한·미 군사동맹관계의 변화 및 전망 : 포기-연루모델을 중심으로(Centers on a Abandonment-Entrapment model) = The Transformation and Prospect of Korea-USA Military Alliance

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

1. Introduction
In these days, Korea has structural duplicity, a peace in the strain, in an atmosphere that the cold war is closed and reconciliation and cooperation is seeked world widely. From the cold war which is after the Korea war to the anti-cold war, the security of Korea is maintained by the Korea - USA military alliance absolutely.
But the U.S.A has kept up a military alliance with Korea which forms a part of the strategy of the world and East Asia for their country's greatest profits. But Korea has maintained a military alliance with U.S.A for a survival strategy against the North Korea's threatening. These two nation's different attitude sometimes has caused complications and many troubles between two nations.
These days the world is changing through a collapse of cold war dipole system and through a course of formation of new international order. This situation of a conversing period contains both risks and chances, we need confrontation abilities to cope with these changes with smart. For that reason, this study aims at active coping with changes by U.S.A and Korea's military alliance, presentation of desirable developments by systematic approaches to the military alliance, for maintaining our greatest national profits.
Until now, the studies about politic, military, diplomatic relations of Korea and the U.S.A have been mainly based on traditional approach, and studies by behavioral approach have studied by applying international system theory and foreign policy decision-making theory. I think it is not enough to explain reciprocal actions and bilateral relationships among the countries. Accordingly, this study intends to translations and prospect the change of military alliance of the U.S.A and Korea by adopting the game theory which is considered to be useful in estimating progressing complications and opponents' behaviors in dispute, and in finding optimum correspond. The Abandonment - Entrapment Model, used in this study as an analyze basis is considered to be able to explain the situation of security mutual relation dynamically, and is proved to have an exactness for explain West Europe and the U.S.A in cold war system. Besides there has been no prior study with The Abandonment - Entrapment Model, so that the assessment of military alliance of the U.S.A and Korea used this theory and prospect can make out basic motivations of a nation's attitude more essentially, with relatively objective view points. Also the Abandonment - Entrapment Model has an accuracy for analyzing bilateral relation like a powerful country and a minor power, and it is considered to be fit in observe the essential elements that determine alliance of the U.S.A and Korea.
As the result, military alliance of the U.S.A and Korea repeated an abandonment stage and an voice stage several times, in cold war system, to 1919 from 1953, when the Korea - U.S.A Mutual Protection Treaty concluded, and after 1919, when neo cold war began, it has assessed that it commanced a partial entrapment stage.
Also, In the leadership of USA, The alliance is maintained. So the unbalance of power is comes out. Because of this situation, It was estimated that Korea recognize the fear of abandonment and U.S.A recognize the fear of entrapment. In the time of anti-cold war, The risk of abandonment and entrapment is present simultaneously in Korea by extension of liberty in alliance and propulsion of the northern-policy.
Aspect of U.S.A, It was estimated that the risk of abandonment was decreased and the risk of entrapment was increased by the increase of their self profits and maintain their profits to the area in present or in future. In present the risk of abandonment and entrapment is present simultaneously and this reciprocal element is balanced by the interaction. As a conclusion, in order to the risk of abandonment or entrapment is not present, a close cooperation is needed short-termly, and We recruit the unbalance of the power of Korea - U.S.A military alliance and make an effort to increase the Korea autonomy long-termly.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목차
• 제1장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 연구목적 및 문제제기 = 1
• 제2절 연구의 범위 및 방법 = 2
• 제2장 이론적 배경과 분석의 틀 = 6
• 제1절 포기-연루 모델의 이론적 배경 = 6
• 1. 군사동맹과 포기-연루모델 = 6
• 2. 양극체제하 포기-연루 = 7
• 3. 다극체제하 포기-연루 = 9
• 제2절 본 연구의 분석의 틀 = 11
• 제3장 냉전체제 한·미 군사동맹관계 = 14
• 제1절 한·미간 지정학적 이해관계 = 14
• 1. 미국의 아시아에 대한 전통적 이해관계 = 14
• 2. 미국의 한반도에 대한 이해관계 = 16
• 제2절 냉전체제 미국의 대한반도 정책과 포기-연루 = 18
• 1. 한국전쟁 발발전 대한 군사정책 = 18
• 2. 닉슨 독트린(Nixon Doctrine)과 대한 군사정책 = 20
• 3. 카터 행정부의 대한 군사정책 = 22
• 4. 레이건 행정부의 대한 군사정책 = 23
• 제3절 포기-연루모델과 한국의 안보정책(표출) = 25
• 1. 1950-60년대(의존기) = 25
• 2. 1970년대(자주국방모색기) = 28
• 3. 1980년대 전반기(신냉전기) = 31
• 제4절 냉전체제 한반도 안보위기와 포기-연루 = 32
• 1. 청와대기습, 푸에블로호 납북사건 = 33
• 2. 판문점 도끼만행사건 = 36
• 3. 아웅산 폭파사건 = 38
• 제5절 소결론 = 40
• 제4장 탈냉전체제 한·미 군사동맹관계 = 47
• 제1절 탈냉전시대 미국의 안보정책 = 48
• 1. 탈냉전시대의 성격과 미국의 대응방향 = 48
• 2. 탈냉전시대 동아시아 안보환경과 미국의 전략 = 52
• 제2절 미국의 대한반도 정책과 포기-연루 = 60
• 1. 부시 행정부의 대한 군사정책 = 60
• 2. 클린턴 행정부의 대한 군사정책 = 62
• 제3절 탈냉전체제 한국의 안보정책(표출) = 65
• 1. 1980년대 후반기(신 세계질서 형성기) = 65
• 2. 1990년대(군사협력 다변화기) = 69
• 제4절 소결론 = 76
• 제5장 포기-연루모델과 한·미 군사동맹관계 전망 = 81
• 제1절 한국의 안보딜레마와 포기-연루모델 = 81
• 1. 한·미 군사동맹관계 포기의 위험성 = 83
• 2. 한·미 군사동맹관계 연루의 위험성 = 91
• 제2절 한·미 군사동맹과 포기-연루의 순환 = 97
• 제3절 한·미 군사동맹관계 전망과 대응방향 = 100
• 제6장 결론 = 106
• 참고문헌 = 110
• ABSTRACT = 114