금융실명법의 경제학적 분석: 게임이론의 응용 = Economic Analysis of Financial Customer Identification Act: Game Theory Applications

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구의 목적은 금융실명법상 식별 메커니즘을 게임이론에 기초하여 분석하고 정책적 시사점과 개선방안을 도출하는 데 있다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 신호발송게임이론(signaling game theory)을 이용하여 비등록식별 메커니즘과 등록식별 메커니즘의 법적 효과를 비교한다. 게임이론을 이용한 분석에 의하면, 비등록식별 메커니즘은 정보비대칭성(information asymmetry)에 의해 효율적인 식별이 제한될 수 있는 반면, 등록식별 메커니즘은 정보비대칭성 문제점을 효과적으로 완화하거나 해소하여 분리균형(separating equilibrium)을 실현하고 사회적 비용을 최소화하는 효율성을 달성한다. 만일 제도적 환경의 제약 등으로 인하여 비등록식별 메커니즘의 등록식별 메커니즘으로의 전환이 쉽지 않다면, 두 가지 정책적 개선의 검토가 필요하다. 첫째, 불법목적의 실소유자에 대한 적발확률을 충분히 높일 수 있는 제도적 방안이 모색되어야 한다. 둘째, 불법거래 동기를 가진 실소유자의 거래유인을 억제할 수 있는 적절한 수준의 제재가 이루어져야 한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This research analyzes financial customer identification mechanisms using signaling game theories and draws policy implications. Financial customer identification problem has been an important issue since in particular the launch of FATF (Financial Action Task Force) in 1989 for anti-money laundering & terrorism financing and related predicate offenses such as false identification of financial customers. Recently it becomes more important because of the development of financial instruments such as cryptocurrencies that inherently lacks the customers identification. FATF recommends registration-based identification for cryptocurrencies. Financial transactions with instruments lacking correct customer identification can hurt the Know-Your-Customer policy and market integrity, and put financial markets into illegality traps.
This research utilizes game theories such as Spence (1973), Cho and Kreps (1987), Stiglitz and Weiss (1990), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Che, Kim and Kojima (2015), Riley (2001), Sobel (2011).
The concept of separating equilibrium of game theory can give us useful intuition how to disconnect illegal transactions from sound transactions, and how to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of identification mechanisms.
This study classifies customer identification mechanisms into two forms: ‘non-registered identification mechanism’ (N-form) and ‘registered identification mechanism’ (R-form). N-form only requires to identify named customer, whereas R-form requires to identify both named customer and beneficial owner. Beneficial owner may be either G-type (good-type that never tries illegal transaction) or B-type (bad type that always tries illegality). Regulator’s monitoring level may be strong or weak. Because of the information asymmetry problem between regulator and beneficial owner about who beneficial owner is and whether he/she intends illegal transactions, N-form fails to reach at separating equilibrium. However, R-form could reach at separating equilibrium by removing the asymmetry problem, and achieve social efficiency of minimizing illegal transactions.
Example of N-form includes The Financial Customer Identification Act of 1993 of Korea, whereas that of R-form includes the Customer Identification Program (CIP) of Bank Secrecy Act of the U.S. and ‘the explicit mutual consent among named, beneficial customers and banks’ that was adjudged by the Korean Supreme Court Case of 2019: ADJ 2008-Da-45828. R-form is also supported by FATF, the U.K., Canada, Australia etc.
In R-form, signaling can be sharper if penalty scheme is arranged incentive-compatibly and proportionately to the illegality. Penalty scheme includes civil money penalty and/or criminal penalty, and the shift of burden of proof from regulator to the detected and presumed B-type beneficial owner who does not register.
In some situations, N-form may not readily transform to R-form because of institutional limitations. In order to minimize the drawbacks in the policy effectiveness of N-form, two policy variables should be reinforced. First, regulatory authority should increase the evidentiary detection probability of unregistered B-type even if it is a harder job in N-form than in R-form. Second, appropriate level of punitive penalty should be charged to disincentivize unlawful motivations by beneficial owners.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 김자봉, "금융실명제도의 비교법적 연구- 미국의 고객확인제도(CIP)와 우리나라의 실명확인제도/고객확인제도의 비교를 중심으로" 은행법학회 12 (12): 173-205, 2019

2 이상제, "금융실명제 국제적 정합성 제고를 위한 개선 방향 검토" 금융위원회 2016

3 The White House, "United States G-8 Action Plan for Transparency of Company Ownership and Control"

4 Stiglitz, J., "Sorting Out the Differences between Signaling and Screening Models" NBER 1990

5 Riley, J., "Silver Signals : Twenty-five Years of Screening and Signaling" 39 (39): 432-478, 2001

6 Cho, I. K., "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria" 102 : 179-221, 1987

7 Sobel, J., "Signaling Games"

8 International organization of securities commissions, "Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry"

9 Horner, J., "New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics" 3-4, 2006

10 Kubler, D., "Job Market Signaling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison" 2005

11 Spence, M., "Job Market Signaling" 87 (87): 355-374, 1973

12 Panyiotis, A., "How to Identify Beneficial Owners"

13 FinCEN, "Guidance on Obtaining and Retaining Beneficial Ownership Information"

14 Dixit, A., "Games of Strategy" Norton 2020

15 OCC, "Final CIP rule"

16 FATF, "FATF Guidance: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership"

17 Che, Y. K., "Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values" 58 : 54-86, 2015

18 Becker, G. S., "Economic Analysis of the Law" Blackwell Publishing 2003

19 "Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks" 68 (68): 2003

20 FinCEN, "Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions"

21 Patrick, B., "Contract Theory" MIT Press 2005

22 "Bank Secrecy Act of 1970"

23 Sobel, J., "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress" Cambridge University Press 305-341, 2013