지배주주의 초과지배권과 기업실패 : 생존분석을 응용한 영향관계 분석

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구에서는 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 지배주주의 초과지배권이 기업실패에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 생존분석방법에서 사용되는 Cox비례위험모형을 응용하여 분석하였다. 분석기간은 1997년부터 2017년까지이고, 표본기업은 총 26,590개(기업-연도)를 사용하였다.
분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 지배주주의 초과지배권이 기업실패에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과에서는 지배주주의 초과지배권이 커지면 기업실패 가능성이 낮아진다는 것을 확인하였다. 이는 지배주주의 초과지배권이 큰 기업은 지배주주에 의해 대리인문제가 발생할 가능성이 크고, 이는 기업실패 가능성을 높일 것이라는 예상과 다른 결과였다. 우리나라 기업에서는 지배주주의 초과지배권이 기업의 경영권을 안정화시키는 효과가 더 크게 작용하여 기업의 실패 가능성을 감소시키는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다.
이러한 결과는 표본 기업을 대기업과 중소기업으로 나누어 분석한 결과에서도 동일하게 나타났다. 우리나라 상장기업에서는 기업규모에 상관없이 지배주주의 초과지배권이 커지면 기업에 경영권의 안정효과를 가져와 기업의 실패 가능성이 감소되는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzed the effects of excess control rights of controlling shareholders on corporate failure for companies listed on the Korea Exchange. For this analysis, the Cox proportional hazard model used in the survival analysis method was applied. The analysis period was from 1997 to 2017, and a total of 26,590 samples (company-year) were used.
The analysis results is as follows. The effect of the controlling shareholder"s excess control rights on corporate failure confirmed that the greater the controlling shareholder’s excess control rights, the lower the likelihood of corporate failure. This was different from the expectation that a company with a large amount of excess control rights by the controlling shareholder would have a high probability of the agency problem caused by the controlling shareholder, which would increase the possibility of corporate failure. In Korean companies, it could be understood that the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder had a greater effect on stabilizing the ownership of the company, thereby lowering the possibility of failure.
These results were the same in the results of analyzing the sample companies by dividing them into large companies and SMEs. In Korea"s listed companies, it could be understood that, regardless of the size of the company, if the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder increases, it will bring a stabilizing effect of ownership to the company and reduce the possibility of corporate failure.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 요약
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 이론적 배경과 가설설정
• Ⅲ. 실증분석의 설계
• Ⅳ. 실증분석 결과
• Ⅴ. 결론
• 참고문헌

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 권세훈, "회사정리 기간에 대한 생존분석" 한국산업경제학회 22 (22): 1287-1305, 2009

2 김동욱, "한국 가족기업 지배주주의 소유·지배권과 기업가치: 터널링과 프로핑 영향분석" 한국금융공학회 13 (13): 143-173, 2014

3 KDI, "시장개혁 추진을 위한 평가지표 개발 및 추정" 2003

4 박용삼, "소유구조가 기업수명에 미치는 영향에 관한 실증 연구" 한국산업경제학회 21 (21): 949-968, 2008

5 Johnson, S., "Tunneling" 90 (90): 22-27, 2000

6 Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the firm : managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure" 3 (3): 305-360, 1976

7 Faccio, M., "The ultimate ownership of western european corporations" 65 : 365-395, 2002

8 Claessens, S., "The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporation" 58 : 81-112, 2000

9 Datta, S., "Reorganization and financial distress : an empirical investigation" 18 (18): 15-32, 1995

10 Cox, D. R., "Regression models and life-tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society" 34 (34): 187-220, 1972

11 Flagg, J. C., "Predicting corporate bankruptcy using falling firms" 1 : 67-78, 1991

12 Gilbert, L. R., "Predicting bankruptcy for firms in financial distress" 17 (17): 161-171, 1990

13 Lemmon, M. L., "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value : evidence from the east asian financial crisis" 58 : 1445-1468, 2003

14 Wei, K. C. J., "Ownership structure, cash flow, and corporate investment : evidence from east asian economies before the financial crisis" 14 : 118-132, 2008

15 Lin, C., "Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing" 100 : 1-23, 2011

16 Lin, C., "Ownership structure and financial constraints : evidence from a structural estimation" 102 : 416-431, 2011

17 Maury, B., "Multiple controlling shareholders and firm value" 29 : 1813-1834, 2004

18 Gilson, S. C., "Management turnover and financial distress" 25 (25): 241-262, 1989

19 Shleifer, A., "Management ownership and market valuation : an empirical analysis" 20 : 293-315, 1998

20 La-Porta, R., "Law and Finance" 106 : 1113-1155, 1998

21 La-Porta, R., "Investor protection and corporate valuation" 57 : 1147-1170, 2002

22 La-Porta, R., "Investor protection and corporate governance" 58 : 3-28, 2000

23 Gompers, P., "Extreme governance : an analysis of dual-class firms in the united states" 23 : 1051-1088, 2010

24 Lins, K., "Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets" 38 : 159-184, 2003

25 Claessens, S., "Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings" 57 : 2741-2771, 2002

26 Lin, C., "Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure" 104 : 1-22, 2012

27 La-Porta, R., "Corporate ownership around the world" 54 : 471-517, 1999

28 Morck, R., "Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth" 63 : 655-720, 2005

29 Johnson, S., "Corporate governance in the asian financial crisis" 58 (58): 141-186, 2000

30 Daily, C. M., "Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm : an empirical assessment" 15 (15): 643-654, 1994

31 Fich, E. M., "Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? an empirical analysis" 30 (30): 225-251, 2008

32 Chancharat, N., "Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms" 29 (29): 144-163, 2012

33 Gilson, S. C., "Bankruptcy, boards, bank, and blockholders : evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default" 27 (27): 355-387, 1990

34 Daily, C. M., "Bankruptcy and corporate governance : the impact of board composition and structure" 37 (37): 1603-1617, 1994

35 Chen, K. H., "An empirical analysis of useful financial ratios" 10 (10): 51-60, 1981

36 Fama, E. F., "Agency problems residual claims" 26 (26): 327-349, 1983

37 Fama, E. F., "Agency problems and the theory of the firm" 88 (88): 288-307, 1980

38 La-Porta, R., "Agency problems and dividend policies around the world" 55 : 1-33, 2000

39 Anyane-Ntow, K., "Accounting information and its relationship to corporate financial distress process" 7 (7): 29-35, 1991