How Social Norms Matter? Critical Reassessment of Coleman’s Accounts

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Three points are claimed: first, that norm can be analyzed from a purely rational stance, and
that the rational reductionist strategy is a better way to understand social norm. Second,
contractual perspective is emphasized such that social norm belongs to a (set of) Nash
equilibrium realized by individually rational strategies. Maximization over extended time
periods (at the individual level) is rendered as the key factor from which the rational character
of norm (at the social level) is derived. Third, social norm inherently conveys a degree of suboptimality
because of the time consistency problem. And the sanctioning system and the
normative nature of social norm will be reinterpreted in our conceptual framework. Each of
these points will be discussed in detail both theoretically (by using well-defined game-theoretic
concepts) and empirically (by relying on various real life examples) in subsequent sections.

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