パ-ティクルボ-ドの疲勞破壞機構に關する硏究

국문 초록 (Abstract)

최근의 국제적 목재자원정세에 따라 省에너지를 지향하는 중요한 목질판재료인파티클보드는 금 후 建築用材로서의 수요확대가 예상되고 있다. 그러나 胞性材料인파티클보드의 構造部材化를 위퐈�長期負荷 또는 動的負荷에 대한 내구성 및신뢰성 확보」가 필수적인 연구과제이다. 따라서 본서는 아직 체계적 구명이이루어지고 있지 않은 3층 파티클보드(PB)및 配向性스트랜드보드(OSB)의性및 破壞機構를 다양한 실험 및 해석방법에 이해 밝힘으로서, 이들 재료의 파괴를효율적으로 예제어하기 위한 정보를 제공하고자 하였다. 일정한 하중이나변형을 반복해서 작용시키는 휨피로시PB는 크리프나 응력환화의 변화추이에따라 遷移→定常→破斷 등 3단계의 과정을 거쳐 파괴를 일읒ㅋ箚鄕ㅏ【�프幣善撻뎬�파괴수명을 예측할 수 있는 역학적 지표임을 밝혔으며, OSB의 경우에늡篤嶽括�복합적 발현에 의해 다양한 非線形的 擧動을 나타냈다. 확률적해석에 의할 때 휨피로시수명은 3-파라미터 weibull 분포함수에 적합한분포형을 나타내지만 높은 응력레벨에서는 2-파라맙�가까운 불안정한분포상태를 나타내고 있음을 구명한 동시에, 피로수명-크로프 진행속도-응력걋�의존성이 있음을 밝혔다. 履歷에너지의 축적에 의한 재료파괴개념의 의해피로파괴요인을 검토, PB는 초기감소. 후기증가형의 이력에너지 변화를나타내며, 그 곡선의 극소치에 의해 피로파괴조정되었다. 또한 재료내부의미세한 동적변화를 추적할 수 있는 음향적 검출법인 AE(Acoustic emis의해하중제어 및 변형제어 피로시험을 비교분석하였을 때, 피로초기과정에서파괴수명을 예측할 셈만� 파괴할 때 까지의 AE발생량의 80%가 영구변형에의한 것임을 밝혔다. 이와 아울러 AE발생량에너지의 관계로부터 재료의피로파괴법칙에 관한 종래의 이론을 증명하였다. 한편 배향성보드의 거동에미치는 내부구조적요인의 영향을 구명하기 위하여 각종 스트랜드 배열양식,불완전접착, 결을 인위적으로 설정한 단순 모델시험체에 의해 변형의 진행및 파괴강도의 지배적 요인을 실험적의慧�

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime (the NPT regime), based on the NPT, the
IAEA, the UN, and the NSG, tends to rely on the supply-side strategic options such as export controls, diversion controls, and punitive sanctions. However, in spite of its remarkable achievements, the NPT regime reveals its limitations in halting nuclear proliferation. In this situation, the demand-side strategy, based on the strategic bargaining for reducing the aspirations of a proliferator for nuclear weapons, emerges as an alternative to nuclear nonproliferation, The North Korean case of nuclear proliferation (from mid 199 1 to December 1995) is an exemplary one which showed the potential of the demand-side strategy. As the NPT regime failed to fully dissuade North Korea from going nuclear, the U.S. and South Korea stroke several bargaining deals with North Korea in order to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea tried to protect or promote its national interests by using its nuclear proliferation option as bargaining leverage. Meanwhile, the U.S. and South Korea adopted diverse strategic options which could affect the incentives and disincentives of North Korea for nuclear weapons.
North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. as bargaining parties faced a variety of
uncertainties which they had to cope with in order to enhance the procedural or
substantive rationality of their strategic choices. In the strategic bargaining to resolve the North Korean nuclear dispute, the patterns of uncertainty management (uncertainty ignoring, uncertainty reduction, uncertainty accommodation, and uncertainty overlooking) influenced the strategic choices of North Korea, South Korea, and the U. S.(conceding strategy, demanding strategy, and compromising strategy). Moreover, the patterns of uncertainty management also affected the bargaining outputs (conflict, cooperation, and capitulation) by influencing the combination of strategic choices of bargaining parties. Uncertainty as a critical variable had a significant impact on the dynamicity of the strategic nuclear bargaining.
This research has significance in three dimensions. In theoretical terms, this research contributes to developing the managerial approach to uncertainty which is newly emerging because of the limitations of the analytic approach to uncertainty. In practical terms, this research helps the understanding of the nuclear incentives, bargaining strategies, and bargaining tactics of North Korea as a nuclear proliferator. In policy terms, this research shows the weaknesses of the supply-side options of the NPT regime, especially the IAEA nuclear inspections and the UN sanctions. Meanwhile, this research reveals the limitations and potential of the demand-side strategic options which can be selected within or beyond the NPT regime.
Index Words: Analytic approach, Conflict, Cooperation, Diversion controls,
Export controls, IAEA, Managerial approach, NPT, NPT regime, North Korea, Nuclear Incentives, Nuclear nonproliferation, Nuclear proliferation, Punitive sanctions, Strategic choice, Supply-side strategy, UN, UN Sanctions, Uncertainty, Uncertainty management,