(A) toolbox for the application of the rules of targeting

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• List of Figures and Tables = xii
• Table of Treaties and other International Acts = xiii
• Table of Cases = xv
• Acknowledgments = xix
• List of Abbreviations = xx
• Chapter One : Introduction = 1
• Chapter Two : How Military Commanders Go About Planning a Military Operation = 11
• 1. The Nature of the Military Goals
• 2. The Building Blocks of a Military Operation
• 2.1 Intelligence Collection
• 2.3 Movement and Manoeuvre
• 2.4 Additional Measures Commanders may take to Reduce Harm to Civilians
• 2.5 Force Protection
• 3. Conclusions
• Chapter Three : An Introduction to the Rules of Targeting = 56
• 1. The Principle of Distinction
• 2. The Rule of Target Verification
• 3. The Principle of the Least Feasible Damage
• 4. The Principle of Proportionality
• 5. An Obligation of Risk Assumption in IHL
• 5.1 The Position of States on Force Protection
• 5.2 The Rule of Target Verification : Establishing a Duty of Risk Assumption
• 5.3 Risk Assumption in the Context of Means and Methods of Warfare
• 6. The Duty to Issue an Advance Warning of the Attack
• 6.1 The Meaning of the Term "Effective"
• 6.2 How Far in Advance Commanders should Issue a Warning
• 6.3 The Meaning of the Term "unless circumstances do not permit"
• 7. To Whom the Rules of Targeting are Addressed
• 8. Conclusions
• Chapter Four : The Practical Application of the Rules of Targeting : A Legal Ambiguity = 124
• 1. The Rule of Target Verification
• 1.1 How Drafters Envisaged the Rules in Art. 57 API 1977
• 1.2 Criteria Developed by Scholars
• 1.3 Testing the Value of the Criteria proposed by Scholars
• 2. The Principle of the Least Feasible Damage
• 3. The Principle of Proportionality
• 4. The Duty to Issue an Advance Warning of the Attack
• 4.1 The Drafting of the Rule in Art. 57(2)(c) API 1977
• 4.2 Goldstone's Restatement of the Traditional Test
• 4.3 Refining Goldstone's Test
• 5. A Theoretical Explanation for the Ambiguity in the Law
• 6. The Hypothesis
• 7. Conclusions
• Chapter Five : Drawing the Line : The Degree of Certainty Required by the Principle of Distinction = 173
• 1. Why There Is So Much Uncertainty around the Required Degree of Certainty
• 2. Investigating the Degree of Certainty Required by the Principle of Distinction
• 2.1 Evidential Standards of Proof
• 2.2 The Issue of the Linkage between Standards of Proof and their Context
• 2.3 The "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" Standard
• 2.4 "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" Standard v. State Practice
• 2.5 The Value of the "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" Standard for International Humanitarian Law
• 2.6 Constructing a Scale
• 2.7 The Contribution of the Scale
• 3. Target Characteristics versus the Degree of Required Certainty
• 4. The Interplay between Operational Factors
• 4.1 The Roles Played by the Four Operational Variables
• 4.2 Examining how the Four Variables Relate to Each Other
• 4.3 How the Four Variables Interact
• 5. Conclusions
• Chapter Six : A Toolbox for the Application of the Rule of Target Verification = 232
• 1. An Examination of how Military Commanders Balance the Three Elements
• A. State Practice of Russia in Chechnya
• B. State Practice of Israel
• C. NATO Attack on the Djakovica Convoy
• D. State Practice of the United States of America
• E. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
• 2. A Framework for the Application of the Rule
• 2.1 Applying the Insights to a Battlefield Scenario
• 2.2 Answering some Outstanding Questions
• 3. Conclusions
• Chapter Seven : A Toolbox for the Application of the Principle of the Least Feasible Damage = 283
• 1. Constructing a Scale for the Spectrum of Harm and Military Advantage
• 1.1 Defining the Element of the Magnitude of Harm to Civilians
• 1.2 Defining the Element of the Likelihood of Civilian Harm
• 1.3 Defining the Element of Military Advantage
• 1.4 Tables for the Three Elements
• 1.5 The Rationale for the Chosen Values for the Scale
• 2. Analysis of State Practice
• A. The State Practice of Philippines
• B. The State Practice of Russia in Georgia
• C. The State Practice of Israel on the Employment of Mortars
• D. The State Practice of Georgia
• E. The State Practice of Israel on the Use of White Phosphorus
• 3. The Relationship between the Three Elements
• 3.1 The Relationship of the Element of Military Advantage to other Elements
• 3.2 The Element of Magnitude of Harm to Civilians : Degree of Care and Objects Entitled to Special Protection
• 3.3 The Relationship of the Element Likelihood of Civilian Harm to the Elements of Military Advantage and Magnitude of Harm to Civilians
• 3.4 The Relationship between the Elements of Military Advantage, Likelihood of Civilian Harm and Magnitude of Harm to Civilians
• 4. Conclusions
• Chapter Eight : The Duty to Issue an Advance Warning of the Attack : Perspectives from Psychology = 342
• 1. The Mechanism behind Making an Assessment when Issuing a Warning of an Attack may "Seriously Compromise" the Chances on Winning
• 2. The Role of the Military Commander's Personality
• 3. The Influence of Mental Templates on the Decision-Making of a Commander
• 3.1 The Mental Template of "Availability"
• 3.2 The Mental Template of "Representativeness"
• 3.3 The Mental Template of "Adjustment and Anchoring"
• 4. Insights regarding how Military Commanders Apply the Goldstone's Formulation of the Rule
• 5. Explaining the Influence of Policy Considerations using the "Social Amplification Theory"
• 6. Conclusions
• Chapter Nine Conclusion = 387
• Bibliography = 405
• Index = 440