by “nuclear links”—clearly shows such transition from one phase to another. During the first and second North Korean nuclear crises, North Korea usually carried out crisis-creating diplomatic acts during the “stable marriage” stage to shift to a negotiating phase (“romantic triangle” or “Ménage à Trois”). This speaks to the dynamics of the strategic triangle in which North Korea takes advantage of the difference in the strategic interests of China and the United States. In the third North Korean nuclear crisis, however, the dynamics were not recreated due to changes in U.S.-China relations; The U.S. refused to negotiate denuclearization with North Korea, setting its top priority on pressuring China. This led to a new type of “stable marriage” between the three countries. In the third nuclear crisis, the U.S. was positioned to determine the pattern of strategic triangle relations. The U.S. mobilizes all available means to win an all-out strategic competition with China, and North Korea's nuclear arsenal is no exception. There are a growing number of casehina hegemonic competition is decided, it is highly likely that the U.S. will not rush denuclearization negotiations while refusing to recs of North Korea's nuclear card being used to pressure China. Until the direction of the U.S.-Cognize North Korea as a "nuclear power." The U.S. will aim at pressuring China with North Korea's existing nuclear force. In response to the U.S., China is also carrying out all kinds of offensive and defensive measures. The hegemonic challenger is trying to strengthen its alliance with North Korea by strengthening economic support. China has also opposed the adoption of additional sanctions against North Korea by the UN Security Council. This backup has provided many opportunities to nuclear-equipped North Korea. It will take quite a long time to find out how the U.S.-China strategic competition will end up. North Korea will have completed its nuclear weapons by that time, raising the possibility of North Korea being recognized as a de facto nuclear state. This is related to the nuclear imbalance on the Korean peninsula as well as the development of the second nuclear era. If North Korea becomes a de facto nuclear state, South Korea must respond. It is about time for South Korea to build a new security strategy, a policy of "nuclear balance," moving away from the past 30 years of denuclearization. If North Korea becomes a de facto nuclear state, South Korea must respond. This study suggests a new security strategy for South Korea: a policy of "nuclear balance," moving away from the past 30 years of denuclearization. South Korea will implement the “nuclear-to-nuclear” principle to form a nuclear balance in the Korean peninsula. Such strategy ensures the safety of South Korean citizens from North Korea’s nuclear attack threats and ultimately directs the two Koreas to return to the path of denuclearization. Key words: nuclear states, US-China hegemonic competition, America's tactical negligence, North Korea's a de facto nuclear state. South Korea’s New Security Strategy. nuclear balance 3차 북핵 위기를 북·미·중 전략적 삼각관계 이론을 적용해 분석해본 결과 1, 2차 핵위기 때와는 다른 특징을 발견할 수 있었다. 미중 전략경쟁이 고조되면서 그 이전에는 볼 수 없었던 새로운 형태의 ‘안정적 결혼’ 유형이 나타난 것이다. 이 유형은 미국을 중심으로 중국과 북한 관계가 모두 부정적이며, 북한과 중국만이 우호적인 관계를 의미한다. 이런 현상은 기본적으로 미중 관계의 변화에서 초래됐다. 1차 북핵 위기 때 미국은 국력이 미약했던 중국을 의식하지 않고 북한과 직접 협상을 진행했다. 그 결과가 1994년 북미간 제네바 합의였다. 2차 위기 때는 미국에 의해 중국이 북핵 협상에 참여하는 것이 용인된 상태됐다. 1,2차 핵위기 때를 전략적 삼각관계 이론으로 분석해보면 북한의 위기조성행위(NPT탈퇴선언, 1차 핵실험)로 국면이 전환되면 전략적 삼각관계 유형도 ‘안정적 결혼 유형’에서 ‘낭만적 관계 유형’으로의 전환이 일어났다. 미중패권경쟁이 본격화된 3차 북핵위기에서는 이런 전환이 이뤄지지 않았다. 미국은 중국을, 중국은 미국을 주적으로 설정한 패권대결을 하게 되면서 북한의 현상변화(핵무력 완성) 속에서도 미국과 중국이 협력해 이를 막기 위한 노력을 하지 않기 때문이다. 북핵 문제보다도 미중관계가 더 중요한 변수가 된 것이다. 이런 현상은 미중 전략경쟁이 진행되는 동안에는 계속될 것으로 전망된다. 이렇게 본다면 미중 전략경쟁의 전개로 인해 북한 핵문제가 과거의 비확산 이슈에서 세력균형 문제로 속성이 전환되고 있음을 알 수 있다. 미국이 자국의 패권을 지키기 위해 도전국 중국을 강력히 견제하는 것을 가장 우선시 하는 시기인 만큼 3차 북핵위기 과정에서 미국은 북한의 위기조성행위나 협상안 제시에도 크게 반응하지 않는다. 중국을 제압하는데 주력하기 때문이다. 심지어 미국은 북한핵을 중국을 압박하는 수단으로 활용하는 경향을 보이고 있다. 이로 인해 미국은 전략적 삼각관계 양상을 결정하는 위상에 서게됐다. 이런 상황에서 미국은 중국을 굴복시키는데 유효한 수단이 될 수만 있다면 한시적이지만 북한의 핵무력에 대한 ‘전략적 묵인’을 할 가능성을 배제할 수 없다. 중국은 패권도전국으로서 지배국 미국에 불만족을 느끼는 북한과 동맹강화를 통해 맞서려 하고 있다. 이 과정에서 북한이 보유하고 있는 핵무력은 중국에게 더 이상 문제가 되지 않을 수 있다. 중국에게 북핵 이슈는 과거에는 비확산 문제였지만 이제는 미국과의 패권경쟁과 결부된 세력균형 문제로 비화된 것이다. 중국에 의한 북한 감싸기는 핵무력을 완성한 북한에게는 기회의 공간을 더욱 넓히게 했다. 이러한 상황은 북한에게 사실상 핵보유국으로 가는 구조적 환경을 제공해주고 있다. 북한이 새로운 의미의 ‘사실상 핵보유국’ 으로 존재할 수 있다는 것은 국제적인 제2차 핵확산 시대의 중대한 사건이다. 또 시야를 한반도로 좁혀보면 북한에 의한 핵불균형이 초래된 것을 의미한다. 한국에게는 중대한 안보 위협이며, 한국의 안보정책의 패러다임 변화를 요구하는 것이다.

Nuclear Effective Theory of µ → e Conversion

Rule, Evan Johnson University of California, Berkeley ProQuest Disser 2022 해외박사(DDOD)

The coming decade promises exceptional experimental progress in searches for charged lepton flavor-violating (CLFV) µ → e conversion due to efforts at Fermilab (Mu2e) and J-PARC (COMET). Branching ratio sensitivities for this process are expected to advance by four orders of magnitude, potentially extending the reach of these probes up to energies of 104 TeV. A pressing challenge for theorists is to extract the maximum amount of information about possible sources of CLFV from these measurements, whether or not a signal of new physics is detected. Efforts to observe µ → e conversion share many similarities with other experimental programs where the nucleus is treated as a laboratory in which to search for beyond-standard model (BSM) physics. These approaches are utilized because they present certain practical advantages: In searches for CLFV, the act of trapping a muon into the Coulomb field of a nucleus allows one to control the energy of the final state electron, ensuring that it is maximal compared to the energy of background electrons originating in standard-model free muon decays. The downside of employing the nucleus as part of the apparatus is that a host of complex nuclear physics consequently intervenes between the experimentalist and the desired observable. To extract meaningful constraints, one must have a method for disentangling the nuclear physics from the underlying BSM physics. Another experimental setting in which the nucleus is treated as a laboratory is in direct detection searches for weakly-interacting massive particle (WIMP) dark matter, where one aims to discern the mass, spin, and fundamental interactions of WIMP dark matter through scattering off of atomic nuclei. Again, to access the sought-after information about BSM physics, one must be able to separate it cleanly from the nuclear physics. In the case of dark matter direct detection, this separation has been achieved through the development of an effective theory formulated at the nuclear scale, which factorizes the nuclear physics from the BSM dark matter physics, sequestering the latter quantity into unknown low-energy constants (LECs) that are probed directly by experiment. As the effective theory describes the most general coupling between the WIMPs and the nucleus, the LECs that specify the effective theory represent the maximum information about the nature of dark matter that can be obtained from scattering off of nuclei. In this thesis, we introduce an analogous effective theory for the problem of µ → e conversion. In order to adapt the existing framework to the problem at hand, several significant modifications are required, primarily stemming from the differing nature of the particles that couple to the nucleus in each scenario: non-relativistic plane-wave dark matter must be replaced by a bound muon in the initial state and an ultra-relativistic electron in the final state. We focus primarily on the case of elastic µ → e conversion, wherein the nucleus remains in its ground state (as this ensures that the energy of the outgoing electron is maximal).The three-momentum transferred from the leptons to the nucleus q ≈ mµ is comparable to the inverse nuclear size, allowing significant angular momentum to be transferred between the leptons and the nucleus. As a result, the nuclear multipole expansion cannot be truncated at any order. This decomposition is complicated by the fact that the outgoing electron interacts with the nuclear charge through the Coulomb potential. Nonetheless, the nuclear multipole expansion can be performed in a straightforward manner by replacing the Coulomb-distorted electron wave function with a plane-wave form parameterized by a suitable local momentum.The effective theory is then specified by a controlled expansion in terms of the relevant velocity operators for the nucleons ~vN and the bound muon ~vµ. (The electron velocity is, in essence, "integrated out" of the theory by the assumption that it is ultra-relativistic.) The construction of the nucleon-scale effective theory proceeds in two steps: First, we specify a complete set (through a given order in power-counting) of CLFV operators that couple the leptons to single-nucleon charges and currents. Next, after performing the nuclear multipole decomposition, the resulting nucleon-level theory is embedded into the target nucleus, where the approximate parity and time-reversal symmetries of the nuclear ground state restrict the operators that can contribute to elastic µ → e conversion.A valid effective theory can be constructed at three distinct degrees of complexity: The most basic theory is generated by including neither vN nor vµ. Relativistic corrections to the muon wave function and effects stemming from nuclear compositeness are completed ignored, and the CLFV amplitude depends on just three nuclear response functions, those of a point like nucleus. Next, we extend the theory by considering vN to first order, and consequently the set of nuclear responses is enlarged by the addition of three velocity-dependent response functions. Finally, we formulate the most complete effective theory, including both velocity operators, vN and vµ, to first order. This corresponds to the inclusion of relativistic muon effects, in the form of the muon's lower Dirac component, and introduces six additional nuclear responses. The muon's lower component always appears as a correction to the upper-component contribution, and therefore we consider the second of these constructions- containing vN but not vµ-to be the prototypical effective theory, complete through leading order in the nuclear response.The various nuclear responses can be understood as the "nuclear dials" that an experimentalist can tune through nuclear target selection in order to access different regions of CLFV parameter space. The nucleus 27 Al, the target of the Mu2e and COMET experiments, has ground-state angular momentum J = 5/2 and provides good sensitivity across a range of responses that are spin- and velocity-dependent/independent. On the other hand, a target such as Ca, whose natural abundance consists (almost) entirely of isotopes with ground-state angular momentum J = 0, will not couple to non-scalar operators. A detailed understanding of the interplay between the various nuclear responses is prerequisite to carrying out an experimental program-across a multitude of targets-in order to fully constrain the unknown CLFV parameters of the nuclear-scale effective theory.Much of the previous literature has focused on a narrow special case in which the leading operator that mediates µ → e conversion couples equally to protons and neutrons and is spin and velocity-independent. Such an operator sums coherently in the conversion amplitude and receives an enhancement by the atomic mass number A relative to incoherent operators, thereby dominating the CLFV response in cases where it is present. The primary advantage of working in this limited case is that the nuclear physics, which is a source of significant complication in general, becomes exceedingly simple. In fact, the coherent nuclear response is governed entirely by the scalar nucleon density, a quantity that is accurately determined by experiments. When considering specific extensions of the standard model that yield a leading coherent response, the µ → e branching ratio can be predicted with a well-understood uncertainty. However, in the initial discovery phase of CLFV searches, one should not assume anything about the underlying nature of flavor-violating operators. The proper approach, which we pursue in this thesis, is to constrain the most general interaction as specified by the effective theory.

(An) examination of the causal link between a state's 'revisionist' tendencies and its nuclear pollback decisions, with special reference to survival analysis

김민정 Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei U 2023 국내박사

핵확산 전문가들은 일반적으로 국가가 자국의 보호와 생존을 위해 핵무기를 개발한다고 가정한다. 그러나 이 가정이 과연 핵개발을 추구하는 모든 국가에 적용될 수 있는가? 핵무기 개발에 관한 정책 결정과정에 일정한 패턴은 없는 것인가? 본 논문의 핵심은 기존 핵확산 연구에서 다루지 않았던 한 영역인, 국가의 수정주의 성향과 핵무기 개발과정 간 상관관계 및 인과관계에 대해 밝히는 것이다. 이 연구의 주요 목표는 국가가 핵야망을 포기하는 이유에 대해 기존 핵확산 연구가 다루지 않았던 공백을 채우는 것이다. 본 연구는 핵 확산 행위를 1) 비활성 2)핵 탐사 3)핵 추구 4)핵무기 획득의 4단계 분류하여 위 질문을 다루고 있다. 본 논문은 이에 더하여 핵포기(rollback) 단계를 추가한 후, 각 단계별 국가별 수정주의 성향을 분석한다. 이 연구는 불만을 제공하는 상대에게 물리력을 행사하거나 군사적 공격을 가하는 행위를 대표적인 수정주의적 행태로 본다. 세력균형이론에 따르면 국가는 외부적으로는 주변국과 전략적 동맹을 맺고 내부적으로는 군비를 증강하는 등의 일련의 활동을 통하여 강대국과의 세력균형을 유지한다. 그러나 국가간 군사적 분쟁을 일으킨 경험이 많은 국가는 주변국과의 비우호적 관계나 갈등, 혹은 주변국들의 비협조로 인하여 세력균형 유지를 위한 활동에 제약이 따를 수 있다. 이는 이들 국가가 핵무기를 추구하는 과정에서 수정주의적 행태가 비교적 두드러지지 않은 국가들에 비하여 외적균형이 파괴되거나 악화될 가능성이 높음을 의미한다. 그리고 이로 인하여 촉발될 안보의 위기로 인해 결국 핵프로그램을 포기할 가능성 또한 증가함을 시사한다. 본 논문은 국가가 공격적인 목적이나 수정주의적 의도를 가지고 핵개발을 추구할 가능성에 관하여 탐구한다. 월츠(Waltz)와 슈웰러(Schweller)의 이론을 기반으로 핵 확산의 맥락에서 수정주의 개념을 발전시킨다. 이후 양적분석이 이어지는데, 우선 국가간 군사적 충돌 데이터(MID 3.0 Dataset)에 수록된 다수의 변수들을 가공하여 각 국가의 수정주의 성향을 수치화한 정량적 변수를 생성한다. 이러한 수정주의 변수를 독립변수로 하여, 핵확산의 각 단계별로 수정주의적 행태가 어떠한 영향을 끼쳤는지를 웨이불(Weibull) 및 지수 (Exponential) 모델을 사용한 생존 분석(survival analysis) 방식을 통하여 검증한다. 이를 통하여 수정주의적 행태를 많이 보인 국가일수록 핵무기를 포기할 가능성이 높음을 입증한다. 이러한 양적분석의 결과는 남아프리카, 리비아, 인도네시아의 사례 연구를 통해 재차 확인된다. 역사적으로 수정주의적 행동이 두드러졌던 이들 국가들은 핵개발 과정 중 외적 균형을 달성하는 데 어려움을 겪었으며 이는 결국 핵포기로 귀결되었다. 마지막으로 본 논문은 이러한 발견이 북핵 사례에 미치는 시사점을 고찰한다. 중국과 러시아의 대미 패권경쟁과 진영 간 경쟁구도 속에 ‘대미 카드’로써의 활용도가 높아진 북한은 잦은 핵도발에도 불구하고 외적 균형을 유지할 수 있었다. 이로써 남아프리카, 리비아, 인도네시아와 달리 북한은 핵개발을 완성하고 포기하지 않을 수 있었던 것이다. 요컨대 이 논문은 핵확산 각 과정에서 수정주의적 행태와 핵확산 의사 결정 사이에 유의미한 관계가 있음을 생존분석, 이론검토, 사례분석 등을 통하여 검증한다. 마지막으로 본 연구는 비확산 정책 수립 시 핵확산 및 핵포기 동기에 관한 다양한 관점을 탐구할 필요가 있음을 강조한다. It is generally assumed by nuclear pundits that states develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of their protection and survival. However, does this assumption hold true for all states opting to go nuclear? Is there a pattern that can be recognized in all states’ decisions to develop nuclear weapons? The central argument of this thesis is to examine one area not often covered in the existing literature: the causal relationship between a state’s revisionist tendencies and its nuclear weapons development. The main goal of this research is to fill this gap in proliferation studies, with special emphasis on why states give up their nuclear ambitions, i.e., rollback on their nuclear weapons program. This thesis deals with these questions by systematically categorizing the proliferation acts into four stages: inactivity, nuclear exploration, pursuit, and acquisition. Then in order to look into the main thesis, a nuclear rollback stage is added. Such an analysis allows for the use of revisionism as a tool to examine each stage, including the last one. According to the balance of power theory, states form strategic alliances with neighboring states to maintain a balance of power against major powers. States with a history of revisionist behavior will face difficulties in doing so, especially if they disrupt the external balance by pursuing nuclear weapons. The resulting loss of security may prompt nuclear rollback. This thesis explores the possibility that states may pursue nuclear weapons for offensive purposes and with revisionist intentions. Building on Kenneth Waltz and Randall Schweller, it develops the concept of revisionism in the context of nuclear proliferation. It then draws on the MID (militarized interstate disputes) 3.0 dataset to create quantitative measures of a state’s revisionist tendency. These measures are analyzed in relation to the key outcome of interest: the extent of progress in nuclear development. The survival model analysis, using Weibull and exponential models, shows that states that are more revisionist are significantly more likely to give up nuclear weapons after the stage of pursuit than less revisionist states. This finding is further assessed in a case study analysis of South Africa, Libya, and Indonesia, which illustrates how states with a history of revisionist behavior are likely to face difficulties in achieving external balancing as they pursue a nuclear weapons program. Lastly, this thesis also considers the implications of these findings for the North Korean case. In sum, this thesis argues that there is a meaningful relationship between revisionist behavior and a state’s decision-making during different stages of the proliferation process. This research highlights the need for exploring different viewpoints on nuclear proliferation, especially when formulating counter-proliferation policy.

(The) dictator's island of excellence : contrasting outcomes of the nuclear weapons program between North Korea and Iraq

전경주 Graduate School, Korea University 2021 국내박사

본 연구는 왜 북한은 이라크와 달리 핵개발에 성공할 수 있었는 가에 대한 답을 찾고자 한다. 기존 연구들에 따르면, 일인독재체제인 북한은 체제 속성이 정책 이행에 야기하는 제약으로 인하여 이라크와 마찬가지로 핵개발에 성공하지 못했어야 했다. 많은 학자들은 이에 대한 답을 얻기 위해 국제 요인에 주목해 왔지만, 본 연구는 국내 요인의 중요성에 집중한다. 핵개발이라는 정책의 성공은 궁극적으로 국내적 동학의 결과이기 때문이다. 외부 위협, 핵기술 공급자, 정치적 비호 등 국제 요인들이 핵개발 결과에 영향을 주기는 하나, 이들의 영향만으로 그 결과가 결정되지는 않는다. 지도자 특성이나 물질적 자원 등 일부 국내 요인들 역시 핵개발과 같은 대규모 국가 프로젝트를 운영함에 있어 요구되는 조건이지만, 이 자체만으로 성공적인 결과를 보장할 수는 없다. 본 연구는 북한과 이라크의 핵개발 사례 연구를 통해, 독재자의 리더십, 핵 관련 제도, 그리고 핵 전문가가 일인독재체제가 갖는 정치적 제약으로부터 절연되어 있는가에 따라 이들 국가의 핵개발 성공 여부가 결정되었다고 주장한다. 일반적으로 일인독재체제에서는 대리인 문제, 유명무실한 제도, 정실주의가 정책 이행의 제약으로 작용한다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 제약으로부터 벗어난 핵개발 프로그램을 독재자의 “‘유능한 일꾼’들의 섬”이라 표현한다. 이러한 섬에서는 독재자가 정책 실행에 관심을 기울이며, 관련 제도가 효과적으로 운용되고, 능력으로 선발된 전문가들이 충분한 역량을 발휘한다. 핵개발을 위해 이 같은 리더십, 제도, 그리고 전문가의 합이 갖춰지고 성숙된다면, 일인독재체제일지라도 핵기반의 구축, 핵분열물질의 생산, 그리고 무기화 단계에 이르는 핵개발 과정에서 뚜렷한 진척을 낼 수 있다. 이라크의 사담 후세인은 일인독재체제로부터 절연시키기 보다는 일인독재체제의 통치 방식 그대로를 적용하여 핵개발을 성공시키려 했다. 이라크의 다른 정책 영역에서와 같이, 핵개발 프로그램은 리더십의 부재, 약하고 불안정한 제도, 그리고 전문성을 잠식하는 정실주의를 바탕으로 운영되었다. 이스라엘의 원자로 폭격으로 이라크 정권의 핵개발 동력은 잠시 증가하였으나, 그 동력이 실행 방식의 개선을 야기하지는 못했다. 결국 이라크는 핵개발을 위한 자체적인 제도적, 전문가적 역량을 갖추지 못했으며, 지도자의 비합리적인 선택으로 인해 핵개발 성공으로부터 더욱 멀어지게 되었다. 이와 대조적으로, 북한의 김일성은 핵개발을 위한 국제적 협력과 국내적 역량을 강화하기 위한 노력을 동시에 기울였다. 그는 핵개발 관련 제도들을 나머지 국가 제도들과 분리한 뒤 특별한 위상을 부여하였다. 또한 정치적 배경과 상관없이 전문가들을 포섭하고, 미래의 핵과학자를 양성하기 위한 수재 교육을 시작했다. 이러한 노력의 결과로 김일성은 자체적 핵개발 기반을 구축하였으며, 핵폭탄에 쓰일 수 있는 플루토늄 생산에도 성공했다. 1994년 기본합의서를 시작으로 핵무기 개발에 본격적인 제동이 가해졌음에도 불구하고, 김정일은 아버지가 구축한 핵개발 운영 방식을 유지 및 발전시켰다. 그는 과감한 선택과 행동에 대하여 위임하기 보다 직접 책임을 다했다. 보다 효과적인 지휘구조를 통해 핵개발 기관들은 성공적인 정책 이행을 위한 집행력을 발휘하도록 했다. 또한 북한 정권은 핵전문가들에 대해 실적주의에 기반한 특별대우를 제공함으로써 이들의 역량을 제고하고자 했다. 이로써 김정일은 무기화에까지 진척을 보이며 첫번째 핵실험에 성공하게 된다. 본 연구는 핵보유에 대한 학계의 논의들과 일인독재체제 문헌을 검토함으로써 핵개발 성공과 실패에 대한 기존의 설명을 보완할 수 있는 주장을 발전시켰다. 북한 핵개발 사례 연구는 열 명의 탈북 엘리트들의 증언과 북한 원전 자료 조사 등에 기반한 새로운 증거들을 포함하고 있다. 이라크 핵 개발 사례는 이미 다른 학자들에 의해 충분히 조사되고 설명되어 왔지만, 본 연구는 이라크 사례를 북한 핵개발 사례에 비추어 봄으로써 이라크 핵개발 실패 요인에 대한 보다 체계적이고 포괄적인 설명을 제시한다. This study examines why the North Korean regime, unlike Iraq, could build nuclear weapons. According to existing theories, North Korea, similar to the Iraqi case, should not have obtained nuclear weapons, due to the domestic constraints inherent to personalist dictatorships. While many scholars have focused on international affairs to derive an answer, this study highlights the importance of internal variables as the nuclear acquisition is a consequence of domestic dynamics. International determinants such as threat, supplier, and patron have an influence on the final result of a state’s nuclear development, but they are by no means exhaustive. Domestic determinants such as a leader’s resolve and material resources play an essential role in operating a grand national project such as nuclear development, but they alone do not guarantee a positive outcome. In seeking a better explanation for both the success of North Korea’s nuclear program and the failure of Iraqi’s program, this study finds that the success of nuclear development in a personalist dictatorship depends on whether leadership, institutions and professionals involved in the nuclear program remained strictly insulated from domestic constraints of policy implementation in a personalist dictatorship: the principal-agent problems, nominal institutions, and cronyism. This research defines a nuclear weapons program with such privileged status in a personalist dictatorship as a dictator’s island of excellence. Within the “island,” the dictator takes care of the implementation, relevant institutions function effectively, and professionals, selected based on merit, provide necessary knowledge and advice. With the formation and consolidation of an island of excellence for nuclear development, the given state has a higher chance to further its nuclear development, including nuclear infrastructure setup, fissile material production and weaponization. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein made an insular environment for a nuclear weapons program, but it was a microcosm of Iraqi personalist dictatorship, rather an island of excellence insulated from it. Similar to other policy areas in Iraq, its nuclear program was characterized by the absence of committed leadership, weak and unsettled institutions, and cronyism above professionalism. Although the Iraqi regime gained momentum after the Osirak bombing in 1981, it followed its personalist rule in operating its nuclear project. In consequence, Iraq could not develop its own institutional and professional capacity for its nuclear development, which was further spoiled by irrational choices made by its leadership. In North Korea, Kim Il-sung demonstrated his commitment to increasing both international cooperation and domestic capacity of nuclear bomb-making. He isolated nuclear-related institutions from the rest of the state apparatus and gave a special status to them. He recruited professionals regardless of background, and started the gifted education system for raising future scientists. With such efforts, the North regime was able to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure and produce a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium. Despite the first crisis to the nuclear weapons program, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Kim Jong-il regime preserved and developed the inherited island of excellence. He assumed responsibility for a series of hard choices and actions rather than delegating. With a more effective command structure, nuclear institutions were able to exercise enough executive power to make implementation successful. In addition, Kim Jong-il maximized the excellence at the program with special treatment for professionals based on meritocracy. This study examines existing nuclear proliferation theories and personalist dictatorship literature to develop a complementary argument for a more complete explanation of nuclear success and failure. The case study of the North Korean nuclear development entails a new set of evidence, incorporating testimonies of ten former North Korean elites, archival research on North Korean publications and memoirs of those with personal experiences with the North Korean nuclear program. While the Iraqi case has been well explained by other authors, this study provides a more comprehensive account by pinpointing the cause of its failure through comparison with the North Korean case.

(A) Study on the U.S. Non-proliferation Policy against Pakistan's Nuclear Program

황원준 경희대학교 평화복지대학원 2020 국내석사

This study has been designed to analyze the causes of changes in the U.S. non-proliferation policy in regards to its opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program between the 1950s and today. It is intended to provide a framework for drawing implications for the U.S.’ non-proliferation policy towards the DPRK today. The U.S. has pursued to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons around the globe since it first unleashed the massive force of the explosion at the end of the Second World War. To prevent uncontrolled proliferation, the U.S. has utilized a variety of different measures, such as multilateral and normative measures, coercion, assurance, and mitigation. Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in the context of trilateral rivalry between itself, the PRC and India, and formally announced itself to be a nuclear state after successive nuclear tests in 1998. In the decades long history of U.S. effort to prevent Pakistan's nuclear armament, the direction of U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan changed from coercion to assurance around 1979 and from coercion to mitigation around 2001. The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Afghanistan War in 1979 put Pakistan in an unique position to counter imminent threats from the Soviet Union. And again in 2001, the September 11 attacks granted a special status to Pakistan for defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These elevations of Pakistan's strategic value were the first causes to changes in U.S policy. In addition, growing Anti-Americanism and the Islamization of Pakistan might have made it challenging for the U.S. to maintain coercive measures against Pakistan's nuclear program. Considering the strategic value of Pakistan, a repeat of losing a vital ally by Islamization and Anti-Americanism could be unacceptable to the U.S., a repeat of the experience in losing Iran in 1979. Also, in terms of U.S. threat perception regarding nuclear proliferation, Pakistan's nuclear armament was not the beginning of a regional nuclear domino effect, but the end of it. Lastly, secondary proliferation to terrorists was much more impending and perilous than the nuclear armament of Pakistan itself. To take prompt measures against the imminent threats of terrorists, the U.S. unavoidably acknowledged the existence of the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Given the above considerations, the DPRK's aspiration for following the case of Pakistan is not expected to be realized.

(A) Study on South Korean Nuclearization Options

주성은 경희대학교 평화복지대학원 2020 국내석사

There are nine nuclear states in the world, including the de facto nuclear states, and each of them is known to have different backgrounds for its nuclearization. Scott D. Sagan explained them with three models: the Security Model, the Domestic Politics Model, and the Normative Model. Based on his classification, this study was designed to evaluate the validity of the two most-likely South Korean nuclearization options, which are mostly argued for by pro-nuclear advocates: Go nuclear and Redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. As of 2019, pro-nuclear arguments have come to the fore as a result of critical security anxieties which are a consequence of two main external factors: the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the anti-alliance posture and behaviour of the Trump administration. Such pro-nuclear arguments posit that the best option for South Korea is to have a self-reliant nuclear capability to counter the threats of a nuclear North Korea; otherwise, and if it is not available, that it would be essential to tie the U.S. to South Korean security interests by the redeploying of tactical nuclear weapons. By examining those two options with three criteria, Suitability, Feasibility, and Efficiency, this study details the strengths and limitations of this approach and argues that the two South Korean nuclearization options are not suitable, feasible, nor efficient for alleviating security anxiety, and furthermore would be detrimental to an identified principle goal of South Korea – the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, this study identifies that such an approach would only serve to make South Korea less stable.

Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy: A Soft Balancing Strategy

일레인 서울대학교 대학원 2023 국내석사

완전한 핵군축을 추구한다는 핵확산금지조약(NPT) 제6조의 약속에도 불구하고 중국, 프랑스, 러시아, 영국, 미국 등 5개 핵보유국(NWS)은 최근 몇 년간 핵군축과 군축에 대해 큰 진전을 이루지 못했다. 이러한 진전의 부족은 오랫동안 세계 핵 군축 의제를 지지해온 동남아시아 국가들을 포함한 비핵 국가들(NNWS)의 불만을 일으켰다. 그러나 NNWS는 NWS가 협상의 끝을 지키지 못함에도 불구하고 글로벌 핵 군축 의제를 계속해서 지지해왔다. 본 논문은 T.V. Paul의 연성균형 개념을 이론적 근거로 삼아 동남아 국가들의 핵군축 외교를 분석하여 위와 같은 태도를 설명하고자 한다. 연성균형은 타국의 위협적이거나 공격적인 정책을 억제하기 위해 국제 제도 및 제한적 제휴와 같은 메커니즘을 사용하여 해당 정책의 국제적 합법성을 감소시키고 목표 달성을 막는 것을 목표로 둔다. 본 논문은 정부 및 학술 문서를 바탕으로 동남아시아 국가들의비동맹운동(NAM) 및 동남아핵무기금지구역(SEANWFZ)과 같은 제한적인 제휴 및 비공식적인 협약, 그리고 핵확산금지조약(NTP) 및 핵무기금지조약(TPNW)과 같은 국제 제도를 포함해서 국제 핵 군축을 위해 동남아시아 국가들이 취한 조치를 검토한다. 본 논문은 동남아시아 국가들이 주요 안보 위협으로 보고 있는 NWS의 핵무기 정책과 관행에 대응하기 위해 다양한 연성균형 수단을 사용하고 있다고 주장한다. 그들의 목표는 핵무기를 확장하고 현대화하며 군축 약속을 회피하는 NWS의 노력을 불법화하여 공격적이거나 위협적인 행동을 제한하는 것이다. Despite the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) Article VI commitment to pursue complete nuclear disarmament, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - have not made significant progress on nuclear force reductions and disarmament in recent years. This lack of progress has led to growing frustration among non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), including Southeast Asian states, which have long supported the global nuclear disarmament agenda. However, NNWS have continued to support the global nuclear disarmament agenda despite the NWS's failure to uphold their end of the bargain. This thesis aims to explain this support by analyzing the nuclear disarmament diplomacy of Southeast Asian states, utilizing T.V. Paul's concept of soft balancing as a theoretical basis. Soft balancing involves the use of mechanisms such as international institutions and limited alignments to restrain the threatening or aggressive policies of states by reducing their international legitimacy and making it harder for them to achieve their goals. Drawing on government and academic documents, this thesis examines the actions taken by Southeast Asian states to support international nuclear disarmament efforts, including the use of limited alignments and informal ententes such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), as well as international legal institutions such as the NPT and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This thesis argues that Southeast Asian states use various means of soft balancing to counter the nuclear weapons policies and practices of NWS, which they view as a major security threat. Their aim is to delegitimize the NWS' efforts to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals and avoid disarmament commitments, thereby constraining their aggressive or threatening behaviour.

(A) Study on the Obama Administration’s Coercive Diplomacy in Nuclear Negotiations : a comparative analysis of the Iranian and North Korean cases

박서현 서울대학교 대학원 2020 국내석사

North Korea’s nuclear program and the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula have been one of the biggest challenges in the history of denuclearisation negotiations. The Trump administration appeared to have been improving the relationship with North Korea and making a dramatic progress on the denuclearisation process through multiple high-level visits and meaningful summits however, his accomplishment has become on the verge of collapse again, just as other previous administrations had undergone. One critical component of the nuclear negotiation with North Korea is the role of the US and the US diplomacy, alongside with various multilateral initiatives and cooperation. Using the US diplomatic framework of coercive diplomacy, this paper seeks to understand the major causes of failure of the US diplomacy during the Obama administration and the negotiation with North Korea in particular. The findings suggest that the strength of motivation and the sense of urgency of negotiating countries one of key factors that facilitates the negotiation process. The findings also suggest that international community, particularly the regional actors plays an increasingly important role during the negotiation process and thus needs to be actively facilitated in negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Analysing the previous administration’s negotiation process, this study is expected to provide an insightful lesson for the Trump administration. 오바마 행정부의 핵심 외교적 성과 중 하나는 바로 이란과의 포괄적공동행동계획(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: JCPOA) 합의이다. 취임 이후 스마트파워 외교를 내세워 세계와 소통하겠다고 다짐했던 오바마 대통령의 의지는 이란과 국제사회의 핵문제에 대한 합의를 가능하게 했다. 하지만 같은 적대국 관여외교를 펼친 북한과는 핵 협상을 진전시키지 못했을 뿐만 아니라 임기가 지날수록 북한에의 관심이 시들 해지는 모습을 발견할 수 있었다. 왜 북한은 예외적인 모습으로 남겨졌을까? 이 논문은 왜 오바마 대통령의 외교정책이 미국의 적대국과의 비핵화 협상 과정에서 각기 다른 결과를 낳았는지에 대한 이유를 주요 연구 문제로 다루며, 이를 설명하기 위해 알렉산더 조지 (Alexander L. George)의 강압외교 (coercive diplomacy) 이론을 활용한다. 이 논문은 우선 이란과 북한과의 핵 협상 과정을 각각 분석하여 오바마 대통령의 두 임기 동안 미국이 어떤 강압전략을 채택하였으며, 그 적대국들이 (각각 이란과 북한) 어떤 역강압 전략을 채택하여 맞대응 하였는지를 분석한다. 이 분석을 기반으로 오바마 행정부의 대이란 전략과 대북 전략에서 드러나는 공통점과 차이점을 비교∙분석함으로써 협상의 성공 및 실패의 요인을 설명한다. 그 결과, 알렉산더 조지가 제시한 ‘강압외교가 성공하기 위한 8가지 조건’ 중에서 크게 동기의 비대칭과 강압국의 요구에 순응해야 하는 긴박감 그리고 국내 및 국제적 지지를 협상의 성패를 가르는 주 요인을 꼽았으며, 이러한 결과는 현재 교착상태에 빠진 북핵 협상을 재가동 하기 위해서는 북한 국내상황에 대한 충분한 이해와 더불어 국제사회의 협력 및 지지가 중요하다는 점을 시사한다.

北韓의 核武器 開發이 韓國의 安保保障에 미칠 영향에 관한 硏究

정진철 漢陽大學校 行政大學院 1994 국내석사