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      공정거래법상 국제적 M&A에 대한 역외적 관할권 - 비교법적 고찰을 포함하여 - = Jurisdictional Issues of extraterritorial M&A regulation under Korean competition law

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Setting notification thresholds for merger review aims at determining the desirable number of notifications and then jurisdictional boundaries of merger control. It has of great importance above all in case of multi-jurisdictional merger. How to delineate jurisdictional limit of national merger control relates to its effective enforcement and possibility of sovereignty impairment. The Korea Anti-Monopoly and Fair Trade Act(hereafter “the Act”) provides with “effects doctrine” as a general principle of any possible extraterritorial application(Article 2-2 of the Act). For this purpose, the domestic effects must be direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable. As for merger control, the Act sets separately certain notification thresholds focusing on domestic revenues of 20 billion Won held by each foreign participants, which shoule be interpreted to specify the principle of domestic effects provided in Article 2-2. Therefore the notification thresholds are overlapping with the reviewing jurisdiction of the Korea Fair Trade Commission(hereafter “the KFTC”). The KFTC, however, tried to review and impose remedy on some extraterritorial merger whose participants had no or just a small size of domestic turnover in Korea without considering an obligatory notification. Such practices seem to reflect the misunderstanding of the KFTC about the purpose and role of the notification thresholds. The tight linking between pre-merger notification and review procedure is likely to enhance legal certainty and foreseeability and to possibly avoid jurisdictional conflicts. Comparative analysis shows the common stance that foreign-to-foreign mergers not subject to obligatory notification cannot be reviewed ex officio by any competition authorities. In this context, it is suggested that the KFTC should refrain from ungrounded activism and, if necessary, present rationale sufficient for extraterritorial application of merger control in official decisions.
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      Setting notification thresholds for merger review aims at determining the desirable number of notifications and then jurisdictional boundaries of merger control. It has of great importance above all in case of multi-jurisdictional merger. How to delin...

      Setting notification thresholds for merger review aims at determining the desirable number of notifications and then jurisdictional boundaries of merger control. It has of great importance above all in case of multi-jurisdictional merger. How to delineate jurisdictional limit of national merger control relates to its effective enforcement and possibility of sovereignty impairment. The Korea Anti-Monopoly and Fair Trade Act(hereafter “the Act”) provides with “effects doctrine” as a general principle of any possible extraterritorial application(Article 2-2 of the Act). For this purpose, the domestic effects must be direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable. As for merger control, the Act sets separately certain notification thresholds focusing on domestic revenues of 20 billion Won held by each foreign participants, which shoule be interpreted to specify the principle of domestic effects provided in Article 2-2. Therefore the notification thresholds are overlapping with the reviewing jurisdiction of the Korea Fair Trade Commission(hereafter “the KFTC”). The KFTC, however, tried to review and impose remedy on some extraterritorial merger whose participants had no or just a small size of domestic turnover in Korea without considering an obligatory notification. Such practices seem to reflect the misunderstanding of the KFTC about the purpose and role of the notification thresholds. The tight linking between pre-merger notification and review procedure is likely to enhance legal certainty and foreseeability and to possibly avoid jurisdictional conflicts. Comparative analysis shows the common stance that foreign-to-foreign mergers not subject to obligatory notification cannot be reviewed ex officio by any competition authorities. In this context, it is suggested that the KFTC should refrain from ungrounded activism and, if necessary, present rationale sufficient for extraterritorial application of merger control in official decisions.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 이봉의, "독점규제법의 역외적용" 4 : 1992

      2 Mestmäcker, "Wettbewerbsrecht GWB"

      3 Immenga, "Wettbewerbsrecht EG/ Teil 2"

      4 Rittner, "Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht" 2014

      5 European Commission, "Towards more effective EU merger control" COM 2014

      6 ICN, "Setting Notification Thresholds For Merger Review" 2008

      7 신상훈, "M&A에 대한 각국의 기업결한 신고 및 심사제도와 사례" 국제거래법학회 20 (20): 1-25, 2011

      8 Simon, "Kartellrecht Bd.1 Europäisches Recht" 2005

      9 Kling, "Kartellrecht" 2016

      10 OECD, "Investigations of Consummated and Non-reportable Mergers, Submission of United States to the OECD Working Party No.3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, at 4 (Feb. 05, 2014)"

      1 이봉의, "독점규제법의 역외적용" 4 : 1992

      2 Mestmäcker, "Wettbewerbsrecht GWB"

      3 Immenga, "Wettbewerbsrecht EG/ Teil 2"

      4 Rittner, "Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht" 2014

      5 European Commission, "Towards more effective EU merger control" COM 2014

      6 ICN, "Setting Notification Thresholds For Merger Review" 2008

      7 신상훈, "M&A에 대한 각국의 기업결한 신고 및 심사제도와 사례" 국제거래법학회 20 (20): 1-25, 2011

      8 Simon, "Kartellrecht Bd.1 Europäisches Recht" 2005

      9 Kling, "Kartellrecht" 2016

      10 OECD, "Investigations of Consummated and Non-reportable Mergers, Submission of United States to the OECD Working Party No.3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, at 4 (Feb. 05, 2014)"

      11 Wagemann, "Handbuch des Kartellrechts"

      12 이중배, "HSR법상 합병신고의무가 없는 M&A가 ‘프리패스’일까?" (185) : 2016

      13 BKartA, "Guidance on domestic effects in merger control"

      14 "ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Mergers and Acquisitions- Undertanding the Antitrust Issues"

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      학술지 이력

      학술지 이력
      연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
      2022 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
      2019-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2016-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2012-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
      2011-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
      2009-01-01 평가 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
      2008-01-01 평가 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
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      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.86 0.86 0.93
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.87 0.86 0.981 0.86
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