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      The Causes of the Korean War(1950-1953)

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in the two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula as a part of the Asiatic mainland in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe as a spring board to attack Russia, asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategy posture,the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-8) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for the Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause. Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and the Soviet aids for national building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of the full American intervention in the projected war. With the full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from Communist China, Kim Il-sung of North Korea attacked South Korea with the North Korean forces better armed, equipped, prepared than their counterparts of South Korea in the confidence and hope that he could expand his political basis throughout the Korean peninsula. This became the “naked” cause of the Korean War, embracing all other immediate and remote, direct and indirect, definite and circumstantial ones.
      Because of the swift American and UN intervention in the war, however, the communist side could not secure a quick victory but could recover the status quo ante-bellum only after the Chinese full interference for the fighting. After the fighting for one year, both sides acquiesced in the fact that the Korean problem was too complex to be solved my military means only. The result was an honorable armistice,leaving the ultimate solution on the Korean issue to time and future, producing the two self-claimed victors.
      The conclusion of the war in this manner, a cease-fire rather than a peace,in fact, set another type and nature of war in the Korean peninsula, a subversive war, employing all kinds of violent and seemingly peaceful ways and means particularly by North Korea. North Korea, that had failed to communize Korea by military means,has engaged in a subversive war against South Korea in order to overthrow the South Korean government and its regime by mobilizing all available destructive and disruptive, deceitful and devious measures and means even in the post-Cold war period. In this regard, the Korean War (1950-3) has not ended in name and fact, and the fundamental cause of the Korean War still lingers on the Korean peninsula.
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      The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in the two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula as a par...

      The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in the two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula as a part of the Asiatic mainland in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe as a spring board to attack Russia, asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategy posture,the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-8) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for the Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause. Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and the Soviet aids for national building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of the full American intervention in the projected war. With the full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from Communist China, Kim Il-sung of North Korea attacked South Korea with the North Korean forces better armed, equipped, prepared than their counterparts of South Korea in the confidence and hope that he could expand his political basis throughout the Korean peninsula. This became the “naked” cause of the Korean War, embracing all other immediate and remote, direct and indirect, definite and circumstantial ones.
      Because of the swift American and UN intervention in the war, however, the communist side could not secure a quick victory but could recover the status quo ante-bellum only after the Chinese full interference for the fighting. After the fighting for one year, both sides acquiesced in the fact that the Korean problem was too complex to be solved my military means only. The result was an honorable armistice,leaving the ultimate solution on the Korean issue to time and future, producing the two self-claimed victors.
      The conclusion of the war in this manner, a cease-fire rather than a peace,in fact, set another type and nature of war in the Korean peninsula, a subversive war, employing all kinds of violent and seemingly peaceful ways and means particularly by North Korea. North Korea, that had failed to communize Korea by military means,has engaged in a subversive war against South Korea in order to overthrow the South Korean government and its regime by mobilizing all available destructive and disruptive, deceitful and devious measures and means even in the post-Cold war period. In this regard, the Korean War (1950-3) has not ended in name and fact, and the fundamental cause of the Korean War still lingers on the Korean peninsula.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 Oliver, Robert T, "Why War Came in Korea"

      2 "US Department of the Army"

      3 "US Department of State"

      4 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Trans. Soviet Top Secret Documents Relating to the Korean War, vol. 1-4"

      5 Military History Research Center, "Trans. Soviet 64th Air Corps Combat Engagement Documents"

      6 Military History Research Center, "Trans. Secret Soviet Documents"

      7 Goulden, Joseph C, "The Untold Story of the War"

      8 Ohn, Chang-Il, "The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Policy and Strategy Regarding Korea, 1945-1953" University of Kansas 1983

      9 Matray, James I, "The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950" University of Virginia 1977

      10 Matray, James I, "The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950"

      1 Oliver, Robert T, "Why War Came in Korea"

      2 "US Department of the Army"

      3 "US Department of State"

      4 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Trans. Soviet Top Secret Documents Relating to the Korean War, vol. 1-4"

      5 Military History Research Center, "Trans. Soviet 64th Air Corps Combat Engagement Documents"

      6 Military History Research Center, "Trans. Secret Soviet Documents"

      7 Goulden, Joseph C, "The Untold Story of the War"

      8 Ohn, Chang-Il, "The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Policy and Strategy Regarding Korea, 1945-1953" University of Kansas 1983

      9 Matray, James I, "The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950" University of Virginia 1977

      10 Matray, James I, "The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950"

      11 Cummings, Bruce, "The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, 2. 1981"

      12 Stueck, William, "The Korean War: An International History"

      13 Lee, Chae-Jin, "The Korean War: 40-Year Perspectives"

      14 Acheson, Dean G, "The Korean War"

      15 Bajanov, Evegeniy P, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century?Based on Secret Soviet Archives"

      16 Stone, I. F, "The Hidden History of the Korean War"

      17 Washington, D. C. National Archives, "Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, G-3 Operations and Plans Division, 1944-1950"

      18 Washington, D. C. National Archives, "Record Group 218: Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff"

      19 Military History Research Center, "ROK National Defense Ministry"

      20 "ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade"

      21 Military History Division, "ROK Army"

      22 Acheson, Dean G, "Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department"

      23 Military History Division, "Operations Reports, 1951.7-1953.7"

      24 Military History Research Center, "North Korean Seized Documents, War Plans, Operations Orders, Daily Combat Records"

      25 Washington, D. C. National Archives, "Military Archives Division. Modern Military Branch"

      26 US Department of the Army, "Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War"

      27 Truman, Harry S, "Memoirs, II: Years of Trial and Hope"

      28 "McCullough, David. Truman"

      29 Zhang, Shu Guang, "Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953"

      30 "MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences"

      31 Osgood, Robert, "Limited War"

      32 Rees, David, "Korea: The Limited War"

      33 Cho, Soon Sung, "Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility"

      34 Military History Division, "Intelligence Reports, 1951.7-1953.7"

      35 Washington, D. C. National Archives, "History of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1945-1952, Vols. Ⅰ, Military History Research Center, ROK National Defense Ministry"

      36 Matray, James I, "Historical Dictionary of the Korean War"

      37 US Department of State, "FRUS, 1945-1950"

      38 Military History Division, "Daily Combat Reports, 1950-1953"

      39 Mansourov, Alexander Y, "Communist War Coalition Formation and the Origins of the Korean War" Columbia University 1997

      40 US Department of State, "Bulletin, VI-XXXI. 1942-1954"

      41 "Bajanov, Evegeniy P. and Natalia Bajanova"

      42 Paik, Sun-Yup, "Army and Me. 1989. And Other Korean Generals’"

      43 Washington, D. C. National Archives, "All Combat History Series"

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      외국어명 : The Studies of International Affairs -> National Security and Strategy
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      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.46 0.46 0.33
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.3 0.27 0.579 0.14
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