Influence of Agents' Risk Tendencies on Global Partnerships: Case on Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance = 행위자들의 위험선호도가 글로벌 파트너십에 미치는 영향: 세계백신연합의 사례 분석을 통하여

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Global partnership has been the center of discussion in the field of global governance especially since the creation of the Millennium Development Goals. Paris Declaration in 2005 and Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 have also emphasized global partnership as a major principle for development aid effectiveness. The 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness has also put grave importance on global partnerships, especially the role of non-governmental agents. Post 2015 development agenda puts value on actual implementation of development policies, and global partnership is critical in doing so.
Despite the mentioned importance, global partnership faces double road block in the field of both theory and practice. While global governance is surely taking place in various sectors, the actual realization of partnerships is limited both in number, quality, fund, and its effectiveness. Current literature on global partnerships makes attempts to explain why agents form global partnerships, but fails to elaborate on when and in what actual condition global partnerships occur. Moreover, discussions on incentives for partnerships and how to fund them also have many rooms for addition.
The primary concern of the paper is to attempt to provide answers to the upper mentioned problems. The paper incorporates J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory and the concept of risk tendency of economics to the field of global partnerships to provide a new framework for evaluating in what condition global partnerships occur. The paper categorizes agents of global partnerships into risk neutral, risk averse, and risk seeking agents and attempts to clarify whether or not they would participate in a fair partnership, favorable partnership, and unfavorable partnership. Then the paper will attempt to cast light on the quantitative amount of incentives that are needed to induce the agents to form partnerships, and how to fund them. In attempting to provide answers to these problems, I will be applying graphical evidences as an attempt to provide quantitative insights to the problem and differentiate my paper from the existing literatures. Then the paper analyzes the case of Gavi, the vaccine alliance with the proposed framework.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Table of Contents
• Abstract i
• Table of Contents iii
• List of Tables iv
• List of Figures v
• I. Introduction 1
• II. Review on Previous Studies 4
• 2.1. Definition of Global Partnerships 4
• 2.2. Necessity of Global Partnerships 6
• 2.3. Motivations of the Agents of Global Partnerships 9
• 2.4. Accountability of global partnerships 12
• 2.4.1. Definition 12
• 2.4.2. Accountability mechanisms and the agents of global partnership 15
• 2.5. Research Question 21
• 2.5.1. Shortcomings of previous studies 21
• 2.5.2. Research Question 22
• III. Analytical Framework 23
• 3.1. Realist paradigm (Rational Choice Theory) 23
• 3.2. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory of Microeconomics 24
• 3.3. Global partnerships and Expected utility theory. 30
• 3.4. Funding for global partnerships, how much incentives are needed? 32
• 3.5. Unfair nature of global partnerships 35
• 3.5.1. Risk neutral agents in unfair games 36
• 3.5.2. Risk averse agents in unfair games 37
• 3.5.3. Risk seeking agents in unfair games 39
• 3.6. Proposition 40
• 3.7. Methodology 44
• IV. Case Analysis- GAVI AMC 45
• 4.1. Overview 45
• 4.2. Advance Market Commitment (AMC) 46
• 4.3. Application of the analytical framework 49
• 4.3.1. Vaccine Manufacturers 50
• 4.3.2. Government (Italy) 52
• 4.3.3. Private Foundation 54
• 4.3.4. Possibility of Partnership 57
• V. Limits and future studies 60
• VI. Conclusion 61
• References 64
• Abstract (Korean) 68