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      제한전쟁을 수행하기 위한 미국의 6·25전쟁 정책과 전략: 전쟁목표에 관한 고찰을 중심으로 = For Limited War: An Analysis on U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Korean War Based on political and Military Goals

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A107816293

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      This paper attempts to shed light on the political goals of the United States which had a multi layer structure during the Korean War. This paper argues that the U.S. had established a fundamental political goal not to conduct another world war by stopping the Communist aggression and preventing the expansion of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. had pursued the second level political goal which stipulated the recovery of status of quo ante June 25, 1950.
      However, with the progress of the war, the U.S. shifted its attitude about the possibility of possible world war. This was politically motivated and championed by military success. Government reports assessed Soviet military reactions with limited scope and Chinese intervention with less cautions. This brought the expansion of the secondary goal to unify Korea on UN’s terms. The result was terrible, so the politico-military leaders of the U.S. reminded the fundamental goal and reset the secondary goal to be similar to the previous one.
      The U.S. had conducted the Korean War with the dual political goals as well as military goals. The triple structure of the goals would be a distinctive figure of the war. Interestingly, the U.S. leaders experienced problems to set up the military goal at the third phase to fulfil political requirements due to flexible military situation. The multi layer structure of political goals and the limiting mechanism of secondary goals could be understood as significant features of limited war.
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      This paper attempts to shed light on the political goals of the United States which had a multi layer structure during the Korean War. This paper argues that the U.S. had established a fundamental political goal not to conduct another world war by sto...

      This paper attempts to shed light on the political goals of the United States which had a multi layer structure during the Korean War. This paper argues that the U.S. had established a fundamental political goal not to conduct another world war by stopping the Communist aggression and preventing the expansion of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. had pursued the second level political goal which stipulated the recovery of status of quo ante June 25, 1950.
      However, with the progress of the war, the U.S. shifted its attitude about the possibility of possible world war. This was politically motivated and championed by military success. Government reports assessed Soviet military reactions with limited scope and Chinese intervention with less cautions. This brought the expansion of the secondary goal to unify Korea on UN’s terms. The result was terrible, so the politico-military leaders of the U.S. reminded the fundamental goal and reset the secondary goal to be similar to the previous one.
      The U.S. had conducted the Korean War with the dual political goals as well as military goals. The triple structure of the goals would be a distinctive figure of the war. Interestingly, the U.S. leaders experienced problems to set up the military goal at the third phase to fulfil political requirements due to flexible military situation. The multi layer structure of political goals and the limiting mechanism of secondary goals could be understood as significant features of limited war.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 정토웅, "한국전쟁과 미국의 제한전쟁: 군사적 측면" (22) : 1991

      2 이선호, "제한전쟁으로서의 한국전쟁" (24) : 1992

      3 손경호, "동북아 국가들의 6·25전쟁 정책과 전략" 지문당 2015

      4 Foot, Rosemary, "The Wrong War" Cornell University Press 1985

      5 Spanier, John W, "The Truman–MacArthur Controversy" The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1960

      6 Acheson, Dean, "The Korean War" W.W. Norton & Company 1971

      7 Paige, Glenn D., "The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950" The Free Press 1969

      8 Blair, Clay, "The Forgotten War" Times Books 1987

      9 Son, Kyengho, "The Establishment and the Role of the State-Joint Chiefs of Meeting during the Korean War" 27 (27): 2020

      10 Bakich, Spencer D, "Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars" The University of Chicago Press 2014

      1 정토웅, "한국전쟁과 미국의 제한전쟁: 군사적 측면" (22) : 1991

      2 이선호, "제한전쟁으로서의 한국전쟁" (24) : 1992

      3 손경호, "동북아 국가들의 6·25전쟁 정책과 전략" 지문당 2015

      4 Foot, Rosemary, "The Wrong War" Cornell University Press 1985

      5 Spanier, John W, "The Truman–MacArthur Controversy" The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1960

      6 Acheson, Dean, "The Korean War" W.W. Norton & Company 1971

      7 Paige, Glenn D., "The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950" The Free Press 1969

      8 Blair, Clay, "The Forgotten War" Times Books 1987

      9 Son, Kyengho, "The Establishment and the Role of the State-Joint Chiefs of Meeting during the Korean War" 27 (27): 2020

      10 Bakich, Spencer D, "Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars" The University of Chicago Press 2014

      11 James, Clayton, "Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953" Free Press 1993

      12 Kissinger, Henry A., "Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy" Harper & Brothers 1957

      13 "NSC 81/1, September 9"

      14 "NSC 81, September 1"

      15 "NSC 73/4, August 25"

      16 "NSC 73/3, August 22"

      17 "NSC 73/1, July 24"

      18 "Minutes of the 67th Meeting of the NSC, September 7, 1950, President’s Secretary Box 181"

      19 "Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the NSC, August 24, 1950, President’s Secretary Box 181"

      20 "Minutes of the 63rd Meeting of the NSC, August 3, 1950, President’s Secretary Box 181"

      21 "Minutes of the 63rd Meeting of the NSC, August 3, 1950, President’s Secretary Box 181"

      22 Truman, Harry S, "Memoirs II" Doubleday & Company, INC 1956

      23 Osgood, Robert E, "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy" The University of Chicago Press 1957

      24 Higgins, Trumbull, "Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Précis in Limited War" Oxford University Press 1960

      25 Schnabel, James F. and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol, "III, 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part I, Washington D" Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999

      26 Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, Korea, Vol. VII"

      27 Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Vol. VII, Part II"

      28 Department of State, "FRUS 1951, Korea and China, Vol. VII, Part I"

      29 Department of State, "FRUS 1950, Korea Vol. VII, Part I"

      30 "A Letter from James E. Noland to Truman, Dated August 25, 1950"

      31 손경호, "6∙25전쟁에 나타난 미국의 제한전쟁 수행체계 분석: 중국군 개입 이후 국무부의 역할 확대과정을 중심으로" 한국국제정치학회 55 (55): 105-137, 2015

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