(A) Study on the U.S. Non-proliferation Policy against Pakistan's Nuclear Program

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study has been designed to analyze the causes of changes in the U.S. non-proliferation policy in regards to its opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program between the 1950s and today. It is intended to provide a framework for drawing implications for the U.S.’ non-proliferation policy towards the DPRK today. The U.S. has pursued to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons around the globe since it first unleashed the massive force of the explosion at the end of the Second World War. To prevent uncontrolled proliferation, the U.S. has utilized a variety of different measures, such as multilateral and normative measures, coercion, assurance, and mitigation. Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in the context of trilateral rivalry between itself, the PRC and India, and formally announced itself to be a nuclear state after successive nuclear tests in 1998. In the decades long history of U.S. effort to prevent Pakistan's nuclear armament, the direction of U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan changed from coercion to assurance around 1979 and from coercion to mitigation around 2001. The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Afghanistan War in 1979 put Pakistan in an unique position to counter imminent threats from the Soviet Union. And again in 2001, the September 11 attacks granted a special status to Pakistan for defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These elevations of Pakistan's strategic value were the first causes to changes in U.S policy. In addition, growing Anti-Americanism and the Islamization of Pakistan might have made it challenging for the U.S. to maintain coercive measures against Pakistan's nuclear program. Considering the strategic value of Pakistan, a repeat of losing a vital ally by Islamization and Anti-Americanism could be unacceptable to the U.S., a repeat of the experience in losing Iran in 1979. Also, in terms of U.S. threat perception regarding nuclear proliferation, Pakistan's nuclear armament was not the beginning of a regional nuclear domino effect, but the end of it. Lastly, secondary proliferation to terrorists was much more impending and perilous than the nuclear armament of Pakistan itself. To take prompt measures against the imminent threats of terrorists, the U.S. unavoidably acknowledged the existence of the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Given the above considerations, the DPRK's aspiration for following the case of Pakistan is not expected to be realized.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract ⅴ
• Chapter 1. Introduction 1
• 1.1. Background 1
• 1.2. Existing Research 2
• 1.3. Purpose, Scope, Methodology, and Research Questions 4
• Chapter 2. The U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy 6
• 2.1. Threats from Nuclear-Proliferation to the U.S. 6
• 2.1.1. Vertical Proliferation and the Loss of Nuclear Primacy 6
• 2.1.2. Horizontal Proliferation to State-Actors 8
• 2.1.3. Horizontal Proliferation to Non-State-Actors 9
• 2.2. Measures of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy 10
• 2.2.1. Legal and Normative Measures 10
• 2.2.2. Coercion 13
• 2.2.3. Assurance 14
• 2.2.4. Mitigation 16
• 2.3. Analytic Framework of the Study 17
• Chapter 3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 18
• 3.1. The Dawn on the Nuclear Program (1950s~60s) 18
• 3.2. Height of the Nuclear Program (1970s~80s) 19
• 3.3. The Completion of the Nuclear Program (1990s~) 23
• Chapter 4. The U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy towards Pakistan 29
• 4.1. The Changes from 1979 29
• 4.1.1. Detection and Sanctions 29
• 4.1.2. The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Afghanistan War 32
• 4.1.3. The Upsurge of Aid 35
• 4.2. The Changes from 2001 38
• 4.2.1. Sanctions after the Nuclear Tests 38
• 4.2.2. The September 11th Attacks and Threats from Nuclear Terrorism 39
• 4.2.3. Sanction Relief and Assistance 41
• 4.2.4. Efforts for Preventing Secondary Proliferation 41
• Chapter 5. Analysis of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy on Pakistan 44
• 5.1. Defeating the Most Impending Threats 44
• 5.2. Pakistan’s Political Instability 46
• 5.3. Regional Context of Threats from Nuclear Proliferation 48
• 5.4. Impending Threats of Nuclear Terrorism and Rogue States 49
• Chapter 6. Conclusion 52
• References 57