[특집] “극동의 영국”으로 변해 가는 일본

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The on-going Japan and the U.S. strategic security dialogues in the past nine months are remarkable events that are bearing fruits. A careful preparation began in early spring of 2000 in Washington. The bipartisan American team was created co-chaired by Ambassador Richard Armitage and Professor Joseph Nye. The outcome was issued in October of 2000 before the presidential election took place. After January of 2001, many co-authors of the report including Deputy Secretary of State Armitage joined with the Bush administration and assumed significant posts. The Bush's security policy toward Japan has been clearly stated in the report, which we now call the “Armitage Report”. Of course, the “Armitage Report”, a private policy recommendation, has never officially been endorsed by the Bush administration, but security experts consider it a de-facto and straight statement of the American will and strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The “Armitage Report” stimulated the Japanese security community when it was made public. LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), under then-PM Yoshiro Mori, launched within the National Defense Division of the Policy Research Council a series of study sessions to investigate and formulate a response to the report. By March, the official LDP response to the “Armitage Report” was made public. This response was titled, “Establishing the Security Policy of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance” and to be brief, called the “Response to Armitage Report”. The report was officially endorsed by LDP the ruling party of Japan. In April, PM Junichiro Koizumi took office and his security policy has been in line with the party's policy platform. The LDP's study groups have been dominating security policy formation in Japan as the opposition parties lack experience, staff and influence. Particularly in the security area, the thrust of the “Armitage Report” is expressed as follows. “We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance [between the U.S. and Japan]”. The report states “Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner”. This arrangement requires the following elements, according to the Report. 1) Reaffirming the defense commitment. The U.S. should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku islands. 2) Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S. -Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. 3) Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness. (...) They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity (...) peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. 4) Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. (...) We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. The LDP's report echoed as the following. “[T]his report has identified, as one of the challenges to promoting wide-ranging global security cooperation in the future and to strengthening our bilateral cooperation, Japanese domestic legal matters including the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense derived from the Japanese Constitution. This report has referred to specific measures to address this challenge”. The paper examines nature of strategic security dialogues initiated by the “Armitage Report” which was responded to by the LDP's report. It touches upon three key issues of 1) the right of collective self-defense, 2) emergency laws making, and, 3) missile defense. Prime Minister Koizu

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 일본과 미국
• Ⅲ. 일ㆍ미동맹의 위기예방적 측면
• Ⅳ. 역내 안정자로서 일ㆍ미동맹
• Ⅴ. 부시 대통령의 취임사
• Ⅵ. 다시 언급되는 “세력의 균형”
• Ⅶ. “아미티지 보고서”: 최종목표가 아닌 최초 출발점
• Ⅷ. 미국의 일관성
• Ⅸ. 일ㆍ미관계의 르네상스를 위하여
• Ⅹ. 일본 내부상황의 진전
• ⅩⅠ. 아미티지 보고서에 대한 자민당의 답변
• ⅩⅡ. 동등한 관계의 동맹을 향하여
• ⅩⅢ. 고이즈미, 집단적 자위권행사 문제를 제기
• ⅩⅣ. 그 외의 선택은?
• ⅩⅤ. 유사법제 마련의 작전적 시각
• ⅩⅥ. 자민당 보고서와 유사법제
• ⅩⅦ. 자민당의 집단적 자위권에 대한 반응
• ⅩⅧ. 1998-2000년, 미사일방어(MD)
• ⅩⅨ. 부시대통령의 5월 1일 연설과 일본의 반응
• ⅩⅩ. 미국의 신방어전략의 의미
• ⅩⅩⅠ. “일ㆍ미방어전략협의회”를 반드시 창설해야
• ⅩⅩⅡ. 결론