We examine the effect of the control–ownership wedge (the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights) in Korean business groups (Chaebols) on corporate social responsibility activities. The results of our analyses show that on corpora...
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https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A105034911
2017
-
325
SCOPUS,KCI등재
학술저널
15-29(15쪽)
0
상세조회0
다운로드다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)
We examine the effect of the control–ownership wedge (the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights) in Korean business groups (Chaebols) on corporate social responsibility activities. The results of our analyses show that on corpora...
We examine the effect of the control–ownership wedge (the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights) in Korean business groups (Chaebols) on corporate social responsibility activities. The results of our analyses show that on corporate social responsibility activities decrease as the control–ownership wedge increases. This result remains consistent when on corporate social responsibility scores are used. This study provides evidence that a greater control–ownership wedge decreases engagement in corporate social responsibility activities in the context of Korean business groups (Chaebols), with their unique ownership structure.
목차 (Table of Contents)
Cultural Capital of Visitors, Classical Music Festival Satisfaction, and Quality of Life
Labor Union and Real Earnings Management
The Strategic Alignment of Management Accounting Information Systems, and Organizational Performance