Segregation and social control: An agent based simulation.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

There exists a considerable body of literature devoted to the evolution of segregated settlement patterns. Among the most influential works is Schelling (1978). Schelling describes a variety of mechanisms that facilitate the partitioning of populations into readily discernable groups. Among Schelling's most important observations regard the influence of individual choices. This study builds on those insights in an examination of uncoordinated individual settlement preferences; and how, when taken in the aggregate, they form clearly segregated residential patterns. This study also examines an element of Schelling's work, that segregation is reinforced by the practices of organizations. In particular, individual choices may be reinforced by formal social control as represented by the influence of policing practices. Following the minority threat perspective as exemplified by Blalock (1967), this study examines how evolving coalitions respond to and are effected both by organizing trends and formal social controls. Rather than relying on observational data such as Census or UCR reports, this study seeks to understand the phenomena of segregation and reinforcement through the use of computer simulation modeling. In using computer models, this research is able to ally many of the problems often associated with research in this area.