마음-업로딩과 심적상태의 동일성 문제 = Mind-uploading and the Problem of the Identity of Mental States

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper critically examines 'mind-uploading', which is suggested as the way of human enhancement. First, I argue that the ‘computational theory of mind' on which the idea of ’mind-uploading’ is entirely depend upon may be suitable for explaining the generative aspect of mental states, rather than its constitutional aspects. For this reason, the occurrence of another mental state in the same way does not guarantee that the same mental content could be obtained. Based on this, I first discusses the fact that a functional, physical realization is possible does not imply the realization of the same mental state, since there is no guarantee that different physical states can share the same mental content, since the ways in which mental states are constructed vary. And since this limitation of mind uploading can cause different mental states to arise from one physical state, which does not guarantee the continuity of self-identity. Therefore, mind-uploading cannot permanently extend human survival or enhance human prosperity. It does not guarantee the enhancement, but rather it may face serious ethical problems that may be subject to involuntary suicide.