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      유무선 융합과 규제정책 ; 유무선 융합과 통신시장 비대칭규제: 공정경쟁인가, 관리경쟁인가? = Fixed-Mobile Convergence and Regulatory Policy ; Asymmetric Regulation Under Fixed Mobile Convergence: Fair Competition or Managed Competition?

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A45035179

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Considering that some service providers have market power in telecommunications service markets, it is natural to have asymmetric regulation policy in the process of creating conditions for fair competition by imposing differential treatment on different providers depending on their market power. Asymmetric regulation, however, should be used to promote competitive safeguards. It should not be used to manage competition. Asymmetric regulation should protect the competition, not the competitors. Some of our current asymmetric regulatory measures have the strong characteristics of managed competition. In the fixed telecommunications service markets, it is desirable to abolish measures such as discount of interconnection charges for late market entrants, prohibition of KT`s bundling service, and arbitrary discount of subscriber local loop lines. They are designed to manage competitive results. Although we see a sign of fixed mobile substitution in some telecommunications traffic, it is too early to regulate fixed carriers and mobile carriers in the same level. The reason is that we do not observe substitution between local calls and mobile calls yet and substitution among subscription demand. In the mobile telecommunications market, some carriers have experienced huge amount of excess profits, and they are expected to sustain in the near future under current regulatory regime. Price regulation on mobile services has facilitated tacit collusion among carriers, which has benefited SK Telecom, the largest market share of all. The Korean Ministry of Information and Communication`s regulatory measure for attaining rather even market share will contribute to distributing excess profits to other carriers more evenly. The MIC policy, however, will not contribute to returning excess profits to customers by price competition. Effective competition under which all carriers earn just normal rate of return is only possible by price competition not by the policy of even market share. We should deregulate price, promote the entry of MVNO, and abolish exit barriers for marginal carrier.
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      Considering that some service providers have market power in telecommunications service markets, it is natural to have asymmetric regulation policy in the process of creating conditions for fair competition by imposing differential treatment on differ...

      Considering that some service providers have market power in telecommunications service markets, it is natural to have asymmetric regulation policy in the process of creating conditions for fair competition by imposing differential treatment on different providers depending on their market power. Asymmetric regulation, however, should be used to promote competitive safeguards. It should not be used to manage competition. Asymmetric regulation should protect the competition, not the competitors. Some of our current asymmetric regulatory measures have the strong characteristics of managed competition. In the fixed telecommunications service markets, it is desirable to abolish measures such as discount of interconnection charges for late market entrants, prohibition of KT`s bundling service, and arbitrary discount of subscriber local loop lines. They are designed to manage competitive results. Although we see a sign of fixed mobile substitution in some telecommunications traffic, it is too early to regulate fixed carriers and mobile carriers in the same level. The reason is that we do not observe substitution between local calls and mobile calls yet and substitution among subscription demand. In the mobile telecommunications market, some carriers have experienced huge amount of excess profits, and they are expected to sustain in the near future under current regulatory regime. Price regulation on mobile services has facilitated tacit collusion among carriers, which has benefited SK Telecom, the largest market share of all. The Korean Ministry of Information and Communication`s regulatory measure for attaining rather even market share will contribute to distributing excess profits to other carriers more evenly. The MIC policy, however, will not contribute to returning excess profits to customers by price competition. Effective competition under which all carriers earn just normal rate of return is only possible by price competition not by the policy of even market share. We should deregulate price, promote the entry of MVNO, and abolish exit barriers for marginal carrier.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 "통신시장현황과 경쟁정책 방향" 정보통신부 2003

      2 "통신시장의 공정경쟁과 비대칭 규제개선방향" 10 (10): 107-125, 2002

      3 "통신서비스산업에서의 불공정거래행위와 독과점 규제" 4 : 31-65, 1996

      4 "유무선 비대칭규제발전방향" KT경영연구소 2002

      5 "시외통화수요함수의 수요추정을 통한 시도간 시외통화와 이동통화의 대체관계에 관한 연구" 8 (8): 227-247, 2002

      6 "시내전화와 이동전화의 수요대체현상에 관한 실증분석" 47 : 29-46, 2000pp

      7 "US Department of Justice" 1993

      8 "The Failure of Antitrust and Regulation to Establish Long Distance Telephone Services" The AEI Press 1996

      9 "Firm size inequality and market power" 18 : 693-722, 2000

      10 "Effective Competition review" 2001

      1 "통신시장현황과 경쟁정책 방향" 정보통신부 2003

      2 "통신시장의 공정경쟁과 비대칭 규제개선방향" 10 (10): 107-125, 2002

      3 "통신서비스산업에서의 불공정거래행위와 독과점 규제" 4 : 31-65, 1996

      4 "유무선 비대칭규제발전방향" KT경영연구소 2002

      5 "시외통화수요함수의 수요추정을 통한 시도간 시외통화와 이동통화의 대체관계에 관한 연구" 8 (8): 227-247, 2002

      6 "시내전화와 이동전화의 수요대체현상에 관한 실증분석" 47 : 29-46, 2000pp

      7 "US Department of Justice" 1993

      8 "The Failure of Antitrust and Regulation to Establish Long Distance Telephone Services" The AEI Press 1996

      9 "Firm size inequality and market power" 18 : 693-722, 2000

      10 "Effective Competition review" 2001

      11 "Economics of Strategy" 2001

      12 "Designing Incentive Regulation For the Telecommunications Industry" The MIT Press 1993

      13 "Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries" 15 (15): 1998

      14 "Competition in the Long Distance Telecommunications Market" Monitor Company 1993

      15 "Competition in Korean mobile telecommunications market" 24 (24): 2000

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      2003-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
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      2016 0.59 0.59 0.63
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