내부회계관리제도와 기업지배구조: 주식소유구조와 이사회 특성 중심으로 = Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance : Focusing on Ownership and Board of Directors' Characteristics

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study investigates the relationship between internal control over financial reporting and corporate governance focusing on ownership and board of directors' characteristics. The effects of corporate governance on disclosure of material weaknesses were tested in internal controls over financial reporting, using samples from companies listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ between 2006 and 2007.
Logistic regression was performed to test the effects of ownership and board of directors' characteristics on disclosure of the material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting. In the analysis of full samples (model 3), manager-controlled firms, in which the controlling owner was not the CEO, showed significantly more material weaknesses than owner-controlled firms, in which the controlling owner was the CEO. Moreover, in the variables of board of directors, board sizes of 6～8 persons and over 9 persons were significantly positively related to material weaknesses, and the activity and financial expertise of outside directors in a board of directors were negatively related to material weaknesses.
An additional analysis was performed on firms which were matched in size across the year and industry to solve the problem of difference in the sample size between ICD firms and non-ICD firms. The additional analysis of matched samples (model 6) showed that while the signs of variables did not change, the statistical significance of the variables showed variances. In the variables of ownership, manager-controlled firms in which the controlling owner was not the CEO disclosed significantly more material weaknesses than owner-controlled firms in which the controlling owner was the CEO. In the variables of board of directors, the activity and financial expertise of outside directors were negatively related to material weaknesses.
In control variables (model 3), firm size, profitability and operating cash flow were negatively related to material weaknesses, and closeness to debt covenant constraints and auditor size were positively related to material weaknesses. In the result of matched firms (model 6), control variables showed the same significance as that of the full samples, except for profitability.
Additionally, the effects of ownership ratio of the controlling owner and the CEO on disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting were tested. As a result of additional testing (model 8), it was found that controlling owner's ownership ratio was significantly negatively related to material weaknesses, and CEO's ownership was positively related to material weaknesses, although it was not statistically significant. Finally, the effects of the number of blockholders on disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting were test. As a result, it was found that the number of blockholders was negatively related to material weaknesses, though not statistically significant.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 내부회계관리제도와 기업지배구조의 관련성을 분석하였다. 기업지배구조 중에서 주식소유구조와 이사회의 특성에 초점을 맞추어 내부회계관리제도에 대한 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 알아보았으며, 내부회계관리제도 모범규준 및 검토기준이 본격적으로 시행된 2006년과 2007년에 유가증권상장법인과 코스닥상장법인을 포함한 상장기업을 대상으로 분석하였다.
연구 결과, 주식소유구조 관련 변수에서는 지배주주와 대표이사가 일치하는 오너경영기업이 전문경영기업에 비해 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률이 낮다는 것을 확인하였다. 이사회 관련 변수에서는 이사회 규모와 중요한 취약점을 보고할 확률과의 비선형 관계를 확인하였으며, 이사회 수가 6～8명 구간과 9명 이상 구간에서 이사회 규모가 증가할수록 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률이 증가하였다. 이사회내에 사외이사 중 재무전문가가 많을수록, 사외이사의 이사회 참석율이 높을수록 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 통제 변수에서는 기업규모가 작을수록, 수익성이 낮을수록, 채무위험이 높을수록, 영업현금흐름이 부(-)일수록, 그리고 외부감사인이 Big 4와 제휴된 유명감사인일수록 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률이 높아진다는 것을 확인하였다.
추가분석을 통하여, 지배주주지분율이 높을수록 중요한 취약점이 보고될 확률이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 전문경영자지분율의 부호는 지배주주지분율과 반대인 양(+)의 부호를 보였지만 통계적으로 유의하지 않았다.

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