경쟁법 적용을 위한 보완재 상품군의 시장획정 = Market Definition of Complementary Goods for the Enforcement of Competition Law

국문 초록 (Abstract)

관련 상품시장의 획정이란 상호간에 실질적 경쟁관계에 있는 상품의 집합을 결정하는 일련의 과정을 일컫는다. 여기서 실질적 경쟁관계 여부는 상품간의 교체 또는 대체가능성으로 판단되어진다. 하지만 경쟁법 적용 사례에서 때로는 대체관계가 성립하지 않는 상품군들을 다루는 경우도 종종 발생한다. 후속시장, 양면시장, 군집시장 등이 이에 해당하는 대표적 예이다. 이들 예는 상품군을 구성하는 상품들 간에 대체성이 성립하지 않기 때문에 이를 고려하지 않고 SSNIP test를 기계적으로 적용할 경우 시장획정에서 오류를 범할 가능성이 있다. 이에 따라 본 논문에서는 보완재 상품군의 시장획정 시 고려해야할 몇 가지 요인들을 살펴본다. 후속시장 획정 시에는 전환비용, 정보의 비대칭성 정도, 거래관행 등을 고려하여 주시장과 후속시장을 동일시장이나 별도의 시장으로 획정할지를 결정하여야 한다. 양면시장에서는 교차 네트워크 외부성으로 서로 다른 측면의 이용자 그룹이 서로 보완재의 역할을 한다는 사실을 염두에 두고 시장획정을 하여야 하며, 군집시장의 경우에는 거래적 보완성, 범위의 경제 및 군집상품의 가격할인율, 분리비용, 기술적 통합정도, 수요행태 및 거래관행 등을 고려하여 군집의 범위를 결정하고 시장획정을 하여야 한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Market definition refers to the process of determining the set of products those are substitutable or interchangeable to the reference good for the purpose of analyzing the antitrust issues at hand. However there are lots of competition law cases in which the reference good consists of complementary goods, and/or relevant goods are not substitutable but complementary each others. Aftermarkets, two-sided markets, and cluster markets are the typical examples. Since goods are not substitutable in those examples, the mechanical application of SSNIP test or critical loss analysis to define relevant good market could make serious mistakes. The most possible mistake will be to define relevant market narrower than actual market since SSNIP test does not consider the complementarity among goods. Therefore this article try to verify the most important factors which should be considers when aftermarkets, two-sided markets, and cluster markets are defined. In case of aftermarket, the extent of switching cost, and information asymmetry between consumers and firms, trade practice should be considered to decide whether equipment and aftermarket service are defined as the same market or not. In case of two-sided market, the most important factor that makes difference from single-sided market is cross-network externality. Two distinct groups of users in the two-sided platform become complementary goods to each other through cross-network externality. Thus the feedback effect of the action which take place in one side should be considered during market definition procedure. In case of cluster market, transactional complementarity, economies of scope and discount rate of cluster price, unbundling cost, extent of technological integration, demand and trade practice should be considered to define the scop of clustering.

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