This paper presents a critical assessment of the management of common property resources that have the unique characteristics of nonexcludability and rivalry in consumption. Common property resources are bound to be overexploited as demand rises. Some...
This paper presents a critical assessment of the management of common property resources that have the unique characteristics of nonexcludability and rivalry in consumption. Common property resources are bound to be overexploited as demand rises. Some theorists about the tragedy of the commons recommend that an external Leviathan control most natural resources to prevent their destruction. Others recommend that privatizing those resources will resolve the problem. However, failures attributed to centralized control and market-oriented models have made the self-financed contract-enforcement game(community) attractive to many policy makers as an alternative means to govern forests, pastures, water, and fisheries. This is called new common resource management. This study, using ethnography research methods in the Gadeokdo case, raises questions about the validity of this management.