기업지배구조와 부도위험

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this study, Korean and Japanese companies were analyzed to determine whether the governance structure affects the default risk. The sample period is from 2001 to 2017, and the governance mechanisms of seven (institutional investor ownership, insider ownership, board independence, board duration, board size, CEO duality, audit committee independence) are considered. The results of the empirical analysis during the sample period are as follows: First, when analyzing the correlation between the governance variables, it was found that in the case of Korean companies, ownership of institutional investors is negatively related to ownership of insiders, the duration of the board, independence, and CEO duality. On the other hand, the insider ownership was negatively correlated with most of the factors. For Japanese companies, institutional investors ownership was negatively correlated with the board size as well as the insider ownership, and insider ownership was reported to have a positive correlation with the Board s duration, independence, size. Second, when a Korean company used CDS spread as a proxy for default risk, institutional investor ownership was identified as an important governance factor in determining default risk, and the size of the board was estimated only statistically significant when it did not include control variables. In addition, when the probability of bankruptcy was used as a proxy for the risk of bankruptcy, the ratio of shares of institutional investors and insiders, CEO duality, and the duration of the Board were reported to have a significant impact on the default risk. Board size and the independence of the Audit Committee were estimated figuratively, and the independence of the Board was shown to have a very weak influence on the probability of bankruptcy within a year. Third, the use of CDS spread as a proxy for default risk by a Japanese company was found to have a significant impact on the default risk, except for the independence of the Board, but only the size of the Board and the independence of the Audit Committee were identified as meaningful governance variables. In addition, the statistical significance of institutional investors ownership, CEO duality and board duration varied with statistically significant estimates of most of the governance factors, even if the probability of bankruptcy was set as a proxy for risk of bankruptcy.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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