(The)palgrave archive edition of A.J. Ayer: writings on philosophy . Vol. 1-7

목차 (Table of Contents)

• [volume. vol.1]----------
• CONTENTS
• Preface = 9
• 1. The Elimination of Metaphysics = 13
• What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality = 13
• Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. = 14
• Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. = 16
• Distinction between conclusive and partial verification. No propositions can be conclusively verifed. = 16
• Or conclusively confuted. = 19
• For a statement of fact to be genuine some possible observations must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. = 20
• Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. = 21
• Metaphysical sentences defined as sentences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses. = 24
• Linguistic confusions the prime sources of metaphysics. = 24
• Metaphysics and Poetry. = 27
• 2. The Function of Philosophy = 30
• Philosophy is not a search for first principles. = 30
• Barrenness of Descartes' procedure. = 30
• The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. = 30
• There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. = 34
• Philosophising is an activity of analysis. = 36
• Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. = 37
• Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. = 38
• We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. = 39
• And take a Humean view of causation. = 40
• Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. = 43
• The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. = 44
• Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. = 45
• Philosophy issues in definitions. = 46
• 3. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis = 48
• Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. = 48
• Russell's 'theory of descriptions' as an example of philosophical analysis. = 49
• Definition of an ambiguous symbol. = 52
• Definition of a logical construction. = 53
• Material things are logical constructions out of sense-contents. = 54
• By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of perception. = 54
• A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. = 55
• Utility of such an-alyses. = 59
• Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. = 59
• The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical consequences of linguistic conventions. = 61
• Rejection of the view that 'every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said'. = 63
• 4. The A Priori = 64
• As empiricists, we must deny that any general proposition concerning a matter of fact can be known certainly to be valid. = 64
• How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics?. = 64
• Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generations. = 67
• They are necessarily true because they are analytic. = 71
• Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. = 71
• Emendation of Kant's definitions. = 73
• Analytic propositions are tautological ; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. = 74
• But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. = 74
• Logic does not describe 'the laws of thought'. = 76
• Nor geometry the properties of physical space. = 77
• Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. = 80
• How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery? = 81
• 5 Truth and Probability = 84
• What is truth? = 84
• Definition of a proposition. = 85
• The words 'true' and 'false' function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs = 85
• The 'problem of truth' reduced to the question. How are propositions validated? = 87
• The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is not purely formal. = 88
• No empirical propositions are certain not even those which refer to immediate experience. = 89
• Observation confirms or discredits not just a single hypothesis but a system of hypotheses. = 93
• 94 The 'facts of experience' can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. = 94
• Danger of mistaking synthetic for analytic propositions. = 96
• Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. = 97
• Definition of rationality. = 101
• Definition of probability in terms of rationality. = 102
• Propositions referring to the past. = 102
• 6. Critique of Ethics and Theology = 104
• How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? = 104
• Distinction between various types of ethical enquiry. = 105
• Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism. = 106
• But unacceptable on other grounds. = 107
• Distinction between normative and descriptive ethical symbols. = 108
• Rejection of intuitionism. = 109
• Assertions of value are not scientific but 'emotive'. = 110
• They are therefore neither true nor false. = 110
• They are partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. = 111
• Distinction between expressions and assertions of feeling. = 113
• Objection that this view makes it impossible to dispute about questions of value. = 113
• Actually, we never do dispute about questions of value, but always about questions of fact. = 114
• Ethics as a branch of knowledge comprehended in the social sciences. = 116
• The same applies to aesthetics. = 118
• Impossibility of demonstrating the existence of a transcendent god. = 119
• Or even of proving it probable. = 120
• That a transcendent god exists is a metaphysical assertion, and therefore not literally significant. Saying this does not make us atheists or agnostics in the ordinary sense. = 120
• The belief that men have immortal souls is also metaphysical. = 122
• There is no logical ground for conflict between religion and science. = 123
• Our views supported by the statements of theists themselves. = 124
• Refutation of the argument from religious experience. = 125
• 7. The Self and the Common World = 127
• The basis of knowledge. = 127
• Sense-contents as parts, rather than objects, of sense-experiences. = 129
• Sense-contents neither mental nor physical. = 130
• Distinction between the mental and the physical applies only to logical constructions. = 130
• The existence of epistemological and causal connections between minds and material things open to no a priori objections. = 132
• Analysis of the self in terms of sense-experiences. = 133
• A sense-experience cannot belong to the sense-history of more than one self. = 133
• The substantive ego a fictitious metaphysical entity. = 134
• Hume's definition of the self. = 135
• That the empirical self survives the dissolution of the body is a self-contradictory proposition. = 135
• Does our phenomenalism involve solipsism? = 136
• Our knowledge of other people. = 138
• How is mutual understanding possible? = 141
• 8. Solutions of Outstanding Philosophical Disputes = 144
• The nature of philosophy does not warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical 'parties'. = 144
• The conflict between rationalists and empiricists. = 145
• Our own logical empiricism to be distinguished from positivism. = 147
• We reject Hume's psychological, as opposed to his logical, doctrines. = 148
• Realism and Idealism. = 150
• To say that a thing exists is not to say that it is actually being perceived. = 151
• Things as permanent possibilities of sensation. = 154
• What is perceived is not necessarily mental. = 155
• What exists need not necessarily be thought of. = 158
• Nor what is thought of exist. = 158
• Empirical grounds for supposing that things may exist unperceived. = 159
• Monism and Pluralism. = 161
• Monistic fallacy that all a thing's properties are constitutive of is nature. = 161
• Illustrates the danger of expressing linguistic propositions in factual terminology. = 164
• Causality not a logical relation. = 165
• Empirical evidence against the monist's view that every event is causally connected with every other. = 167
• The unity of science. = 168
• Philosophy as the logic of science. = 168
• Appendix = 171
• Index = 200
• [volume. vol.2]----------
• Ⅰ. THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION = 1
• 1. Exposition of the Argument = 1
• 2. Evaluation of the Argument = 11
• 3. The Introduction of Sense-data = 19
• 4. Misuses of the Argument from Illusion = 28
• 5. Theories of Perception as Alternative Languages = 46
• Ⅱ. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF SENSE-DATA = 58
• 6. Acts and Objects in Sensation = 58
• 7. "Esse est Percipi" = 65
• 8. Sensing and Knowing = 78
• 9. The Errors of Formalism = 84
• 10. Sentences, Propositions, and Facts = 92
• 11. The Nature of the "Given" = 113
• Ⅲ. THE EGOCENTRIC PREDICAMENT = 136
• 12. The Privacy of Personal Experience = 136
• 13. Public and Private Languages = 146
• 14. Concerning the Privacy of Sense-data and the Publicity of the Material World = 153
• 15. The Hypothesis of the Existence of Other People's Experiences = 162
• Ⅳ. CAUSALITY AND PERCEPTION = 171
• 16. The Causal Theory of Perception = 171
• 17. Formulation of "the Principle of Determinism" = 179
• 18. The Animistic Idea of Necessary Connexion = 183
• 19. Criticism and the Rationalist Interpretation of Causal Laws = 199
• 20. Evaluation of "the Principle of Determinism" = 207
• 21. The Causation of Sense-data = 220
• Ⅴ. THE CONSTITUTION OF MATERIAL THINGS = 229
• 22. Concerning Phenomenalism = 229
• 23. Elementary Construction of the Material World = 243
• 24. Appearance and Reality = 263
• INDEX = 275
• [volume. vol.3]----------
• PREFACE = ⅶ
• CHAPTERⅠ : PHILOSOPHY AND KNOWLEDGE = 1
• (ⅰ) The method of philosophy = 1
• (ⅱ) Common features of knowledge = 5
• (ⅲ) Does knowing consist in being in a special state of mind? = 9
• (ⅳ) Discussion of method : philosophy and language = 24
• (ⅴ) Knowing as having the right to be sure = 28
• CHAPTERⅡ : SCEPTICISM AND CERTAINTY = 35
• (ⅰ) Philosophical scepticism = 35
• (ⅱ) The quest for certainty = 41
• (ⅲ) 'I think, therefore I am' = 45
• (ⅳ) Are any statements immune from doubt? = 54
• (ⅴ) Public and private uses of language = 60
• (ⅵ) Are mistakes about one's own immediate experience only verbal? = 64
• (ⅶ) How do we know? = 73
• (ⅷ) Doubts about factual reasoning : the problem of induction = 76
• (ⅸ) The pattern of sceptical arguments = 81
• (ⅹ) Remarks on the different methods of answering the sceptic = 88
• CHAPTERⅢ : PERCEPTION = 91
• (ⅰ) Are physical objects directly perceived? = 91
• (ⅱ) The argument from illusion = 94
• (ⅲ) A method of introducing sense-data = 104
• (ⅳ) Concerning the legitimacy of sense-data = 115
• (ⅴ) Na$$\ddot i$$ve realism and the causal theory of perception = 125
• (ⅵ) Phenomenalism = 131
• (ⅶ) The justification of statements about physical objects = 144
• CHAPTERⅣ : MEMORY = 149
• (ⅰ) Habit memory and the memory of events = 149
• (ⅱ) Dispensability of memory images = 153
• (ⅲ) In what does remembering consist? = 159
• (ⅳ) Memory and the concept of the past = 165
• (ⅴ) Concerning the analysis of statements about the past = 172
• (ⅵ) The past and the future : memory and precognition = 185
• (ⅶ) Why cannot cause succeed effect? = 192
• CHAPTERⅤ : MYSELF AND OTHERS = 199
• (ⅰ) What makes a person the person that he is? = 199
• (ⅱ) General criteria of personal identity. Must they be physical? = 212
• (ⅲ) The privacy of experience = 226
• (ⅳ) What can we communicate? = 233
• (ⅴ) The thesis of physicalism = 238
• (ⅵ) The analysis and justification of statements about other minds = 243
• INDEX = 255
• [volume. vol.4]----------
• PREFACE = ⅴ
• 1 PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE = 1
• 2 CAN THERE BE A PRIVATE LANGUAGE? = 36
• 3 PRIVACY = 52
• 4 THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON = 82
• 5 NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS = 129
• 6 TRUTH = 162
• 7 TWO NOTES ON PROBABILITY :
• (ⅰ) The Conception of Probability as a Logical Relation = 188
• (ⅱ) On the Probability of Particular Events = 198
• 8 WHAT IS A LAW OF NATURE? = 209
• 9 FATALISM = 235
• INDEX = 269
• [volume. vol.5]----------
• Preface = 9
• CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
• 1 INTRODUCTION = 12
• 2 THE BASES OF PEIRCE'S PRAGMATISM = 17
• A His Theory of Truth = 17
• B His Theory of Meaning = 40
• 1 What is Belief? = 40
• 2 Operations on Concepts = 49
• 3 Concessions to Realism = 62
• 3 PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE = 74
• A The Three Kinds of Reasoning = 74
• B The Justification of Induction = 91
• C The Factor of Chance = 103
• 4 PEIRCE'S CATEGORIES AND HIS THEORY OF SIGNS = 112
• A The Three Categories = 112
• 1 Feeling and Perception = 112
• 2 Facts and Laws = 121
• B The Interpretation of Signs = 130
• C The Divisions of Signs = 147
• 1 Types and Tokens = 147
• 2 Icons, Indices and Symbols = 149
• 3 Propositions and their Subjects = 158
• D Appraisal of Peirce's Theory of Signs = 166
• WILLIAM JAMES
• 1 INTRODUCTION = 183
• 2 THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH = 191
• A Jame's Emotional Commitments = 191
• B The Nature of Truth = 196
• 1 Truth in Relation to Matters of Fact = 202
• 2 A priori Truths = 205
• 3 Moral and Aesthetic Judgements = 208
• C The Will and its Freedom = 212
• D The Place of Religious Belief = 219
• 3 RADICAL EMPIRICISM = 224
• A The Data of Experience = 224
• 1 Sensation and Perception = 224
• 2 The Genesis of Space = 233
• 3 The Genesis of Time = 243
• 4 The Analysis of Memory = 252
• B The Knower and the Known = 256
• 1 The Concept of the Self = 256
• 2 A Theory of Personal Identity = 263
• 3 Percepts and Concepts = 288
• C The Construction of the Physical World = 298
• 1 Experiences in their Double Aspect = 298
• 2 The Basis of the Construction = 303
• 3 The Question of Privacy = 311
• 4 The Construction Outlined = 321
• 5 On What There Is = 329
• Index = 337
• [volume. vol.6]----------
• Preface = ⅸ
• Bertrand Russell
• 1 The Challenge of Scepticism = 3
• A. Russell's Life and Works = 3
• B. His Conception of Philosophy = 10
• C. The Motives for Logical Construction = 15
• D. Classes and the Theory of Types = 20
• 2 The Theory of Descriptions = 28
• A. On Denotation = 28
• B. Russell's Analysis of Descriptions = 32
• C. The Meaning of Existence = 35
• D. Russell's Theory of Names = 38
• E. Evaluation of the Theory = 47
• 3 Logical Atomism - Part 1 : The Primary Objects = 54
• A. Criterion of Simplicity = 54
• B. The World of Sensibilia = 57
• C. The Requirement of Atomicity = 66
• D. Particulars and Universals = 69
• 4. Logical Atomism - Part 2 : Russell's Theories of Judgement and of Truth = 80
• A. Propositions and Facts = 80
• B. The Thesis of Extensionality = 91
• C. Russell's Theories fo Judgement = 98
• D. His Theories of Truth = 105
• 5 Russell's Conception of What There Is = 110
• A. His Neutral Monism = 110
• (ⅰ) The Constitution of Minds = 110
• (ⅱ) His Account of Causality = 113
• (ⅲ) His Analysis of Memory = 117
• B. The Location of Percepts = 121
• C. The Physical World = 129
• G.E. Moore
• 6 The Refutation of Idealism = 137
• A. Moore's Life and Works = 137
• B. His Interpretation of the Principle that To Be is To Be Perceived = 143
• C. His Criticism of this Principle = 147
• D. The Dogma of Internal Relations = 155
• 7 The Defence of Common Sense = 161
• A. The Common-sense View of the World = 161
• B. Moore's Proof of an External World = 168
• C. An Extension of Moore's Argument = 178
• 8 Moore's Treatment of Abstract Entities = 188
• A. The Reality of Concepts = 188
• (ⅰ) Moore's Early Platonism = 188
• (ⅱ) His Conception of Reality = 190
• B. The Nature of Universals = 195
• C. The Existence of Classes = 202
• D. Are There Propositions? = 205
• E. Propositions and Facts = 212
• 9 The Fruits of Analysis = 220
• A. Moore's Conception of Analysis = 220
• B. The Paradox of Analysis and the Naturalistic Fallacy = 228
• C. The Role of Sense-data = 232
• D. The Analysis of Propositions about Material Objects = 240
• Index = 247
• [volume. vol.7]----------
• Preface = ⅸ
• ⅠThe Claims of Metaphysics
• A Philosophy and Science = 1
• B Evaluation of Mystical Experience = 4
• C Appearance and Reality : Some Metaphysical Positions = 7
• D Time and Motion : Some Metaphysical Arguments = 15
• ⅡMeaning and Common Sense
• A The Verification Principle = 22
• B The Criterion of Falsifiability = 27
• C Meaning and Use = 29
• D The Claims of Common Sense = 34
• ⅢPhilosophical Analysis
• A Formal Analyses = 44
• B Logical Grammar = 45
• C Analyses of Ordinary Usage = 49
• D Looking at the Facts = 51
• E The Theory of Knowledge = 58
• ⅣThe Problem of Perception
• A What do we Perceive? = 68
• B The Argument from Illusion = 73
• C The Causal Theory of Perception = 82
• ⅤConstruction of the Physical World
• A The Elements = 89
• B The Question of Privacy = 93
• C Outline of the Construction = 99
• D Phenomenalism = 106
• E Common Sense and Physics = 108
• ⅥBody and Mind
• A Persons and their Experiences = 112
• B Are There Mental Substances? = 117
• C Vagaries of Personal Identity = 121
• D Physicalism = 126
• E One's Knowledge of Other Minds = 132
• ⅦFacts and Explanations
• A The Problem of Induction = 137
• B The Primary System = 140
• C Necessity and Law = 147
• D Theory and Observation = 155
• ⅧOrder and Chance
• A The Uniformity of Nature = 160
• B Statements of Probability
• 1 The Calculus of Chances = 163
• 2 The Frequency Theory = 166
• 3 The Logical Theory and Statements of Credibility = 170
• C The Problem of Confirmation = 174
• D Cause and Effect = 179
• ⅨLogic and Existence
• A The Laws of Logic
• 1 The Propositional Calculus = 184
• 2 Predicate-Logic and the Theory of Descriptions = 187
• 3 Set-Theory and the Theory of Types = 191
• 4 Semantic Necessities = 195
• 5 Identity = 196
• B Analyticity = 198
• C The Existence of Abstract Entities = 203
• ⅩThe Claims of Theology
• A The Existence of God = 211
• B The Argument from Design = 217
• C Religious Hypotheses = 220
• D Religion and Morality = 223
• E The Freedom of the Will = 227
• F The Meaning of Life = 233
• Index = 237