1930年代 中國經濟恐慌의 進展過程 : 列强의 對中國貨幣戰을 中心으로 With Special Reference to Powers' Monetary War' aganist China = On the Chinese Financial Crisis in the Thirties

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Chinese financial crisis during the period or 1932-1935. Two aspects of the Chinese financial crisis deserve clarification: The characteristics of the crisis which occured in a semi-feudalistic and semi-colonial economy and its relation to Western Power's monetary war' against Chinese economy under silver standard.
The Great Depression of 1929 triggered a great shock wave through China which had been already integrated into world capitalist economy. In China the economic panic, however, had not begun until 1932 when the Great Depression hit the bottom. The fact that China began to be affected by the economic panic as much as 2 years later than most other capitalist countries can be accounted for by the fact that China was on silver-standard while advanced capitalist countries were gold-standard.
The price level of China under silver-standard was subject to both the fluctuations of silver prices in London and New York silver markets and the Price changes in the United States, England and Japan. During the period from 1929 to 1931 the silver prices fell more rapidly than the world-wide general price level. The silver price in New York market fell 40.8% whereas the wholesale price in the United States dropped 23.4%. And the silver price in London market fell 34.9%, whereas the wholesale price in England dropped 23.7%.
Thus, the price level of China, rose. The wholesale price index in Shanghai rose from 104 in 1929 to 126.7 in 1931. And the inflow of silver to China brought down the rate of interest. These enabled the indigenous commercial businesses and firms in harbor cities including Shanghai to enjoy abnormal and fictitious prosperity. The amount of bill taken by the banks in Shanghai, for example, rose from 47 million yuan(元) to 60 million yuan(元).
However, the rise of silver price which began from 1931, turned the tables. Silver price which had been falling since twenties began to rise from September 1931, when England abandoned the gold-standard and further rose due to silver policy of the United States in 1934. The silver price in London silver market rose from 14.59 pence per ounce in 1931 to 21.20 pence in 1934.
The rise of silver prices in the world markets resulted in the fall of the price level and worsening of the agricultural crisis in China, which led to industrial crisis. The wholesale price index in Shanghai fell from 112.4 in 1932 to 90.5 in July 1935. As rising silver price caused the overvaluation of China's foreign exchange, farm products export in 1932 fell to 63% of that in 1930. And farm products export in 1934 when Chinese financial crisis culminated, fell to 43% of that in 1930, The withering of rural markets caused the devastation of industries. Though there was difference between agricultural crisis and industrial one in that the former had its roots in the breakdown of agricultural production while the latter occurred against the background of prosperity of 1929-31, the two crises were interrelated through the medium of silver crisis.
And rising silver price resulted in the substantial outflow of silver, bringing about financial crisis and collapse of silver standard. The amount of silver outflow from China rose from 10 million yuan(元) in 1932 to 257 million yuan(元) in 1935. The amount of silver outflow in 1935 was 7.8% of silver stock and one third of the amount of currency in circulation. Thus most of the small and medium banks went banktrupt.
Nanking government responded to this crisis with the introduction of "legal tender system"(法幣制度) in 1935. The newly introduced monetary system can be said to be an improvement since it got rid of some disadvantages of the silver standard. The Nanking Government controlled the issue of banknotes and required banks to have adequate reserves in the form of silver bar, coin, or foreign exchange, usually up to two-thirds of the amount of banknotes in circulation.
After the monetary reform of 1935, Nanking government accelerated the issue of banknotes. The interest rates were cut down and the exchange rates was stabilized. The Chinese economy recovered from the chronic depression and showed signs of prosperity during the 1936∼37. But the monetary reform did not foster the development of Chinese capitalist economy. Through this process, the stage was set for the accumulation of the "bureaucratic capital"(官僚資本), a special form of monopoly capital in China.
Meanwhile Nanking Government, enraged by the silver policy of the U.S., depreciated purposely its currency vis-a-vis both dollar and yen. The U.S., finding herself in a disadvantageous position in trade and investment, concluded silver agreement with China in 1936. Nanking government took the occasion to announce the supplementary policies to the monetary reform and declared the independency of her monetary system. However, this "legal tender system"(法幣制度), designed by Sir Fredric Leith-Ross, chief economic adviser to British government, was destined to be influenced by the monetary policy of the United States.
On the basis of above analysis it can be con cluded the economic crisis China encountered during the period of 1932-35 represents neither a simple over-production panic nor a feudalistic economic crisis but a special from of panic which comprised an over-production in urban areas and under-production in rural areas and that the two different economic crises in urban and rural areas were interrelated and aggrevated by the silver crisis caused by the United States' massive purchase of silver, artificial rise of silver price, and accerlerated outflow of silver from China under silver standard,

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 序 言
• Ⅱ. 中國의 銀本位制와 世界恐慌
• Ⅲ. 中國의 金融恐慌과 美國의 銀政策
• Ⅳ. 中國의 恐慌對策과 列强의 動向
• Ⅴ. 結 言