공공선택학파와 오스트리아학파의 지적 관계

국문 초록 (Abstract)

공공선택학과 오스트리아학파 경제학은 방법론과 이념을 일부 공유한 학문적 친척이란 점에서 ‘시장경 제연구소’와 ‘공공선택연구소’ 두 기관이 공존했던 80년대 이후 조지메이슨대학 중심으로 “오스트리아 학파식 공공선택학”(Austrian Public Choice)을 형성했지만, 동시에 반목 요소도 보여주었다. 최근 대두 된 두 학문 간 불화를 주관주의·합리성·인식론의 세 국면에서 규명하였다. 첫째, 공공선택학은 뷰캐 넌의 주관주의 선언에도 불구하고 주관주의를 제한하며 사회적 낭비, 사회적 효율성 등의 객관주의적, 총량적 개념에 여전히 사로잡혀 있다. 둘째, 공공선택학은 비현실적이고 이상적이며 합리성에만 좌우되 는 인공적 인간형에 토대하여 ‘합리적 무지’가 아닌 한 그에게는 지식이 있고, 정부에게도 문제해결 능 력이 있다고 본다. 그러나 오스트리아학파는 이성 외에 직관·감성도 가진 현실적 인간을 전제로 하며, ‘진정한 무지’도 나타날 수 있다고 본다. 셋째, 인식론과 관련하여 공공선택학은 정치인이 겉으로 표방 하는 공익과 실제로 추구하는 사익 간 괴리가 정부실패를 낳으며 정치인을 정부실패의 고의범으로 보 지만, 오스트리아학파측은 정치인도 공익을 진정 추구할 수 있고 정부실패는 ‘동기 문제’가 아니라 ‘지식 문제’에서 나타나며, 따라서 정치인을 정부실패의 고의범이 아니라 과실범으로 본다. 동거와 불화를 다 겪어 온 두 학문은 자신의 사고방식과 연구 절차를 상대측에게 요구하거나, 학문적 결혼을 추구하기보다 자신의 연구 성과들로 학문 시장에서 경쟁하는 것이 필요하다. 각 학파는 시장과 정부에 관해 나름 특화된 분산된 지식(dispersed knowledge)을 가지고 있다. 학문 세계 속 그들 간 이 지식의 교환 및 경쟁은 또 다른 의미의 시장과정(market process) 작용이며, 학문 세계의 소비자들은 그 어느 한쪽에 표를 던지는 일종의 공공선택(public choice)을 행할 것이다. 양 학문의 반목 관계는 이런 거시적 맥락에서 새롭게 이해될 필요가 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Public Choice school has had long history of relation with Austrian Economics school, with companionship and discord as well. Since 1960s, two formed the intellectual kinship, developing so-called ‘Austrian Public Choice’ with the linking pin of George Mason University’s “Mercatus Center” and “Center for Study of Public Choice”. Namely, Austrian school scholars employ research program on politics, or Public Choice scholars employ methodology or philosophy of Austrian schools. However two tenets also revealed tensions between them, which goes from simple recommendation that Public Choice scholars intellectually accommodate themselves to Austrian philosophy to extreme voice that two schools’ relationship came to an end mainly due to Public Choice scholars. This article treats how are the conflicts between them on three points: subjectivism, rationality and epistemology. First, on dimension of subjectivism, Austrians criticize that Public Choice school has not fully employed subjectivism despite of Buchanan’s proclamation on it. Rather, they relied on aggregation concepts such as ‘social waste’, ‘social efficiency’ etc. incongruent to subjectivism. Second, on dimension of rationality, Austrian school criticize that Public Choice school has assumed unrealistic ideal man solely with reason. It denies no room for irrationality, nor the possibilities that decisions are made without information and knowledge, except it was deliberately chosen by logic of ‘rational ignorance’. But Austrians oppose that kind of rationality sense, assuming model of ‘actual man’ with insight and emotion as well as reason. It accepts the possibilities that ‘irrationality’ happens, even without rational ignorance logic. Third, on dimension of epistemology, Austrian schools criticize that Public Choice school exaggerate ‘incentive problem’, ignoring more fundamental ‘knowledge problem.’ They affirm Public Choice school also attribute gov’t failure to ‘deception’, not ‘error’ of public actors. Given the fact that defensive arguments from Public Choice school is somewhat less than challenges from Austrian school, it seems fair to represent some arguments for Public Choice tenet on why Public Choice has chosen existing way of logic and reality. Buchanan considered full subjectivism would lead intellectual frustration, causing agnosticism. His ‘Insufficient’ subjectivism is not fault nor incompetence as Austrians rebuke, but strategic choice as reasoning method. In the world of ‘political process’, requirement to ‘objectively’ express any evaluation for benefits or for costs on policies is far higher than in the world of ‘market process.’ These features might leave Public Choice school some inevitable room that it cannot fully observe methodological requirements Austrian school has asked for. Both omniscience of market and gov’t have well been denied by both schools. It, then, also should be denied that one of two schools does predominantly better on market as well as politics process. Each school has shown comparatively respective advantageous explanatory power and relevant intellectual works. Requiring Public Choice school to employ Austrians’ full methodology, or requiring Austrians to change its main research programs from market to politics is sort of another ‘intellectual deceit’. Trying ‘General Political Economy’ through ‘intellectual marriage’ or ‘grafting’ also cannot be any solution either. What is vital instead on compatibility issue between Austrian school and Public Choice school is letting each compete for more valid researches whether on market or on politics. That would be another form of ‘market process’ in academic world, for which voters in that world would eventually make public choice on which way of thinking is better supported.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 한글초록
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 동거: ‘오스트리아학파식 공공선택학’ - Austrian Public Choice -
• Ⅲ. 반목-1: 주관주의(subjectivism)
• Ⅳ. 반목-2: 합리성
• Ⅴ. 반목-3: 인식론(epistemology)
• Ⅵ. 결어
• 참고문헌
• Abstract

참고문헌 (Reference)

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