In recent years, the notable backlash against feminism, identity politics and political correctness among Korean men in their 20s is being problematized as ‘20s male phenomenon’. The phenomenon is then again coupled with the high rate of disapprov...
In recent years, the notable backlash against feminism, identity politics and political correctness among Korean men in their 20s is being problematized as ‘20s male phenomenon’. The phenomenon is then again coupled with the high rate of disapproval of Moon Jae-In’s administration and the ruling party among voters in their 20s, being problematized as the ‘20s phenomenon’. Considering the fact that the current government and the ruling party are considered as moderate progressives, and that the youths are conventionally deemed to tend to be liberals, such discordance is unsettling. Established mainstream discourse of ‘20s phenomenon’ primarily examines anti-liberal enunciations among men in their 20s and reduces the ‘20s phenomenon’ into the problem of emotion of hate, dismissing it as a reactionary backlash. This paper regards that the emotion of hate of men in their 20s and the collective political deviation of the millennials share the same structure, thus defines ‘20s male phenomenon’ as a general problem of the 20s, and the nature of the problem as populism.
Social conditions of South Korea today accords with what Chantal Mouffe has labelled as the populist moment. Political economic conditions and cultural political conditions of Korea provides a foundation for populism. This paper seeks to demonstrate that such populist conditions are interconnected with the ‘20s phenomenon’. In order to do so, 10 normal people of all genders in their 20s are interviewed and asked to express their thoughts and feelings on politics, current affairs and conditions they are living in. The analysis of the interview is summarized as follows. The interviewees are indifferent and hostile to South Korean politics, disillusioned with both progressive and conservative parties, and blindly anticipate new leaders to emerge from outside of established political parties. Simultaneously, they are able to recognize the irresistible force of objective conditions which overwhelm personal economic acts. They tend to counteract such force by excluding ‘them’ from ‘us’ to form constitutive outside. In doing so they hope to secure slight advantage over the peripheral beings.
The mainstream discourse on populism defines it as transitional, pathological politics which is founded on ‘appeal to the people’ by ‘charismatic leader’ at times of democratic crisis. Whereas this paper approaches populism in the aspect of ‘populism from below’ which Laclau and Mouffe have elaborated in terms of left populism/radical democracy. The mainstream discourse tends to regard populism as a threat to democracy and something to be rejected thus conclude the discussion by suggesting restoration of social order as the sole solution. However, it is unreasonable to say that the restoration of the existing order is needed to overcome the problems of populism which comes from the inherent limitations of the existing order itself. On the other hand, ‘Populism from below’ is a general logic of the political and refers to the phenomena that the incommensurable demands and conflicts which were marginalized in the political space of liberalism burst out from the outside and exert their influence to the inside. This study comprehends the problems from the aspect of ‘populism from below’ to reveal the popular demands germinating under the layer of anti-liberal enunciations of the people in their 20s, aims to find nodal points that constitutes chain of equivalence based on the popular demands and seeks the possibility for such demands to convert into a left populism.