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      (A) Study on South Korean Nuclearization Options

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T15513452

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      There are nine nuclear states in the world, including the de facto nuclear states, and each of them is known to have different backgrounds for its nuclearization. Scott D. Sagan explained them with three models: the Security Model, the Domestic Politics Model, and the Normative Model. Based on his classification, this study was designed to evaluate the validity of the two most-likely South Korean nuclearization options, which are mostly argued for by pro-nuclear advocates: Go nuclear and Redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. As of 2019, pro-nuclear arguments have come to the fore as a result of critical security anxieties which are a consequence of two main external factors: the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the anti-alliance posture and behaviour of the Trump administration. Such pro-nuclear arguments posit that the best option for South Korea is to have a self-reliant nuclear capability to counter the threats of a nuclear North Korea; otherwise, and if it is not available, that it would be essential to tie the U.S. to South Korean security interests by the redeploying of tactical nuclear weapons. By examining those two options with three criteria, Suitability, Feasibility, and Efficiency, this study details the strengths and limitations of this approach and argues that the two South Korean nuclearization options are not suitable, feasible, nor efficient for alleviating security anxiety, and furthermore would be detrimental to an identified principle goal of South Korea – the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, this study identifies that such an approach would only serve to make South Korea less stable.
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      There are nine nuclear states in the world, including the de facto nuclear states, and each of them is known to have different backgrounds for its nuclearization. Scott D. Sagan explained them with three models: the Security Model, the Domestic Politi...

      There are nine nuclear states in the world, including the de facto nuclear states, and each of them is known to have different backgrounds for its nuclearization. Scott D. Sagan explained them with three models: the Security Model, the Domestic Politics Model, and the Normative Model. Based on his classification, this study was designed to evaluate the validity of the two most-likely South Korean nuclearization options, which are mostly argued for by pro-nuclear advocates: Go nuclear and Redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. As of 2019, pro-nuclear arguments have come to the fore as a result of critical security anxieties which are a consequence of two main external factors: the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the anti-alliance posture and behaviour of the Trump administration. Such pro-nuclear arguments posit that the best option for South Korea is to have a self-reliant nuclear capability to counter the threats of a nuclear North Korea; otherwise, and if it is not available, that it would be essential to tie the U.S. to South Korean security interests by the redeploying of tactical nuclear weapons. By examining those two options with three criteria, Suitability, Feasibility, and Efficiency, this study details the strengths and limitations of this approach and argues that the two South Korean nuclearization options are not suitable, feasible, nor efficient for alleviating security anxiety, and furthermore would be detrimental to an identified principle goal of South Korea – the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, this study identifies that such an approach would only serve to make South Korea less stable.

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • Contents
      • Acknowledgment i
      • Contents ii
      • Table of Contents & Figure Contents iii
      • Contents
      • Acknowledgment i
      • Contents ii
      • Table of Contents & Figure Contents iii
      • Abstract iv
      • 1. Introduction 1
      • 1.1. Purpose 1
      • 1.2. Scope 3
      • 2. Theoretical Framework 5
      • 2.1. Deterrence Theory 5
      • 2.2. Stability – Instability Paradox 7
      • 2.3. Nuclear Skepticism Theory 8
      • 2.4. Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics 11
      • 3. Literature Review 14
      • 3.1. Pro-Nuclear Arguments 14
      • 3.2. Models of Nuclearization and Denuclearization 19
      • 3.3. Criteria for Evaluation 22
      • 4. Alternative 1: Go Nuclear 24
      • 4.1. Suitability 24
      • 4.2. Feasibility 30
      • 4.3. Efficiency 33
      • 5. Alternative 2: Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons 46
      • 5.1. Suitability 46
      • 5.2. Feasibility 50
      • 5.3. Efficiency 52
      • 6. Conclusion 63
      • 7. References 66
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