기업지배구조가 특수관계자 거래에 미치는 영향 = The Effect of Corporate Governance on Related-Party Transactions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this study, we analyze related-party transactions with corporate governance evaluation system implemented in terms of securing corporate accounting transparency and investor protection. That is, by newly combining related-party transactions as a social issue, we do comprehensive analysis whether corporate governance system makes enough role of a control device on related-party transactions. The results of this study are summarized as follows: Firstly, there are negative relations between related-party transactions and corporate governance. In other words, higher corporate governance score, lower related-party transactions, and this result consequently supports the hypothesis 1. Corporate governance evaluation system implemented to secure corporate accounting transparency and investor protection not only affects related-party transactions significantly, but also serves as a checking mechanism in and outside of the corporate system. Secondly, we find negative relations between related-party transactions and corporate governance rated with higher grades such as B+ and above. Higher corporate governance scores, lower related-party transactions, and this result consequently supports the hypothesis 2 that disclosures of the corporate governance ratings above B+ grade reduce more related-party transactions than other corporate disclosures. Thirdly, we do also further analysis to confirms existing methodological problems on regression analyses assuming that both related-party transactions and corporate governance may influence on each other, but at least we find there is no problem in the methodological issue in this study. Lastly, we classify corporate governance into the two categories of four groups except the middle groups, and confirm the robustness as showing statistically negative relations between the two groups categorized into high and low on the analysis of related party transactions.