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https://www.riss.kr/link?id=G3722546
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2002년
English
한국연구재단(NRF)
0
상세조회0
다운로드다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)
This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existi...
This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existing literature offers two alternative perspectives on the behavior of such owner-manager, convergence of interests and management entrenchment hypotheses. We tested how the alternative views are reflected in
earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase, supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager. Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders. On the one hand, institutions/blockholders have incentives to actively monitor management. However, on the other hand, institutions/blockholders may not render effective monitoring because they lack expertise, suffer from free-rider problems, or strategically ally with the management. These opposing views predict conflicting signs on the relation between the earnings informativeness and holdings of institutions/blockholders. We find that earnings informativeness increases with the holdings of institutions and blockholders. This supports the active monitoring role of institutions/blockholders. Finally, we test the relationship between earnings informativeness for chaebol (Korean business group) affiliated companies versus that for non-chaebol affiliated companies, and find no significant relationship between the owner-largest shareholder’'s holdings and earnings informativeness. This provides evidence that for chaebol companies, the negative effect of management entrenchment/expropriation of minority shareholders offsets the positive effects arising from convergence of interest. This phenomenon is more apparent for a group of firms with more distinctive characteristics of chaebol.
다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)
1. Introduction 2. Ownership Structure in Korea 3. The Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Earnings Informativeness 4. Data 5. Results 6. Conclusion
1. Introduction
2. Ownership Structure in Korea
3. The Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Earnings Informativeness
4. Data
5. Results
6. Conclusion