This paper discusses ROK`s policy approach to enhance the PSI participation for the prevention of WMD proliferation. ROK became a full participant of the PSI after North Korea`s 2nd nuclear test in May 2009 and hosted PSI operational expert group meet...
This paper discusses ROK`s policy approach to enhance the PSI participation for the prevention of WMD proliferation. ROK became a full participant of the PSI after North Korea`s 2nd nuclear test in May 2009 and hosted PSI operational expert group meetings as well as PSI exercise in Busan in October 2010. This was a very symbolic action to send a signal to North Korea, which was suspected as an important proliferator in spite of UN Security Council resolution which strongly prohibits North Korean from engaging in international trade on WMDs and arms. As a PSI participant, ROK needs to establish action plans and institutional mechanisms for the implementation of the PSI interdiction principles. Also, it should positively participate in international PSI exercises and meetings. Nevertheless, it is necessary for ROK to think of the effects ROK`s action and policy will have on South-North Korean relations, because North Korea is a major object of PSI action. This paper explains ROK` practical approaches to maritime interdiction operations, and suggests that ROK should develop domestic institutional mechanisms needed for PSI actions.