韩美同盟外交困境探析： 以文在寅-特朗普政府为例 = Analysis on the Diplomatic Dilemma of the US-ROK Alliance: Take the Trump-Moon Jae-in administration as an example

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

本文运用自主-安全交易模型作为分析框架，结合连累抛弃模型和威胁均衡论等同盟理论，以对韩美同盟关系发展产生较大影响的朝核问题和同盟防卫费分担问题为切入点，对文在寅和特朗普政府治下的同盟外交所面临的困境进行了详细的探讨。通过分析比较，认为韩美两国各自调整在同盟中的自主比例，盟友间的利益重合幅度降低，韩美关系出现凝聚力弱化的问题。韩美调整同盟自主要求的背后动因是基于维护自国的利益，双方利益的不一致引发盟友间的冲突和博弈。但又因为利益的不一致，同盟体系不仅没有崩溃反而使其能够维持正常运行，同盟拥有较长的生命力。根本原因是因为韩美属于非对称同盟，同盟中力量弱小的一方依赖大国提供的安全保障。也就造成韩国不得不在自主问题上做出让步。而美国一方面在扩大同盟自主的同时无疑又增加了安全上的支付成本，当其不能满足支付要求时则又会引起盟友的不满。本文认为，在非对称同盟体系下，盟友间的自主-安全交易很难达到完全的均衡。因此，围绕自主-安全的均衡盟友间的冲突和博弈始终贯穿同盟政治互动过程的本身。

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper uses the Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model as the analytical framework, combining the Entrapment-Abandonment Dilemma and Balance of Threat theory and so on, starts with the North Korean nuclear issue and the issue of the defense cost sharing of the alliance which have had a significant impact on the development of the US-ROK alliance, and makes a detailed exploration on the diplomatic dilemma faced by the alliance under the governance of the Trump and Moon Jae-in administrations. Through analysis and comparison: It is believed that the United States and South Korea adjust their respective autonomous proportions in the alliance, therefore, the overlap of interests between allies has decreased, and the cohesion of the relationship between the United States and South Korea has weakened. The motivation behind the U.S. and South Korea's requirements for adjusting the alliance’s autonomy is to safeguard their own interests, and the inconsistency of the interests of the two parties triggers conflicts and games among allies. However, because of the inconsistency of interests, the alliance system not only did not collapse, but enabled itself to maintain normal operations, and gave it a longer vitality. The fundamental reason is that the United States and South Korea belong to an asymmetric alliance. The weaker side of the alliance depends on the security provided by the stronger one. This also resulted in South Korea having to make concessions on the issue of autonomy. The United States will undoubtedly increase its security payment costs while expanding its autonomy in the alliance. When it cannot meet the payment requirements, the United States will cause dissatisfaction among its allies. This paper argues that: Under the asymmetric alliance system, autonomy-security trade-off between allies cannot achieve a complete equilibrium. Therefore, the conflicts and games between allies around the balance of autonomy and security always run through the political interaction process of the alliance itself.