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      가격차 반환제도 하의 기간별 가격설정 전략: 다재화의 경우 = Intertemporal Pricing Strategy under the Most-Favored-Customer Policy: A Two-Good Case

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A40055398

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      A two-good, two-period model of the most-favored-customer policy (MFCP) is presented and analyzed in the present paper. The MFCP is a seller`s promise t o reimburse the difference to the today`s buyers when the seller reduces the price tomorrow. The MFCP is compared with the ordinary-sale policy (OSP) under which every price paid is final. Our major finding includes the followings. If the high-valuation consumers in each group is substantially small, then the OSP is better for the seller than the MFCP. On the other hand, if one of the markets has a large size of the high-valuation consumers then it is optimal for the seller to adopt the MFCP.
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      A two-good, two-period model of the most-favored-customer policy (MFCP) is presented and analyzed in the present paper. The MFCP is a seller`s promise t o reimburse the difference to the today`s buyers when the seller reduces the price tomorrow. The M...

      A two-good, two-period model of the most-favored-customer policy (MFCP) is presented and analyzed in the present paper. The MFCP is a seller`s promise t o reimburse the difference to the today`s buyers when the seller reduces the price tomorrow. The MFCP is compared with the ordinary-sale policy (OSP) under which every price paid is final. Our major finding includes the followings. If the high-valuation consumers in each group is substantially small, then the OSP is better for the seller than the MFCP. On the other hand, if one of the markets has a large size of the high-valuation consumers then it is optimal for the seller to adopt the MFCP.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 "in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure" MIT Press 1986

      2 "The Theory of Industrial Organization" MIT Press 1988

      3 "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules" 28 (28): 269-290, 1997b

      4 "The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990" 6 (6): 151-174, 1997a

      5 "Rational expectations and durable goods pricing" 12 : 112-128, 1981

      6 "Rand Journal of Economics" 377-388, 1986

      7 "Rand Journal of Economics" 147-155, 1993

      8 "Quality choice and the Coase problem" 64 (64): 107-115, 1999

      9 "Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time Journal of Political Economy" 1010-1028, 1991

      10 "Intertemporal Price Discrimination under the Most-Favored- Customer Policy" 12 (12): 219-242, 1996

      1 "in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure" MIT Press 1986

      2 "The Theory of Industrial Organization" MIT Press 1988

      3 "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules" 28 (28): 269-290, 1997b

      4 "The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990" 6 (6): 151-174, 1997a

      5 "Rational expectations and durable goods pricing" 12 : 112-128, 1981

      6 "Rand Journal of Economics" 377-388, 1986

      7 "Rand Journal of Economics" 147-155, 1993

      8 "Quality choice and the Coase problem" 64 (64): 107-115, 1999

      9 "Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time Journal of Political Economy" 1010-1028, 1991

      10 "Intertemporal Price Discrimination under the Most-Favored- Customer Policy" 12 (12): 219-242, 1996

      11 "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture Journal of Economic Theory" 155-190, 1986

      12 "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand Journal of Political Economy" 1459-1478, 1989

      13 "Durable-Goods Monopolists" 90 : 314-332, 1982

      14 "Durability and Monopoly" 15 : 143-149, 1972

      15 "A Simple Analysis on the Partial Claim to Refund under the Most-Favored-Customer Policy" 14 : 165-177, 1999

      16 "A Direct Proof of the Coase conjecture" 29 (29): 57-66, 1998

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      학술지 이력

      학술지 이력
      연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
      2026 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
      2020-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
      2017-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2013-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
      2010-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
      2008-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
      2005-08-25 학회명변경 한글명 : 한국국민경제학회 -> 한국경제통상학회
      영문명 : The Korean National Economic Association -> The Korean Economic and Business Association
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      2005-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
      2004-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
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      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0 0.46 0.58
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.54 0.53 0.924 0.17
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