The assumptions underlying rationales for bank capital regulation are not compatible with the governance and risk profiles of cooperative financial institutions. In case of German cooperative banks subject to both the Cooperative Act and the Banking A...
The assumptions underlying rationales for bank capital regulation are not compatible with the governance and risk profiles of cooperative financial institutions. In case of German cooperative banks subject to both the Cooperative Act and the Banking Act, the Cooperative Act has been revised to make it easier for cooperative banks to meet the regulatory and operational capital needs, and as a result their organizational structures and operational methods have been changed. The German Banking Act, however, still reflects the cooperative characteristics of cooperative banks in the definition and composition of capital. The US credit unions which have been organized and operated under Credit Union Acts are not subject to the Basel Capital Accord. The bank-style PCA system was introduced in the late 1990, but the PCA model for credit unions differentiates capital regulations of credit unions based on their size and operational characteristics. German and US cases illustrate the need for timely response to changing circumstances and the appropriate consideration of cooperative characteristics in capital regulation.