Principal‐agent models with multiple agents typically assume that the principal wishes to maximize the sum of the agents' achievements (net of the rewards paid to them). But in many settings, like R&D, all that the principal “needs” is that at l...
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https://www.riss.kr/link?id=O119759813
2019년
-
0143-6570
1099-1468
SCOPUS;SSCI
학술저널
353-362 [※수록면이 p5 이하이면, Review, Columns, Editor's Note, Abstract 등일 경우가 있습니다.]
0
상세조회0
다운로드다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)
Principal‐agent models with multiple agents typically assume that the principal wishes to maximize the sum of the agents' achievements (net of the rewards paid to them). But in many settings, like R&D, all that the principal “needs” is that at l...
Principal‐agent models with multiple agents typically assume that the principal wishes to maximize the sum of the agents' achievements (net of the rewards paid to them). But in many settings, like R&D, all that the principal “needs” is that at least one agent will be “successful.” We identify settings where the principal actually wants agents to refrain from exerting high effort in order to save expected compensation. We show that the number of agents can decrease in the project's value for the principal. We also consider sequential efforts and investigate settings where the principal can provide support to agents.
Differentiated‐product distribution in a dual‐channel supply chain
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