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      금융시장 안정을 고려한 금융회사 지배구조의 개선 = The Improvement of Corporate Governance of Financial Companies in consideration of Financial Market Stability

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      The corporate governance of a financial company should be designed not only based on the financial soundness of the firm and the protection of its shareholders and other stake-holders but on the stability of financial markets. The financial crisis in 2008 well illustrates that if the corporate governance of a financial company is not appropriate to control the management’s rent seeking, it may put the long-term growth of the firm and the interests of its shareholders and stake-holders into trouble and further lead to a crisis in financial markets. In this context, major countries have made efforts to renovate the corporate governance of financial companies in the light of the protection of the interest of shareholders and stake-holders as well as its influence on the financial market stability.
      This essay, in this regard, examines whether the current laws effectively control the rent seeking by the management and take good account of its potential influences on the financial market stability. Currently, the commercial law does not impose special restrictions on financial firms, but under the commercial law listed companies are subject to strengthened conditions in the case of independent directors and an auditing committee. And these conditions shall be applied to the financial companies which means they are under stricter controls than others. The recently enacted law on corporate governance is considered to be well corresponding to global standards. However, the independency of the board of directors, remunerating system of the management, internal control, and risk management should be improved further for the financial market stability.
      In the consideration of the influences of financial companies on financial market stability, the corporate governance of financial companies should be able to supervise rent seeking by the management with efficiency and effectiveness. To this end, it is critical to ensure transparent and independent work of supervision on corporate management activities. For transparency the scope of responsibility of among internal inspection agencies should be clarified and for independency from the clout of the management and dominant stockholders should be secured during the nominating process of directors.
      More specifically, first the board of directors shall be responsible for comprehensive decision-making in supervising the management and related risk management. Second, a remunerating system should be associated with longer term achievement, thus not alluring short-term rent seeking by the management. Third, an auditing committee should secure higher independency in their work of audit and accounting. Four, compliance officers who are responsible for the observance of internal rules of a company should perform their duties by clear standards. Five, the decision-making by the management in regard of risk management should be checked and balanced by a risk management committee.
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      The corporate governance of a financial company should be designed not only based on the financial soundness of the firm and the protection of its shareholders and other stake-holders but on the stability of financial markets. The financial crisis in ...

      The corporate governance of a financial company should be designed not only based on the financial soundness of the firm and the protection of its shareholders and other stake-holders but on the stability of financial markets. The financial crisis in 2008 well illustrates that if the corporate governance of a financial company is not appropriate to control the management’s rent seeking, it may put the long-term growth of the firm and the interests of its shareholders and stake-holders into trouble and further lead to a crisis in financial markets. In this context, major countries have made efforts to renovate the corporate governance of financial companies in the light of the protection of the interest of shareholders and stake-holders as well as its influence on the financial market stability.
      This essay, in this regard, examines whether the current laws effectively control the rent seeking by the management and take good account of its potential influences on the financial market stability. Currently, the commercial law does not impose special restrictions on financial firms, but under the commercial law listed companies are subject to strengthened conditions in the case of independent directors and an auditing committee. And these conditions shall be applied to the financial companies which means they are under stricter controls than others. The recently enacted law on corporate governance is considered to be well corresponding to global standards. However, the independency of the board of directors, remunerating system of the management, internal control, and risk management should be improved further for the financial market stability.
      In the consideration of the influences of financial companies on financial market stability, the corporate governance of financial companies should be able to supervise rent seeking by the management with efficiency and effectiveness. To this end, it is critical to ensure transparent and independent work of supervision on corporate management activities. For transparency the scope of responsibility of among internal inspection agencies should be clarified and for independency from the clout of the management and dominant stockholders should be secured during the nominating process of directors.
      More specifically, first the board of directors shall be responsible for comprehensive decision-making in supervising the management and related risk management. Second, a remunerating system should be associated with longer term achievement, thus not alluring short-term rent seeking by the management. Third, an auditing committee should secure higher independency in their work of audit and accounting. Four, compliance officers who are responsible for the observance of internal rules of a company should perform their duties by clear standards. Five, the decision-making by the management in regard of risk management should be checked and balanced by a risk management committee.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 윤영신, "회사지배구조에서 법규제(Legal Rule)와 소프트 로(Soft Law)의 역할 및 관계" 법학연구소 48 (48): 85-104, 2007

      2 이철송, "회사법" 박영사 2016

      3 조창훈, "준법감시인의 편제와 보고체계에 관한 검토* -CEO(이사회), 감사위원회(상근감사), 내부회계관리자,위험관리인과의 편제구조 검토-" 한국증권법학회 14 (14): 115-151, 2013

      4 신종석, "주식회사 사외이사의 독립성 확보를 위한 법적 과제" 한국법학회 (57) : 117-135, 2015

      5 서세원, "이사와 집행임원의 보수규제에 관한 비교법적 연구" 한국법제연구원 2006 (2006): 2006

      6 이병윤, "은행권 사외이사제도 개선방안" 한국금융연구원 2009

      7 성승제, "스튜어드십 코드의 문제점과 개선방안" 한국법제연구원 2016

      8 김한종, "상법상 주식회사의 사외이사제도에 관한 연구 - 상장회사 사외이사의 독립성 제고방안을 중심으로 -" 법학연구소 17 (17): 479-506, 2016

      9 최준선, "상법과 충돌하는 ‘모범규준’, 지배구조는 기업 결정에 맡겨야"

      10 안수현, "기업지배구조법제 형성에 관한 小考 - 최근의 의원발의 법률안을 소재로 검토 -" 한국상사법학회 34 (34): 9-65, 2015

      1 윤영신, "회사지배구조에서 법규제(Legal Rule)와 소프트 로(Soft Law)의 역할 및 관계" 법학연구소 48 (48): 85-104, 2007

      2 이철송, "회사법" 박영사 2016

      3 조창훈, "준법감시인의 편제와 보고체계에 관한 검토* -CEO(이사회), 감사위원회(상근감사), 내부회계관리자,위험관리인과의 편제구조 검토-" 한국증권법학회 14 (14): 115-151, 2013

      4 신종석, "주식회사 사외이사의 독립성 확보를 위한 법적 과제" 한국법학회 (57) : 117-135, 2015

      5 서세원, "이사와 집행임원의 보수규제에 관한 비교법적 연구" 한국법제연구원 2006 (2006): 2006

      6 이병윤, "은행권 사외이사제도 개선방안" 한국금융연구원 2009

      7 성승제, "스튜어드십 코드의 문제점과 개선방안" 한국법제연구원 2016

      8 김한종, "상법상 주식회사의 사외이사제도에 관한 연구 - 상장회사 사외이사의 독립성 제고방안을 중심으로 -" 법학연구소 17 (17): 479-506, 2016

      9 최준선, "상법과 충돌하는 ‘모범규준’, 지배구조는 기업 결정에 맡겨야"

      10 안수현, "기업지배구조법제 형성에 관한 小考 - 최근의 의원발의 법률안을 소재로 검토 -" 한국상사법학회 34 (34): 9-65, 2015

      11 최완진, "기업지배구조법" 한국외국어대학교 지식출판원 2016

      12 김광록, "기업지배구조 개선을 위한 최근의상법상 변화" 한국비교사법학회 21 (21): 1769-1808, 2014

      13 조창훈, "기업의 윤리와 법규준수 지배구조에 대한 연구 - 준법감시인, 준법지원인, 자율준수관리자 -" 법학연구소 35 : 355-380, 2016

      14 정순섭, "금융회사의 조직규제 -금융회사 지배구조의 금융규제법상 의미를 중심으로-" 한국상사판례학회 24 (24): 3-47, 2011

      15 정재규, "금융회사의 사외이사제도 국제동향 및 시사점" 한국기업지배구조원 2011

      16 정재규, "금융회사의 사외이사 제도" 한국상사법학회 29 (29): 9-44, 2011

      17 정기승, "금융회사 지배구조론" 법문사 2007

      18 이승희, "금융회사 지배구조 연차보고서 분석" 50 : 2015

      19 권재열, "금융회사 지배구조 모범규준, 쟁점과 평가" 2014

      20 한국금융연구원, "금융회사 지배구조 개선법 제정 필요성" 2010

      21 김용진, "금융투자회사에서의 감사위원회 제도 검토" 3 (3): 2013

      22 백정웅, "금융위기시 금융산업에 대한 미국와 EU의 규제변화와 그 시사점에 관한 연구" 배재대학교 출판부 2010

      23 정대, "글로벌 스탠더드로서의 내부통제: 상장회사의 준법지원인제도" 한국법학회 (43) : 267-296, 2011

      24 신석훈, "글로벌 금융위기 이후 회사 소유ㆍ지배구조 정책 동향과 시사점" 법학연구원 26 (26): 31-65, 2016

      25 김홍기, "건전한 금융회사 지배구조의 원칙과 운용방안 - 금융회사의 지배구조에 관한 법률을 중심으로 -" 한국상사판례학회 28 (28): 3-56, 2015

      26 박선종, "개정상법상 준법통제와 준법지원인" 한국법학원 (124) : 233-261, 2011

      27 "https://pal.assembly.go.kr"

      28 "http://www.fsc.go.kr"

      29 "http://www.cgs.or.kr"

      30 Marco Becht, "Why bank governance is different" 27 (27): 2011

      31 International Monetary Fund, "Risk taking by banks: The role of governance and executive pay, in International Monetary Fund—Global Financial Stability Report Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking Curbing Excess while Promoting Growth, World Economic and Financial Surveys" 2014

      32 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Principles for enhancing corporate governance"

      33 Senior Supervisors Group, "Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence"

      34 Borio, Claudio, "Marrying the macro- and micro- prudential dimensions of financial stability, vol.1," Bank for International Settlements 2001

      35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Guidelines – Corporate governance principles for banks"

      36 OECD, "G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance"

      37 OECD, "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis : Key Findings and Main Messages"

      38 OECD, "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis"

      39 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review" Academy of Management 14 (14): 1989

      40 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, "AIG and Credit Default Swaps"

      41 David Walker, "A review of corporate governance in UK and other financial industry entities"

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      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.8 0.8 0.78
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.66 0.71 0.893 0.18
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