북한의 신년도 외교정책 전망 = Prospects of Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy in 2021

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Pyongyang’s diplomacy has focused on three major strategies Since the establishment of the regime in 1948: ① maintaining cooperative relations with traditional socialist allies such as China and the Soviet Union, ② inducing support from third world countries centered on non-alignment movement, ③ attacking weak points of ROK-U.S. alliance and the Western bloc. Under these three strategies, North Korea has pushed foreign policies that appropriately blends isolation, deception, and ‘calling my way.’ While Pyongyang’s foreign policy in the early and mid Kim Jong-un era, especially from 2012 to 2016, was based on this strategic direction, its efforts were focused on enhancing relations with China and Russia, establishing direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations, and expanding international base centered on EU countries.
Pyongyang’s diplomatic efforts, however, were confronted with obstacles in 2017 due to the growing international backlash against the assassination of Kim Jong-nam and its nuclear/missile tests. North Korea’s diplomatic standing reduced, and direct negotiations with the United States were hampered by the inauguration of the Trump administration. China and Russia also disagreed with North Korea’s excessively tough foreign policy. On the contrary, 2018 was a very encouraging year for North Korea. The three summits with South Korea and the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore provided the foundation for North Korea to break away from its image of ‘hermit kingdom’ and to be a ‘normal’ member of the international community. Based on this, it promoted the U.S.-North Korea dialogue and reinforced ties with existing allies, and secured the capacity to focus on managing traditional diplomatic footholds in various regions. But the momentum for Pyongyang’s diplomatic maneuver weakened dramatically in 2019, as the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended in a ‘no-deal.’ In addition, North Korea’s diplomacy has fallen into a total crisis as it faces the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
Factors that have caused North Korea’s diplomacy to be troubled, especially the sluggish U.S.-North Korea negotiations and the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis are likely to still frustrate North Korea in 2021. To overcome this, Pyongyang will first seek to strengthen triangle cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia, and there is a possibility that Kim Jong-un may visit China and Russia during the first half of 2021. In this case, however, North Korea will maintain vigilance on the risk that strengthening relations with China and Russia would lead to North Korea's political and economic dependency. At the same time, It could target areas of power vacuum in the Middle East, such as Iran and Syria. The provocation against the U.S. is also a fully anticipated scenario, and North Korea may test-fire ICBM/SLBMs introduced at the military parade marking the 75th anniversary of Korean Worker’s Party establishment in 2020. It is also expected that Pyongyang will first try relatively comfortable provocations against the South Korea in the sense that it will sound out the U.S. response before conducting provocative acts against Washington. This policy direction was once again implied by hard-line messages toward Seoul and Washington at the 8th Korean Worker’s Party Congress.