GAMES OF POLITICAL CHANGE: REFORM-MONGERING IN THE SOVIET UNION, SOUTH AFRICA, AND JAPAN (REFORM, LEADERSHIP).

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Politicians often are thought to be motivated primarily by a desire to retain office, designing institutions to that end. Changes to the rules of the political game that prove detrimental to the interests of long-ruling groups therefore are of considerable theoretical significance. Existing explanations of the successful reformer's tactics emphasize either surprise and deception or bargaining to create a coalition for change. The former explains neither how a leader who employs such tactics avoids being ousted by disgruntled followers nor accounts for why some successful reformers have opted for prolonged public discussion of change. The latter is both overly optimistic about the resources available to the reformer and unable to account for cases of reform in which most of the ruling group neither desired change nor had been bought off.
Missing from existing theories of reform is an appreciation for group dynamics. I argue that the reformer can use these dynamics to his advantage in three ways. First, right after assuming the leadership, the reformer can signal his competence by making a decision his colleagues disagree with but which turns out to be in the interests of the ruling group. By demonstrating trustworthiness, the leader may convince colleagues to support reform despite their strong reservations. Second, during the discussion of change, the leader can attempt to coordinate support for a plan by persuading colleagues that other options are worse. Finally, when a vote on reform is held, the leader can exacerbate the collective action problem of opponents by buying off members of the ruling group's inner circle.
Reform appears most difficult when attempted in a polity long dominated by one party. Comparing successful electoral reform in Japan, the Soviet Union, and South Africa with earlier, less successful, attempts in those countries, reveals how it can come about under the most hostile circumstances. This provides a basis for analyzing less arduous types of change, leading to conclusions about the tactical desiderata of reform in various environments.