Cournot Conjectures with Asymmetric Information under Uncertainty

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 기업1이 부분 정보를 가지고 있고 기업2가 서로 다른 위험 부담 행위 하에서 경쟁기업의비용함수에 대한 완전 정보를 가지고 있는 비대칭 상황에 직면한 간단하고 표준적인 쿠르노(Cournot) 복점 모형을 도입한다. 이러한 비대칭적 상황을 분석하기 위해 기업의 위험 부담 행동의 두 가지유형을 제시한다. 첫째, 두 기업이 모두 위험 중립적일 때 각 기업이 경쟁 기업의 비용함수에 대한완전정보를 가지고 있는 경우와 비교하여, 기업2의 최적 생산 수준은 변하지 않지만, 기업1은 증가하거나 감소할 수 있다. 둘째, 기업1은 위험회피적이고 기업2는 위험 중립적인 경우를 고려한다. 본논문은 두 기업이 모두 위험 중립적인 경우와 비교하여 비대칭 정보 하에서 기업 1의 최적 산출수준은 감소하고 기업 2의 산출 수준은 증가한다는 것을 보여준다. 또한 기업의 최적 전략은 위험부담행동에 의존하고 있음을 알 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper introduces the simple and standard Cournot duopoly model facing the asymmetric situation in which firm 1 has partial information and firm 2 has perfect information on the cost function of their rival under different risk-taking behaviors. We present two types of risk-taking behaviors of firms to analyze this asymmetric situation. First, when both firms are risk-neutral, compared with the results that each firm has perfect information on its rival’s cost function, the optimal output level of firm 2 does not change; however, that of firm 1 can increase or decrease. Second, we consider that firm 1 is risk-averse and firm 2 is risk-neutral. We find that firm 1’s optimal output level decreases and that of firm 2 increases under this kind of asymmetric information, compared with the results in the case in which both firms are risk-neutral. Further, we find that firms’ optimal strategies depend on their risk-taking behaviors.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Model and Analysis Ⅲ. Concluding Remarks

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 Kirby, A., "Trade associations as information exchange mechanism" 19 : 138-146, 1988

2 Hwang, H. S., "Optimal information acquisition for heterogeneous duopoly firms" 59 : 385-402, 1993

3 Sandmo, A., "On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty" 61 : 65-73, 1971

4 Sakai, Y., "Oligopoly, information and welfare" 49 : 3-24, 1989

5 Gal-Or, R., "Information transmission-cournot and Bertrand equilibria" 53 : 85-92, 1986

6 Sakai, Y., "Information sharing in oligopoly: Overview and evaluation. Part II. Private risks and oligopoly models" 28 : 51-71, 1991

7 Sakai, Y., "Information sharing in oligopoly: Overview and evaluation. Part I. alternative models with a common risk" 27 : 17-41, 1990

8 Gal-Or, R., "Information sharing in oligopoly" 53 : 329-343, 1985

9 Gehrig, T., "Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs" 51 (51): 77-99, 2007

10 Doyle, M. P., "Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry" 107 : 1324-1364, 1999

11 Novshek, W., "Fulfilled expectations Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release" 13 : 214-218, 1982

12 Shapiro, C., "Exchange of cost Information in oligopoly" 53 : 433-446, 1986

13 Malueg, D. A., "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope" 14 : 119-136, 1996

14 Vives, X., "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand" 34 : 71-91, 1984

15 Clarke, R. N., "Duopolist don’t wish to share information" 14 : 33-36, 1983

16 Malueg, D. A., "Distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange" 16 : 785-797, 1998

17 Kultti, K., "Demand uncertainty in cournot-duopoly" 47 : 24-32, 1998

18 Li, L., "Cournot oligopoly with information sharing" 16 : 521-536, 1985

19 Ryu, S., "Conjectures between two Cournot firms with symmetric information and their risk-taking behaviours" 54 : 223-234, 2017

20 Clarke, R. N., "Collusion and the incentives for information sharing" 14 : 383-394, 1983

21 Jin, J. Y., "A test for information sharing in Cournot oligopoly" 8 : 75-86, 1996