Under a myopic best‐reply dynamic, efforts in repeated contests may exhibit chaotic behavior. This may help explain, for example, why experimental data often show nonconvergence to one‐shot equilibrium efforts. (JEL C61, C72, D72, D74, D83)
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https://www.riss.kr/link?id=O120777190
2018년
-
0095-2583
1465-7295
SSCI;SCOPUS
학술저널
1486-1491 [※수록면이 p5 이하이면, Review, Columns, Editor's Note, Abstract 등일 경우가 있습니다.]
0
상세조회0
다운로드다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)
Under a myopic best‐reply dynamic, efforts in repeated contests may exhibit chaotic behavior. This may help explain, for example, why experimental data often show nonconvergence to one‐shot equilibrium efforts. (JEL C61, C72, D72, D74, D83)
Under a myopic best‐reply dynamic, efforts in repeated contests may exhibit chaotic behavior. This may help explain, for example, why experimental data often show nonconvergence to one‐shot equilibrium efforts. (JEL C61, C72, D72, D74, D83)
DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION AND SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN A REAL‐EFFORT COMPETITION
ASYMMETRIES IN THE RESPONSES OF REGIONAL JOB FLOWS TO OIL PRICE SHOCKS
TO DETER OR TO MODERATE? ALLIANCE FORMATION IN CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION