Since 1989 when the North Korean nuclear issue first rose to global prominence, efforts by the international community to resolve the issue have not moved it meaningfully closer to the actual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and ...
Since 1989 when the North Korean nuclear issue first rose to global prominence, efforts by the international community to resolve the issue have not moved it meaningfully closer to the actual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and weapon holdings. While North Korea has succeeded in getting the United States to the negotiation table by using the nuclear card and consolidating its own regime security, the process of resolving the issue has been locked in a cycle of negotiation, agreement, abrogation of agreements, the heightening of crisis, and renegotiation. Thus, whereas the Six-Party Talks have yielded agreements to end North Korea’s nuclear programs, notably through the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear weapons program. It is therefore clear that the North Korean nuclear issue is showing little, if any, sign of being resolved despite pressure from the international community, including the South Korean government’s suspension of economic assistance and cooperation with the North, and the UN Security Council sanctions against the North. This paper accordingly examines the North Korean nuclear issue-the most pressing security problem on the Korean Peninsula during the past two decades. This paper explores the recurring pattern of the North Korean nuclear crises and North Korea’s negotiating behavior, analyzing the core and critical issues of dealing with the North Korean nuclear program and the difficulties that have arisen in the process. In so doing, policy priorities are identified that could help to bring about a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.