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      포스코 거래거절 판례에 대한 연구 = A Study on the Posco`s Unilateral Refusal to Deal

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A82315238

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Posco is a monopolistic supplier in the domestic hot rolled steel coil market. Hysco Co. Ltd-Posco`s competitor in the cold rolled steel sheet market-requested Posco to provide it with hot rolled steel coils, an essential material in producing cold rolled steel sheets. Posco declined the request. The KFTC found Posco`s refusal to supply Hysco Co. Ltd with hot rolled steel coil as constituting an obstruction of the competitor`s business activities that undermines competition in the market. In the end, the KFTC imposed corrective measures and a penalty surcharge on Posco. The Seoul High Court confirmed the KFTC`s decision. However, the Supreme Court quashed the decision, citing that regardless of Posco`s refusal to provide hot rolled steel coils, Hysco could produce cold rolled steel sheets by importing hot rolled steel coils from Japan. Furthermore, the court took note of the fact that Hysco earned a good profit, and therefore, there was no competition-restricting effect and no intent to restrict competition or eliminate competitors. This case has great significance that the Supreme Court clarified the criterion for the illegality of the dominant firm`s refusal to deal for the first time. The court held that the effect of restriction on the competition should be considered in determining whether the dominant firm`s refusal to deal constitutes the violation of the antitrust law. The court stated that refusal to deal is not presumed to be illegal just because the firm has dominant position. Therefore in order to prohibit the dominant firm`s conduct, the KFTC should establish not only that the company is in a market dominant position in having a market share exceeding a certain percentage(50% or more), but also that the alleged refusal to deal causes anti-competitive effect. Under the principle of freedom of contracts, the refusal itself is not in violation of the antitrust law. Only the `unreasonable` refusals are regarded as violating the MRFTA. However, there has been debates over what the `unreasonable` refusal means. The court declared that it is not sufficient to determine abuse of a market power on the bases that a specific competitor has some difficulties to manage its business activities or suffers from disadvantages because of the refusal. The court stated that when distinguishing abuses of dominant power from unfair practices, the former would require anti-competitiveness while simple unfairness of means would be enough for the latter. Therefore, to satisfy the `unreasonable` requirement in determining abuse of a dominant position, the KFTC should prove anti-competitive effects that include price increase, output reduction, hampering innovation, eliminating important competitors etc. The decision, however, has some problems. The court said that the KFTC should prove the specific `intent` to monopolize and restrict competition. This is incompatible with the Korea antitrust law since we have no provision which stipulates `intent`. Even in the U.S., the motherland of intent requirement, the intent to restrict competition can be presumed only if dominant firm`s conduct causes anti-competitive effect today. Therefore, this should be reconsidered in the following cases. In addition, there are some problems regarding the definition of the relevant market. It is favorable that supply substitution as well as demand substitution should be considered in defining the relevant product market. Regarding geographical market, however, while the court admitted the possibility of foreign inflows, it limited the relevant market to the domestic area and did not expand the market to the international market. It deserves criticism.
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      Posco is a monopolistic supplier in the domestic hot rolled steel coil market. Hysco Co. Ltd-Posco`s competitor in the cold rolled steel sheet market-requested Posco to provide it with hot rolled steel coils, an essential material in producing cold ro...

      Posco is a monopolistic supplier in the domestic hot rolled steel coil market. Hysco Co. Ltd-Posco`s competitor in the cold rolled steel sheet market-requested Posco to provide it with hot rolled steel coils, an essential material in producing cold rolled steel sheets. Posco declined the request. The KFTC found Posco`s refusal to supply Hysco Co. Ltd with hot rolled steel coil as constituting an obstruction of the competitor`s business activities that undermines competition in the market. In the end, the KFTC imposed corrective measures and a penalty surcharge on Posco. The Seoul High Court confirmed the KFTC`s decision. However, the Supreme Court quashed the decision, citing that regardless of Posco`s refusal to provide hot rolled steel coils, Hysco could produce cold rolled steel sheets by importing hot rolled steel coils from Japan. Furthermore, the court took note of the fact that Hysco earned a good profit, and therefore, there was no competition-restricting effect and no intent to restrict competition or eliminate competitors. This case has great significance that the Supreme Court clarified the criterion for the illegality of the dominant firm`s refusal to deal for the first time. The court held that the effect of restriction on the competition should be considered in determining whether the dominant firm`s refusal to deal constitutes the violation of the antitrust law. The court stated that refusal to deal is not presumed to be illegal just because the firm has dominant position. Therefore in order to prohibit the dominant firm`s conduct, the KFTC should establish not only that the company is in a market dominant position in having a market share exceeding a certain percentage(50% or more), but also that the alleged refusal to deal causes anti-competitive effect. Under the principle of freedom of contracts, the refusal itself is not in violation of the antitrust law. Only the `unreasonable` refusals are regarded as violating the MRFTA. However, there has been debates over what the `unreasonable` refusal means. The court declared that it is not sufficient to determine abuse of a market power on the bases that a specific competitor has some difficulties to manage its business activities or suffers from disadvantages because of the refusal. The court stated that when distinguishing abuses of dominant power from unfair practices, the former would require anti-competitiveness while simple unfairness of means would be enough for the latter. Therefore, to satisfy the `unreasonable` requirement in determining abuse of a dominant position, the KFTC should prove anti-competitive effects that include price increase, output reduction, hampering innovation, eliminating important competitors etc. The decision, however, has some problems. The court said that the KFTC should prove the specific `intent` to monopolize and restrict competition. This is incompatible with the Korea antitrust law since we have no provision which stipulates `intent`. Even in the U.S., the motherland of intent requirement, the intent to restrict competition can be presumed only if dominant firm`s conduct causes anti-competitive effect today. Therefore, this should be reconsidered in the following cases. In addition, there are some problems regarding the definition of the relevant market. It is favorable that supply substitution as well as demand substitution should be considered in defining the relevant product market. Regarding geographical market, however, while the court admitted the possibility of foreign inflows, it limited the relevant market to the domestic area and did not expand the market to the international market. It deserves criticism.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 차성민, "포스코 열연코일 공급 거절 사건에서 부당성의 의미" 법문사 5 : 2009

      2 설 민 수, "지적재산권 사용계약에 대한 거래거절에 관한 미국과 EU에서의 공정거래법 적용" 한국법학원 (101) : 60-107, 2007

      3 홍명수, "지배력 남용의 의의와 유형화에 대한 고찰. in: 공정거래법과 규제산업" 법문사 2007

      4 이철남, "시장지배적 지적재산권자의 라이선스거절과 끼워팔기의 규제에 관한 연구" 고려대학교 2005

      5 황태희, "시장지배적 지위남용 규제의 본질적 의미" 법문사 5 : 2009

      6 최승재, "시장지배적 사업자의 거래거절행위의 부당성 판단기준, 법률신문(제3692호), 2008.10.23"

      7 신광식, "시장지배적 사업자의 거래거절에 대한 공정거래법리: 대법원의 포스코 사건 판결" 한국경쟁법학회 18 : 74-116, 2008

      8 이봉의, "불공정거래행위의 위법성. in: 공정거래와 법치" 법문사 2004

      9 엄기섭, "불공정거래행위의 성립요건으로서 부당성과 공정거래저해성" 한국공정경쟁협회 2003

      10 박세일, "법경제학(개정판)" 박영사 2007

      1 차성민, "포스코 열연코일 공급 거절 사건에서 부당성의 의미" 법문사 5 : 2009

      2 설 민 수, "지적재산권 사용계약에 대한 거래거절에 관한 미국과 EU에서의 공정거래법 적용" 한국법학원 (101) : 60-107, 2007

      3 홍명수, "지배력 남용의 의의와 유형화에 대한 고찰. in: 공정거래법과 규제산업" 법문사 2007

      4 이철남, "시장지배적 지적재산권자의 라이선스거절과 끼워팔기의 규제에 관한 연구" 고려대학교 2005

      5 황태희, "시장지배적 지위남용 규제의 본질적 의미" 법문사 5 : 2009

      6 최승재, "시장지배적 사업자의 거래거절행위의 부당성 판단기준, 법률신문(제3692호), 2008.10.23"

      7 신광식, "시장지배적 사업자의 거래거절에 대한 공정거래법리: 대법원의 포스코 사건 판결" 한국경쟁법학회 18 : 74-116, 2008

      8 이봉의, "불공정거래행위의 위법성. in: 공정거래와 법치" 법문사 2004

      9 엄기섭, "불공정거래행위의 성립요건으로서 부당성과 공정거래저해성" 한국공정경쟁협회 2003

      10 박세일, "법경제학(개정판)" 박영사 2007

      11 이석준, "미국과 EU의 시장지배적 지위남용 규제 비교" 한국공정경쟁연합회 (129) : 2006

      12 이호영, "독점규제법의 이론과 실무" 홍문사 2006

      13 황창식, "공정거래법상 시장지배력 남용 규제의 해석 및 집행상의 문제점-불공정거래행위 규제와의 법적용 관계를 중심으로" 법문사 5 : 2009

      14 이황, "공정거래법상 단독의 위반행위 규제의 체계 - 시장지배적 지위 남용행위로서의 거래거절행위의 위법성, 그 본질과 판단기준" 사법발전재단 1 (1): 201-263, 2008

      15 임영철, "공정거래법" 법문사 2007

      16 공정거래위원회, "공정거래백서2009" 공정거래위원회 2009

      17 공정거래위원회, "공정거래백서2008" 공정거래위원회 2008

      18 이기수, "경제법(제7판)" 세창출판사 2006

      19 권오승, "경제법(제6판)" 법문사 2008

      20 정호열, "경제법(제2판)" 박영사 2008

      21 신현윤, "경제법" 법문사 2006

      22 Mark Furse, "mpetition Law of the UK and EC(5th ed.)" Oxford University Press 2006

      23 Valentine Korah, "Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules" Hart Publishing 2006

      24 Herbert Hovenkamp, "Federal Antitrust Policy: The law of Competition and its practice(3rd ed.)" West Group 2005

      25 한현옥, "EU의 지배적 지위 남용행위 규제 특징과 개선 논의에 대한 고찰" 한국EU학회 11 (11): 61-96, 2006

      26 Gellhorn, Kovacic, "Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics(5th ed.)" West Group 2004

      27 Valentine Korah, "An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice(9th ed.)" Hart Publishing 2007

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      2016 0.75 0.75 0.74
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