Relationship between Firm’s Wage Payment and Capital Structure : Evidence from Korea

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper empirically investigates how firm’s wage payment as human capital cost influences firm’s capital structure using non-financial firms listed in KOSPI (Korean Stock Exchange) market over period of 2000 to 2016 year. In previous several papers, Titman (1984); and Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) suggest that human capital cost and bankruptcy cost related to financial distress could have an incentive to issuing debt in firms. Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) find that CEO payment and employee wage as proxies for human capital costs are affected positively by firm’s leverage. These empirical results imply that labor cost restricts the borrowing fund from capital market. Based on these facts and theories in this paper, it tries to find this phenomenon as follows: First, inconsistent with above hypothesis, leverage has significantly and statistically negative effect on the CEO payment. Second, it finds that leverage has a negative effect on employee’s wage significantly and statistically. This finding is very unique and characteristics fact for Korean non-financial firms and inconsistent with suggested hypothesis. As matter of fact, this empirical results support the another hypothesis. Third, firms with high leverage and high financial distress has a positive effect on only CEO payment, but not on employee’s wage. As a result, these evidences imply that Korean non-financial firms have more very unique and different characteristics in financial policy rather than other country’s firm.

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