(The) industrial organization of banking : bank behavior, market structure, and regulation

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• 1 Introduction : The Banking Environment = 1
• Three Fundamental Areas Within the Industrial Organization of Banking = 1
• Objectives = 2
• Bank Behavior and the Structure of Banking Markets = 2
• Bank Competition and Public Policy = 3
• Assessing Bank Regulation = 3
• The Bank Balance Sheet = 4
• Bank Assets = 4
• Loans = 5
• Securities = 6
• Cash Assets = 6
• Trends in U.S. Bank Asset Allocations = 6
• Bank Liabilities and Equity Capital = 8
• Large-Denomination Time Deposits = 8
• Transactions Deposits, Savings Deposits, and Small-Denomination Time Deposits = 8
• Purchased Funds and Subordinated Notes and Debentures = 9
• Bank Capital = 9
• Trends in Bank Liabilities and Equity Capital = 9
• The Bank Income Statement = 10
• Interest Income = 11
• Noninterest Income = 11
• Interest Expenses = 11
• Expenses for Loan Loss Provisions = 12
• Real Resource Expenses = 12
• Bank Profitability Measures = 12
• Asymmetric Information and Risks in Banking = 13
• Adverse Selection = 14
• Moral Hazard = 14
• Risks on the Balance Sheet = 14
• Credit Risk = 15
• Market Risks = 15
• Liquidity Risk = 15
• Systemic Risk = 16
• Trends in U.S. Banking Industry Structure = 16
• The Number of Commercial Banks = 16
• Mergers, Acquisitions, and Concentration = 16
• References = 18
• 2 Alternative Perspectives on Bank Behavior = 21
• Identifying the Outputs and Inputs of a Bank = 21
• What Banks Do : Alternative Perspectives on Bank Production = 21
• Assessing the Economic Outputs and Inputs of Banks = 22
• Banks as Portfolio Managers = 24
• The Basic Bank Portfolio-Management Model = 24
• Limitations of Portfolio Management Models = 25
• Banks as Firms = 25
• A Perfectly Competitive Banking Industry = 26
• A Static Banking Model = 26
• Fundamental Dynamics in a Perfectly Competitive Banking Model and Implications for Portfolio Separation = 32
• Imperfectly Competitive Banking Markets = 35
• Monopolistic and Monopsonistic Interest Rate Determination in Bank Loan and Deposit Markets = 35
• Social Losses Due to Imperfect Competition in Banking = 37
• Alternative Modes of Behavior Between Perfect Competition and Monopoly and Monopsony = 38
• References = 43
• 3 The Industrial Economics of Banking = 47
• The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm in Banking = 47
• The SCP Hypothesis with Identical Banks = 48
• Structural Asymmetry, Dominant Banks, and the SCP Paradigm = 49
• A Dominant-Bank Model = 49
• Strategic Entry Deterrence = 51
• Evaluating the Applicability of the SCP Paradigm to the Banking Industry = 51
• Traditional SCP Evidence from Cross-Sectional Banking Data = 52
• Evidence from Cross-Country Studies = 53
• Dynamic Interest Rate Responses: Competition and Pass-Through Effects = 53
• The Conduct and Relative Performances of Large and Small Banks = 55
• Market Structure and Bank-Customer Relationships = 57
• Basic Market-Structure Implications of Bank-Customer Relationships = 58
• Evidence on Bank-Customer Relationships = 60
• Determinants and Impacts of Bank-Customer Relationships = 60
• Competition and Relationship Lending = 63
• The Efficient Structure Theory and Banking Costs = 65
• The Efficient Structure Challenge to the SCP Paradigm = 65
• Banking Efficiency and Costs = 66
• Efficient Structure Theory and Bank Performance = 68
• Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs and Banking Industry Structure = 71
• Endogenous Sunk Costs and Concentration = 72
• Non-Price Competition in Banking: Implicit Deposit Rates Versus Quality Rivalry = 73
• Evidence on Advertising Outlays in the Banking Industry = 75
• Endogenous Sunk Costs and the Banking Industry = 76
• References = 77
• 4 The Economics of International Banking = 89
• The Growth of Global Banking = 90
• The First Big Wave of Banking Globalization: The Colonial Period = 90
• The Second Globalization Wave : The Most Recent Decades = 90
• Fundamental Elements Influencing Cross-Border Banking = 92
• Distance = 92
• Competitive Structure and Effects of Entry in Host-Country Banking Markets = 93
• Bank Size and Entry Costs = 95
• Idiosyncratic Elements and Prior Experience = 96
• The Industrial Organization of Multinational Banking = 97
• Determinants of the Overall Scope of Foreign Direct Investment in Banking = 97
• Greenfield Investment Versus Acquisitions of Host Nations’Banks = 98
• Real-Resource-Based Analyses of Cross-Border Trade in Banking Services = 100
• Differences in Nation’s Capital-Labor Ratios and Efficiencies as Determinants of Cross-Border Banking = 102
• The Structure of Niepmann’s Framework for a Closed Economy = 102
• Extending Niepmann’s Setup to a Two-Country Environment = 103
• An Intra-industry Model of International Trade in Banking Services = 105
• A Closed-Economy Setting with Differentiated Banking Services = 106
• A Two-Economy Environment with Traded Banking Services = 107
• Evidence on the Empirical Relevance of Trade-Based Theories of International Banking = 109
• References = 110
• 5 The Economics of Banking Antitrust = 115
• Why Banks Merge = 115
• Profit Enhancements from Mergers = 115
• Diversification Benefits of Bank Mergers = 118
• Assessing Loan and Deposit Market Effects of Bank Consolidation = 120
• Mergers in Initially Perfectly Competitive Banking Markets = 120
• Mergers in Initially Imperfectly Competitive Banking Markets = 122
• Evidence on the Consequences of Banking Consolidation = 123
• Mergers and Market Power = 123
• Evidence on Efficiency Gains from Banking Consolidation = 126
• Banking Antitrust in Practice = 127
• U.S. Bank Merger Guidelines = 127
• The Relevant Market = 128
• Merger Screening = 129
• Evaluating the U.S. Bank Merger Guidelines = 130
• Is the Official Relevant Banking Market Really Relevant? = 131
• Do the Formal Guidelines Mis-Measure Market Power? = 133
• Implications of Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs = 134
• Do Banking Consolidations Preclude Entry and Reduce Consumer Welfare? = 135
• Rethinking Bank Merger Analysis = 136
• References = 138
• 6 Bank Competition, Stability, and Regulation = 143
• Banks as Issuers of Demandable Debt = 144
• The Diamond-Dybvig Model = 144
• An Optimal Risk-Sharing Contract = 145
• The Diamond-Dybvig Intermediation Solution and the Problem of Runs = 145
• Evaluating the Diamond-Dybvig Analysis = 146
• Banks as Screeners and Monitors = 148
• Evidence on Bank Monitoring Activities = 149
• Evidence from Announcement Effects = 150
• Evidence from Firm Investment and Bond Yields = 151
• Evidence from Syndicated Loans and Loan Sales = 151
• Direct Evidence of Bank Monitoring Activities = 152
• A Monitoring Model with Heterogeneous Banks = 153
• Behavior of Monitoring and Nonmonitoring Banks = 153
• Loan Market Equilibrium and Equilibrium Monitoring = 154
• The Relationship Between Banking Competition and Risks = 156
• Perfect Competition and Bank Risks = 156
• The “Excessive Deposit Competition” Argument = 157
• The Competition-Illiquidity Argument = 158
• The Competition-Asset Risk Argument = 159
• Market Power and Bank Risks : Theory and Evidence = 160
• Competition and Risk: Theory = 161
• Bank Size, Competition, and Risk: Evidence = 162
• Deposit Insurance, “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine, and the Basel Standards = 164
• The Distorting Effects of Deposit Insurance = 164
• The Impact of the Too-Big-to-Fail Doctrine = 166
• Capital Regulation and the Three Pillars of the Basel Framework = 169
• References = 169
• 7 Capital Regulation, Bank Behavior, and Market Structure = 175
• The Portfolio Management Perspective on Capital Regulation = 176
• The Bank as a Competitive, Mean-Variance Portfolio Manager Facing Capital-Constrained Asset Portfolios = 176
• Taking Deposit Insurance Distortions into Account = 178
• Explaining the Mixed Implications of Portfolio Management Models = 180
• Asset-Liability Management Under Capital Regulation = 181
• An Incentive-Based Perspective on Capital Regulation = 182
• Incentives and Capital Requirements = 182
• Perfect Competition Models of Bank Capital Regulation = 183
• Monopolistic Competition Models of Capital Regulation = 187
• Demandable Debt, Bank Risks, and Capital Regulation = 189
• Capital Regulation and Fragile Deposits = 189
• Moral Hazard, Bank Lending and Monitoring, and Capital Regulation = 191
• Capital Regulation and Bank Heterogeneities = 192
• Adverse Selection and Capital Regulation = 193
• Capital Requirements, Heterogeneous Banks, and Industry Structure = 194
• Capital, Shocks and Procyclicality, and Bank Performance = 198
• Does Toughening Capital Requirements Boost Bank Capital Ratios and Create Credit Shocks? = 199
• Procycical Features of a Capital-Regulated Banking Industry = 201
• Empirical Evidence on Procyclical Effects of Capital Regulation = 203
• Do Tougher Capital Regulations Yield Better Outcomes? Empirical Evidence = 204
• References = 206
• 8 Market Discipline and the Banking Industry = 213
• The Basel Framework’s Market Discipline Pillar = 214
• The Channels of Market Discipline = 215
• Motivations of Agents Who Discipline Banks = 215
• Conditions for Market Signals to Effectively Discipline Banks = 217
• Potential Benefits and Costs of Market Discipline in Banking = 218
• Evaluating Incentives for Information Disclosure = 218
• Ways to Enhance Bank Market Discipline = 220
• Industry Structure and Market Discipline = 223
• Market Discipline in a Basic Banking Model = 223
• Market Power, Information Disclosure, and Market Discipline = 224
• Evidence on Market Discipline’s Effectiveness = 227
• Information Content of Market Prices and Bond Yield Spreads = 227
• Market Discipline Versus Regulation = 229
• Regulatory Crowding Out of Market Discipline? = 230
• Additional Evidence on Interactions between Regulation and Market Discipline = 231
• Evidence on Bank Information Disclosure = 233
• Evaluating the Market Discipline Pillar vis-
  a-vis the Other Pillars of the Basel Framework = 234
• The Limitations of Market Discipline under the Basel Framework = 234
• Theory Versus Reality Under the Basel Market Discipline Pillar = 235
• References = 236
• 9 Regulation and the Structure of the Banking Industry = 243
• Public Interest Versus Public Choice Perspectives on Bank Regulation = 243
• Public Interest and the Alleged “Need” for Bank Regulation = 243
• Public Choice Motivations for Bank Regulation = 244
• Applying the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Banking Industry = 245
• Assessing the Implications of the Economic Theory of Regulation = 246
• A Generalized Perspective on Evaluating Bank Regulation = 249
• The Political Economy of Banking Supervision Conducted by Multiple Regulators: Is a “Race to the Bottom” Unavoidable? = 250
• Regulatory Preferences and Bank Closure Policies = 250
• Competition Among Bank Regulators = 252
• A Theory of Optimal Supervisory Choices of a Single Bank Regulator = 253
• The Case of Competing Regulators = 255
• A Supervisory Race to the Bottom? = 255
• Is Greater Centralization of Regulatory Functions the Answer? = 257
• The Supervisory Review Process Pillar of the Basel Standards = 259
• The Supervisory Review Process Pillar: Conceptual Issues = 261
• Discretion Versus Rules = 261
• How Tough Should a Supervisory Policy Rule Really Be? = 262
• Is There Really a Basel Supervisory Review Process? = 264
• Regulatory Compliance Costs and Industry Structure = 266
• Assessing Banks’ Costs of Basel Compliance: Economies of Regulation? = 266
• Rule-of-Thumb Estimates = 266
• Estimates of Basel Compliance Costs Based on Survey Data = 267
• “Economies-of-Basel”—Scale Advantages in Basel Compliance? = 268
• To What Extent Do Basel Compliance Costs “Matter”? = 269
• Bank Regulation and Endogenous Fixed Costs = 270
• Regulatory Compliance Costs : A Missing Component? = 271
• Regulatory Sunk Fixed Costs = 272
• References = 275
• 10 Macroprudential Regulation and International Policy Coordination = 281
• Systemic Risk = 281
• Defining Systemic Risk = 281
• Measuring Systemic Risk = 283
• Doing Something About Systemic Risk : Macroprudential Policy = 284
• Implementation of Macroprudential Policy = 284
• Structuring Macroprudential Regulation = 285
• Additional Macroprudential Policy Instruments = 286
• Pitfalls of Macroprudential Regulation = 288
• International Regulatory Policy Coordination = 289
• Essentials of the Regulatory Policy Coordination Problem = 289
• Recent Research on International Coordination of Financial Regulatory Policies = 291
• Can Impediments to International Bank Regulatory Coordination Be Surmounted? = 296
• References = 299